Vanoski v. Thomson
| Decision Date | 16 June 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 16501,16501 |
| Citation | 114 Idaho 381,757 P.2d 244 |
| Parties | Kenneth VANOSKI and Penelope J. Hieb, formerly known as Penelope J. Vanoski, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Betty J. THOMSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
The Court's prior opinion, dated February 3, 1988, is hereby withdrawn.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court holding a debtor liable on a promissory note. We are presented with two questions: whether the district court erred in admitting parol evidence of the intent of the parties to a transaction releasing a security for the debt; and whether the obligees on the note were estopped from seeking to collect the debt by virtue of having signed documents purporting not only to release the underlying security but also to discharge the debt itself. The district court, sitting without a jury, determined that, despite recitals to the contrary, the debt was not discharged. For reasons explained below, we affirm the judgment.
The underlying facts may be stated briefly. In 1977 Betty and Ronald Thomson and James Christie contracted with Kenneth and Penelope Vanoski to purchase the Vanoskis' shares of stock in an Idaho corporation operating a business in Boise. Payments for the stock were to be made in ten fixed annual installments. When the balance was paid in full, the Thomsons and Christie would own all of the stock in the corporation. The Thomsons and Christie executed a promissory note. The obligation was secured, in part, by a deed of trust on the Thomson residence. It named the Vanoskis as the beneficiaries.
Ronald Thomson died in 1979. On May 8, 1980, Betty Thomson sold her interest in the corporation to Christie. Twenty days later, the Vanoskis gratuitously reconveyed to Betty Thomson the property pledged as security for the promissory note. The deed of reconveyance read, in pertinent part:
WHEREAS, the undersigned, ARKAD, INC., an Idaho corporation, as trustee under the trust deed dated the 18th day of January, 1978, executed by Ronald E. Thomson and Betty J. Thomson, grantors, in which KENNETH VANOSKI and PENELOPE J. VANOSKI are named as beneficiaries, and the undersigned as trustee, ... has received from KENNETH VANOSKI and PENELOPE J. VANOSKI, the beneficiaries thereunder, a written request to reconvey, reciting that all sums secured by such trust deed have been fully paid and that such trust deed and the note secured thereby have been surrendered to the undersigned, as trustee, for cancellation.... [Emphasis added.]
Despite the language in the instrument, the sums due under the promissory note had not fully been paid. After the reconveyance, Christie defaulted on the obligation to the Vanoskis. Betty Thomson received a copy of the notice of default sent to Christie. Subsequently, the Vanoskis brought an action against Thomson and Christie for the balance due under the note. Thomson filed a cross-claim against Christie for indemnification. Christie did not appear to defend against the claim and, as a result, both the Vanoskis and Thomson obtained default judgments against him. Christie could not be located to satisfy the judgment. Accordingly, the Vanoskis sought to enforce their claim against Thomson.
The salient issue at trial centered around the conflict between the language of the deed of reconveyance--which purported to discharge the debt--and the Vanoskis' intent only to release the security but not to discharge the debt secured by it. The trial judge allowed extrinsic evidence of the Vanoskis' intent, contradicting the terms of the deed. Thomson contended the deed was clear and unambiguous and, therefore the Vanoskis were estopped from seeking to enforce a debt which they had plainly discharged. Thomson testified that she had relied on the terms of the deed. The trial court found the recital in the deed untrue and concluded that Thomson was still obligated for the balance of the debt. This appeal followed.
Findings of fact by a trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a). Consequently, our standard for reviewing a trial court's findings and conclusions is to determine whether they are supported by substantial, competent evidence, and to determine whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts as found. See Rasmussen v. Martin, 104 Idaho 401, 659 P.2d 155 (Ct.App.1983).
Thomson first contends the trial court erred as a matter of law in permitting the Vanoskis to present parol evidence of their intent in executing the deed of reconveyance. As our discussion to follow illustrates, we discern no error in the trial court's decision.
In construing a deed the trial court should, if possible, give effect to the intent of the parties. If a deed is plain and unambiguous, the general rule is that the intent must be ascertained from the deed and parol evidence is not admissible. Gardner v. Fliegel, 92 Idaho 767, 450 P.2d 990 (1969); Allen v. Boydstun, 111 Idaho 188, 722 P.2d 497 (Ct.App.1986). This general rule is followed when issues arise concerning the...
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Hall v. Hall
...105 P. 1070 (1909) (parol evidence was admissible to explain what was meant by "other considerations"). See also Vanoski v. Thomson, 114 Idaho 381, 757 P.2d 244 (Ct.App.1988), petition for review denied (1988) (where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it......
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McCandless v. Carpenter
...The law uniformly allows the admission of parol evidence to prove that a recital of fact is untrue." Vanoski v. Thomson, 114 Idaho 381, 383, 757 P.2d 244, 246 (Ct.App.1988). Of course, in the present case, the burden of showing the insufficiency of consideration is upon Carpenter. The distr......