Vanelli v. Reynolds School Dist. No. 7

• Decision Date: 21 January 1982
• Docket Number: 79-4205,Nos. 79-4172,s. 79-4172
• Citation: 667 F.2d 773
• Parties: 2 Ed. Law Rep. 366 George E. VANELLI, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. REYNOLDS SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 7, et al., Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 773

667 F.2d 773

2 Ed. Law Rep. 366

George E. VANELLI, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. REYNOLDS SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 7, et al Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

Nos. 79-4172, 79-4205.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Jan. 8, 1981.

Decided Jan. 21, 1982.

Mitchell E. Roth, Washington, D. C., argued, for Vanelli; R. Lawrence Dessem, Washington, D. C., on brief.

W. A. Masters, Jones, Lang, Kelin, Wolf & Smith, Portland, Or., for Reynolds.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.

Before CHOY, KENNEDY and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges.

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge:

In this case we examine again the procedural protections afforded by the due process clause when a public employee is dismissed. Appellant, a high school teacher, was dismissed at the midpoint of a one-year contract. The board dismissed him without a pre-termination hearing but did conduct a full evidentiary hearing one month later. It affirmed its earlier decision to terminate.

Appellant brought this section 1983 action against the district and board members, alleging that both liberty and property interests were damaged because the evidentiary hearing was insufficient and because a pre-termination hearing was also necessary. The district court found that permanent dismissal could be sustained because the evidentiary hearing was adequate, but assessed relatively minor damages for failure to hold a pre-termination hearing. In this court, the appellant employee insists that the subsequent hearing was insufficient to sustain the dismissal. The district cross-appeals, contending that no property or liberty interest was implicated at all.

We agree with the district court that the post-termination hearing can support the permanent dismissal but that some damages are proper for failure to hold a pre-termination hearing. We remand on this latter point, finding it was error to award damages for the deprivation of a property interest in view of the validity of the subsequent dismissal but concluding further that some damages may be appropriate for injury to a liberty interest from the failure to hold a pre-termination hearing.

Appellant, George Vanelli, was hired by the school district to teach sophomore English at Reynolds High School during the 1975-76 school year under a probationary contract which ran for one academic year, and which reserved the school board's right to discharge the teacher "for any cause deemed in good faith sufficient by the Board." Or.Rev.Stat. § 342.835. Midway through the year, some female students complained of offensive conduct by Vanelli. An assistant principal called him to discuss the matter and when Vanelli arrived he was given a letter notifying him of suspension. ¹ The meeting lasted a few minutes and Vanelli did not attempt to present his side of the case, though he did request to appear at the school board meeting on March 11, 1976, to respond to the charges leveled against him. He was told not to attend and that he would be given an opportunity to respond at a later date. Vanelli made no attempt to present a written rebuttal to the board, apparently because he was under the reasonable impression the board would not consider it.

The school board met for approximately 45 minutes on Sunday, March 11, and, after the school administrators had presented the case against Vanelli, the board voted to terminate his contract without giving him an opportunity to respond to the charges either in person or in writing. Another school board meeting was scheduled for April 7, 1976, to review the termination decision. At that hearing, Vanelli was represented by an attorney and was permitted to cross-examine the witnesses, all of whom testified under oath. Four of the five girls who filed the complaints were present (the fifth was ill), and the hearing was tape recorded.

Despite certain objections to the procedures at the hearing, the board upheld the earlier dismissal. ² Soon thereafter, Vanelli sought employment at other high schools, but found difficulty in securing a permanent position due to the circumstances surrounding his dismissal from Reynolds.

The fourteenth amendment's guarantee of procedural due process applies when a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest is at stake. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). An interest in property arises only when there is a legitimate claim of entitlement, rather than an abstract need or desire for the particular benefit. Id. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709. It is well established that an employee dismissed during the term of a one-year contract and in breach of its provisions has a legitimate claim of entitlement and a property interest in continued employment. ³ Under Oregon law, moreover, that interest is not eliminated by a baseless termination even though a probationary teacher's contract specifically provides for midyear dismissals "for cause" pursuant to Or.Rev.Stat. § 342.835. ⁴ Accordingly, we hold appellant's midyear dismissal implicated a property interest protectible under the due process clause.

Appellant's interest in liberty is similarly implicated if a charge impairs his reputation for honesty or morality. ⁵ The procedural protections of due process apply if the accuracy of the charge is contested, there is some public disclosure of the charge, and it is made in connection with the termination of employment or the alteration of some right or status recognized by state law. ⁶ Under these principles, appellant's midyear dismissal implicated a protectible liberty interest. ⁷

We must decide next whether the timing and procedures of the hearing provided by the school district adequately protected appellant's property and liberty interests. We are met at the outset with the school district's contention that a post-termination hearing is sufficient compliance with the due process clause. Under the circumstances of this case, however, we cannot agree.

There is a strong presumption that a public employee is entitled to some form of notice and opportunity to be heard before being deprived of a property or liberty interest. ⁸ Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-75, 95 S.Ct. 729, 736, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1018, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Endicott v. Huddleston, 644 F.2d 1208, 1216 (7th Cir. 1980); Old Dominion Dairy Prods., Inc. v. Secretary of Defense, 631 F.2d 953, 968 (D.C.Cir.1980). See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 678-79, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1416, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977). Apart from this general presumption, a court should analyze whether the timing of a hearing comports with due process, given the exigencies and circumstances of any particular case, according to the three part balancing test outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361, 367 (9th Cir. 1976); see Peacock v. Board of Regents, 510 F.2d 1324, 1328 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1049, 95 S.Ct. 2668, 45 L.Ed.2d 701 (1975). The factors to consider include the private interest that will be affected, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, and the fiscal and administrative burdens that any additional procedural requirements would entail. Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903.

Application of this balancing test necessarily compels our determination that under these circumstances a pre-termination hearing is constitutionally required. The weight of the private interest affected is apparent. Teaching had been Vanelli's livelihood for over sixteen years, and the stigma arising from a midyear dismissal on the grounds here asserted would seriously impair opportunities for future employment. The interest of the school district in dismissing, rather than merely suspending, Vanelli without affording him a hearing is less clear. The lower court found no emergency situation requiring immediate dismissal, and on this record we cannot say the finding was clearly erroneous. ⁹ The risk of an erroneous deprivation was substantial, since appellant was dismissed without an opportunity to confront the evidence and was denied the opportunity to respond to the charges at the school board meeting. The administrative burdens of permitting appellant to appear at the March 11 school board meeting and rebut the charges made against him or present a written rebuttal were minimal. In denying appellant's request to attend the March 11 meeting and thereby proceeding to dismiss him without any opportunity to be heard in person or in writing, the board deprived him of property and liberty interests without due process.

Appellant characterizes the April 7 hearing as a mere review of the March 11 termination decision and, accordingly, claims his right to a de novo trial was violated. ¹⁰ Under the circumstances of this case, however, we cannot agree that the April 7 hearing was unconstitutionally infirm because of the board's participation in the prior termination decision. Irrespective of whether the April 7 hearing is labeled a review of a prior hearing or a de novo hearing, the critical inquiry is whether it comported with due process. The key component of due process, when a decisionmaker is acquainted with the facts, is the assurance of a central fairness at the hearing. See Withrow, supra, 421 U.S. at 46, 95 S.Ct. at 1463; Vance v. Chester County Bd. of School Trustees, 504 F.2d 820, 826 (4th Cir. 1974). Essential fairness is a flexible notion, but at a minimum one must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). An individual must have an opportunity to confront all the evidence adduced against him, in particular that evidence with which the decisionmaker is familiar.

The ...