Vanmeter v. W. Va. Dept. of Motor Vehicles

• Decision Date: 27 January 1984
• Docket Number: No. 16105,16105
• Citation: 313 S.E.2d 405,173 W.Va. 129
• Parties: John E. VANMETER, et al. v. W. VA. DEPT. OF MOTOR VEHICLES, et al.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

Page 405

313 S.E.2d 405

173 W.Va. 129

John E. VANMETER, et al. v. W. VA. DEPT. OF MOTOR VEHICLES, et al.

No. 16105.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Jan. 27, 1984.

Dissenting Opinion March 5, 1984.

Syllabus by the Court

"A writ of mandamus will not issue unless three elements coexist--(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the relief sought; (2) a legal duty on the part of the respondent to do the thing which the petitioner seeks to compel; and (3) the absence of another adequate remedy." Syl. Pt. 2 of McGrady v. Callaghan, W.Va., 244 S.E.2d 793 (1978)

Staggers, Staggers & Webb and David Webb, Keyser, for petitioners.

Chauncey H. Browning, Atty. Gen. and Gregory W. Bailey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Charleston, for respondents.

NEELY, Justice.

This is an original mandamus proceeding. Petitioners seek to compel the respondent, the West Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), to return to them fees of twenty-five dollars ($25) which petitioners believe were improperly charged by respondent for the return of registration plates. Because we believe that respondent acted properly and within the statutory guidelines, we deny petitioners' writ.

The West Virginia Legislature has adopted a law that requires every owner or registrant of a motor vehicle licensed in this state to maintain security against legal liability during the registration period for each vehicle. W.Va.Code 17D-2A-1 [1981]. The petitioners had complied with that legal requirement for some time. However, because the rates imposed by their insurance carrier had risen substantially, they sought and obtained insurance with new companies. When their former insurers informed the DMV that petitioners were no longer insured, as they were required to do by W.Va.Code 17D-2A-5(a) [1982], the DMV sent notices of pending suspension to petitioners by certified mail as required by W.Va.Code 17D-2A-5(b) [1982].

The letters told petitioners that they were required to submit a new certificate of insurance within twenty days or the registrations of their vehicles would be suspended and they would be required to pay a ten dollar ($10) reinstatement fee. The notice went on to inform petitioners of their right to an administrative hearing and stated that on receipt of a written request for such a hearing within ten days of the receipt of the Order of Suspension, they would not have to return their West Virginia license plates unless the results of that hearing were unfavorable to them. Finally, the notice informed petitioners that if they failed to request a hearing or submit a certificate of insurance, the license plates would have to be returned before the date of suspension. Failure to comply with this aspect of the notice would lead to an order being filed with the state police to secure the license plates from petitioners and would also result in an additional fifteen dollar ($15) punitive fine. This final section was in accordance with W.Va.Code 17A-9-7 [1981].

Although petitioners had obtained new insurance on their vehicles, they failed to comply with the notice by either sending respondent a new certificate of insurance or requesting the hearing at which they could prove the continuation of their coverage with another insurer. Furthermore, they did not return their license plates as required. Accordingly, they were assessed the statutory fee and fine.

Petitioners argue that the purpose of the relevant statute was to remove uninsured motorists from the highways and not to place obstacles in the way of individuals who seek to change insurance carriers. We agree. Nevertheless, the means chosen by the legislature to advance this goal requires individuals to furnish the DMV with evidence of their continued coverage if they choose to change insurers. After all, there must be some policing mechanism to make sure that the legislative goal of universal automobile insurance becomes a reality. The means chosen does not seem unduly burdensome. Individuals who change insurers have options about how to inform the DMV of their continued coverage and adequate time in which to do so. If petitioners find this system unsatisfactory, their complaint should be taken up with the legislature. This is not a proper case for the issuance of a mandamus order.

We do not wish to appear overly callous in this case; certainly we recognize that government paperwork requirements are burdensome for everyone, but particularly for those who have little business or legal experience. In this case, however, the equities lie with the DMV. Petitioners were sent a clear letter written in plain English which outlined their available options. ¹ The letter was sent by certified mail to assure that petitioners received it. It was signed by an individual and contained a phone number which petitioners could have called if they had any questions. Petitioners had insurance agents who were familiar with this process and whom they could have contacted for assistance. In fact those agents did act on their behalf, albeit in an untimely manner.

The petitioners' decision to ignore the DMV's clear directive imposed real costs on the DMV. After all, the government must have some cost-efficient means of assuring that citizens are carrying automobile insurance. If the DMV tracked down each individual's insurer on its own, the cost to the public would be substantial. Although it may seem draconian to send out police officers to remove plates, in reality the fact that police were required to perform this function because petitioners ignored their legal responsibilities does not redound in favor of petitioners. It was their irresponsibility which required the police to expend valuable time on this matter.

It is settled law in West Virginia that a "A writ of mandamus will not issue unless three elements coexist--(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the relief sought; (2) a legal duty on the part of the respondent to do the thing which the petitioner seeks to compel: and (3) the absence of another adequate remedy." Syl. Pt. 2, McGrady v. Callaghan, W.Va., 244 S.E.2d 793. Neither the first nor second element of this test exists in the present case. Petitioners have no clear legal right because their injury flows solely from their own failure to respond to adequate and clear notice of their legal responsibilities. Respondent has no legal duty to refund the fines because she acted in full compliance with her statutory responsibilities.

Accordingly, for the reasons given above, we decline to award the writ.

McGRAW, Justice, dissenting:

In 1981, the West Virginia Legislature enacted West Virginia Code §§ 17D-2A-1 to -9 (1983 Supp.), the Security Upon Motor Vehicles Act, 1981 W.Va.Acts ch. 157. Its stated purpose is "to promote the public welfare by requiring every owner or registrant of a motor vehicle licensed in this State to maintain certain security during the registration period for such vehicle."

As this Court stated in Dickey v. Smith, 42 W.Va. 805, 809, 26 S.E. 373, 375 (1896):

It is a fundamental principal of law that "whenever a statute is capable of two constructions, one of which would work manifest injustice, and the other would work no injustice, it is the duty of the court to adopt the latter, as it can scarcely be presumed that an injustice was in the legislative intent." Am. & Eng.Enc.Law, 23, 361.

See also Meadows v. Lewis, 307 S.E.2d 625, 642 (W.Va.1983); State ex rel. Simpkins v. Harvey, 305 S.E.2d 268, 277 (W.Va.1983); Richardson v. State Compensation Commissioner, 137 W.Va. 819, 824, 74 S.E.2d 258, 261 (1953); State ex rel. McLaughlin v. Morris, 128 W.Va. 456, 461, 37 S.E.2d 85, 88 (1946); Syl. pt. 2, Newhart v. Pennybacker, 120 W.Va. 774, 200 S.E. 350 (1939); Syl. pt. 2, Click v. Click, 98 W.Va. 419, 127 S.E. 194 (1925); Syl. pt. 2, Parsons v. Roane County Court, 92 W.Va. 490, 115 S.E. 473 (1922); Syl. pt. 1, Rider v. Braxton County Court, 74 W.Va. 712, 82 S.E. 1083 (1914); Syl. pt. 2, Hasson v. City of Chester, 67 W.Va. 278, 67 S.E. 731 (1910).

Similarly, in Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, 61 W.Va. 367, 56 S.E. 518 (1907), this Court stated:

A statute is to be interpreted in the light of the nature of its subject matter, the purpose of the legislature in passing it, and the conditions and circumstances under which the law making body must have known it would operate; and, upon these conditions, it will not be so interpreted as to make it impose unreasonable burdens, greatly disproportionate to the resultant public benefit, unless its terms are so explicit and positive as to preclude any other construction.

See also Syl. pt. 5, Pond Creek Pocahontas Co. v. Alexander, 137 W.Va. 864, 74 S.E.2d 590 (1953).

The majority ignores both of these well settled rules of statutory construction, as well as the avowed intent of the Legislature, in holding that motorists who have their plates seized despite having insurance may not recover fees charged for the return of those plates.

The purpose of the statute in question is clear, it is to keep uninsured motorists...