Vanegas v. City of Pasadena

• Decision Date: 31 August 2022
• Docket Number: 21-55478
• Parties: Javier VANEGAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF PASADENA ; City of Pasadena Police Department; Klotz, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; Arellanes, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; Stark, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; Riehl, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; Murren, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; Lemos, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; Salazar, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; Bundy, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; Does, 1–10, individually, and in their capacity as Police officers for Pasadena Police Department, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

46 F.4th 1159

Javier VANEGAS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.CITY OF PASADENA ; City of Pasadena Police Department; Klotz, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; Arellanes, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; Stark, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; Riehl, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; Murren, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; Lemos, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; Salazar, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; Bundy, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; Does, 1–10, individually, and in their capacity as Police officers for Pasadena Police Department, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 21-55478

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted March 2, 2022 Pasadena, California

Filed August 31, 2022

Krista R. Hemming (argued), The Hemming Firm, San Pedro, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Arnold F. Lee (argued), Assistant City Attorney; Michele Beal Bagneris, City Attorney; Office of the City Attorney, Pasadena, California; for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: Daniel A. Bress and Patrick J. Bumatay, Circuit Judges, and Roger T. Benitez,^* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Bumatay ;

Concurrence by Judge Bumatay ;

Concurrence by Judge Bress ;

Concurrence by Judge Benitez

BUMATAY, Circuit Judge:

At issue in this civil rights lawsuit is whether police officers had probable cause to arrest Javier Vanegas either for reports that he followed and harassed an attorney outside a courthouse or for his refusal to identify himself during an investigatory stop. The district court found that officers had probable cause for both crimes. We hold that Vanegas's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim fails, and we affirm.

I.Background

This lawsuit stems from events immediately following Vanegas's 2019 divorce proceedings at the Superior Courthouse in Pasadena, California. Vanegas appeared at the family court hearing, along with his ex-wife, Sandra Kerguelen, and her attorney, Karen Suri. According to Suri, Vanegas raised his voice and yelled at Suri and the judge during the hearing. As a result, the judge admonished Vanegas to control himself or face sanctions. After the hearing, Suri asked a court bailiff to help her and Kerguelen leave without Vanegas following them. The bailiff stood in front of Vanegas, blocking the way so that Suri and Kerguelen could exit.

After Suri and Kerguelen left the courthouse, Vanegas followed them. Vanegas started yelling aggressively at Suri. Suri and Kerguelen tried to walk away, but Vanegas continued to follow while calling Suri a "scumbag" and "liar." Vanegas eventually came within arm's reach of Suri. Feeling threatened, Suri told Vanegas that she would call the police. But he still didn't leave. Suri then dialed 911. Suri told the operator that there was a man following her, yelling at her on the street, and that she was afraid and needed help.

At that point, Suri saw a Pasadena Police Department Community Service Officer and flagged him down. Suri told the officer that Vanegas was following her and that she did not feel safe. The officer asked Suri to walk to the police station across the street to file a report. Suri and Kerguelen did so.

Pasadena Police Officer Philip Klotz was at the courthouse on other business. While there, he heard an alert over the police radio about a 911 caller being followed outside the courthouse. So Officer Klotz exited the Courthouse and headed toward the southeast corner of Garfield Avenue and Walnut Street. As he walked to the intersection, Officer Klotz received an update, advising that the suspect, named "Javier Vanegas," was walking northbound on Garfield Avenue. After Officer Klotz reached the intersection, he observed only one man, later identified as Vanegas, heading north on Garfield Avenue.

Officer Klotz asked Vanegas whether his name was "Javier." Vanegas responded by asking Officer Klotz who he was. Officer Klotz identified himself as a law enforcement officer and asked Vanegas for his identification. Despite at least three requests for identification, Vanegas did not comply and instead took out his cell phone to record the interaction. Officer Klotz then gave Vanegas the option of either producing his identification or being placed in handcuffs. Vanegas still refused to identify himself.

After several other officers arrived, Officer Klotz placed Vanegas in handcuffs for officer safety. Afterward, Officer Klotz received a radio call that Vanegas violated California Penal Code § 415 —a disturbing-the-peace ordinance. Officer Klotz asked other officers to have Suri identify Vanegas. Officer Klotz received confirmation over the radio that Suri positively identified Vanegas as the person who was following her.

While other officers remained with Vanegas, Officer Klotz walked across the street to speak with Suri. Officer Klotz saw Suri almost crying and visibly shaking. Suri relayed that Vanegas began following her and Kerguelen after the family court hearing. After interviewing Suri, Officer Klotz walked back to Vanegas and advised him that he was under arrest. The officers then took Vanegas to the Pasadena police station for booking. Vanegas was eventually released with a citation for violating California Penal Code § 148(a)(1), which punishes obstructing a peace officer. The Office of the City Attorney for Pasadena declined to pursue charges and Vanegas was never convicted of any offense stemming from his arrest.

A few months later, Vanegas sued the police officers involved and the City of Pasadena alleging, among other claims, violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The officers and the City moved for summary judgment. In granting summary judgment, the district court ruled that probable cause existed to arrest Vanegas under California Penal Code §§ 148(a)(1) and 415(2) and so there was no Fourth Amendment violation. The court also held that Vanegas did not establish Monell liability against the City. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

Vanegas appeals the dismissal of his § 1983 claim. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Branch Banking & Tr. Co. v. D.M.S.I., LLC , 871 F.3d 751, 759 (9th Cir. 2017). We first address Vanegas's claim against the officers and then turn to his claim against the City. As to both claims, we affirm.

II. § 1983 Claim Against the Officers

To prevail under § 1983, Vanegas must show that (1) Pasadena police officers "violated a federal statutory or constitutional right" and (2) "the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time." District of Columbia v. Wesby , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018) (simplified). So the inquiry is two-fold. Did the officers violate Vanegas's constitutional rights? And if so, were those rights clearly established at the time?

On the first question, Vanegas's challenge implicates the Fourth Amendment since he claims he was unlawfully "seized." In the context of a § 1983 action, a Fourth Amendment violation occurs when a person is arrested "without probable cause or other justification." Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty. , 693 F.3d 896, 918 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (simplified). Probable cause to arrest exists when there is a "fair probability or substantial chance of criminal activity" by the arrestee based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time of arrest. Id. (simplified). This "is not a high bar." Kaley v. United States , 571 U.S. 320, 338, 134 S.Ct. 1090, 188 L.Ed.2d 46 (2014).

On the second question, even with a constitutional violation, officers may still receive qualified immunity if the unlawfulness of their conduct was not "clearly established" at the time of arrest. By "clearly established," we mean that the "contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Acosta v. City of Costa Mesa , 718 F.3d 800, 824 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (simplified). In other words, "existing law must have placed the constitutionality of the officer's conduct beyond debate." Wesby , 138 S. Ct. at 589 (simplified). And we only look to "controlling authority" or "a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority" to determine settled law. Id. at 589–90 (simplified).

While Vanegas asserts he was unlawfully arrested, the officers maintain that they had probable cause to arrest him on two grounds: (1) disturbing the peace under California Penal Code § 415(2) ; and (2) obstructing an officer under California Penal Code § 148(a)(1). And even if no probable cause existed under state law, they contend they are still entitled to qualified immunity given there was no violation of clearly established law. We look at each basis for arrest in turn.

A.

California Penal Code § 415(2)

California Penal Code § 415(2) punishes "[a]ny person who maliciously and willfully disturbs another person by loud and unreasonable noise." "Maliciously" means a wish to "vex, annoy, or injure another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law." Cal. Penal Code § 7(4). "Willfully" means "a purpose or willingness to commit the act." Id. § 7(1). To comply with the First Amendment, California courts have construed § 415(2) to prohibit loud noises in only two circumstances: (1) "where there is a clear and present danger of imminent violence," or (2) "where the purported communication is used as a guise to disrupt lawful endeavors." In re Brown , 9 Cal.3d 612, 108 Cal.Rptr. 465, 510 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Cal. 1973). So the ordinance only criminalizes loud noise "designed to disrupt rather than...