Vanran Commc'ns Servs., Inc. v. Vanderford

Decision Date10 January 2012
Docket NumberNo. A11A1646.,A11A1646.
Citation313 Ga.App. 497,12 FCDR 137,722 S.E.2d 110
PartiesVANRAN COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, INC. v. VANDERFORD.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Michael J. Gorby, Mary Donne Peters, Atlanta, Jeffrey David Cooper, for appellant.

Mahaffey, Pickens & Tucker, Matthew Parks Benson, Lawrenceville, for appellee.

PHIPPS, Presiding Judge.

We granted VanRan Communications Services, Inc.'s application for interlocutory review of the trial court's order denying in part its motion for summary judgment. At issue is whether VanRan is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its shareholder/former employee's claims for (1) an annual bonus and (2) the removal and installation of certain directors and officers of VanRan. Because the trial court erred in denying VanRan's motion for summary judgment on those claims, we reverse.

C.W. Vanderford and Doranne Satterlee started a telephone equipment business called VanRan Communications Services, Inc. In 2003, C.W. Vanderford and Satterlee executed a buy-sell agreement providing, among other things, that “if either party dies or is mentally disabled, the remaining partner will control all decisions re: the corporation.” In 2006, C.W. Vanderford died.

C.W. Vanderford's son, Charles M. Vanderford (hereafter “Vanderford”), was employed by VanRan from 1988 through 2008. In addition to a salary, in some years of his employment Vanderford received a bonus from VanRan. In 2009, VanRan's board of directors voted to terminate Vanderford's employment following reports that he had, inter alia, become disruptive and violent and had been involved in altercations with other employees. The board further decided to not pay Vanderford a bonus for 2008.

Vanderford sued VanRan and Satterlee, seeking a declaration that the buy-sell agreement entitled him to continued employment with VanRan and that he was entitled to receive a bonus for work performed in 2008. Vanderford later added a claim for breach of obligation of good faith based on the alleged violation of the buy-sell agreement and seeking to, among other things, have Satterlee and another person removed as directors and officers of VanRan and have himself appointed as a director and officer. At the time of the amendment, Satterlee was a director and CEO of VanRan, and was a 51 percent owner of the voting shares of VanRan. Vanderford was not a director or officer of VanRan at that time, but owned 24.5 percent of the voting shares of VanRan.

VanRan and Satterlee moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to VanRan and Satterlee on Vanderford's claim for continued employment and the related claim of good faith, and to Satterlee on all claims asserted against her individually; the court denied summary judgment to VanRan on the claim for the bonus and for requested changes in VanRan's leadership. We granted VanRan's interlocutory appeal from the denial of its motion for summary judgment as to those two claims.

A trial court properly grants summary judgment when the moving party demonstrates there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party may discharge his burden by demonstrating the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. If the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party is required to point to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue.1

When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, this court conducts a de novo review of the law and the evidence.2

1. The claim for the bonus. In his complaint, Vanderford claimed he was entitled to receive “not less than $175,000.00” from VanRan as a bonus for work he performed in 2008. He based this amount, implicitly, upon the amount VanRan allegedly paid another employee as a bonus for 2008. Vanderford has conceded that the buy-sell agreement contained no provision related to the payment of employee bonuses, and that there was no other written agreement or document entitling him to an annual bonus. VanRan was entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Vanderford deposed that the bonuses he had previously received were not based on a specific formula or percentage of profits, that he was not guaranteed any particular amount, that the bonuses were “to be based on how well we did and what we did, ...” and that the amount of the bonuses was decided by Satterlee and his father.

A promise to pay future compensation is not enforceable unless it, among other things, is for an exact amount or based upon a formula or method for determining the exact amount of the bonus.3 The rationale behind this rule is that “the sum of money to be paid for performance of services under a contract should be definitely and objectively ascertainable from that contract.” 4 Where an employee bonus is based even in part on the exercise of discretion, the promise to pay a bonus in the future amounts to a promise to change the terms of compensation in the future and, thus, is an unenforceable executory obligation.5 Thus, assuming arguendo that there was a contract to pay Vanderford an annual bonus, because the amount was not definitely and objectively ascertainable from the contract, it was not enforceable. Notably, the buy-sell agreement specifically provided that the surviving party (here, Satterlee) would control all decisions regarding the corporation.

Vanderford posits, however, that in this case the indefinite contract to pay a bonus became definite and enforceable through the subsequent words and conduct of the parties.6 He states that prior to 2003, he earned a salary and commissions at VanRan, but that when he changed positions at VanRan in 2003, he no longer earned commissions and experienced a decrease in pay. According to Vanderford, Satterlee and his father orally agreed in 2003 to pay him bonuses or a “share of the profits” to maintain his pre–2003 compensation levels.

However, as noted above, Vanderford admitted on deposition that he was not guaranteed any particular amount and that the decision as to the amount of any bonus was made by Satterlee and his father. And an accountant/board member for VanRan deposed that Satterlee recommended to the board that Vanderford receive no bonus for 2008, and that the board voted on and approved the recommendation. When asked if the payment of bonuses for VanRan employees was within the board's discretion, the accountant/board member responded “I never knew that it was any other way.” Because the payment of a bonus and the amount thereof were discretionary, any promise to pay a bonus was unenforceable. 7 Thus, the trial court erred in denying VanRan's motion for summary judgment on Vanderford's claim for the bonus.

2. The OCGA § 14–2–941 claim. In his amended complaint, Vanderford sought, inter alia, the removal of certain directors and officers and his own appointment as a director and officer of VanRan, pursuant to OCGA § 14–2–941.

OCGA § 14–2–941(a) pertinently provides that if the court finds that one or more of the grounds for relief described in OCGA § 14–2–940(a) exist, it may order, among other things, the removal from office of any director or officer and/or the appointment of any individual as a director or officer.8 OCGA § 14–2–940(a)(1) pertinently provides that a shareholder of a statutory close corporation may petition the superior court for any of the relief described in OCGA § 14–2–941(a) if the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner, whether in his capacity as shareholder, director or officer of the corporation. 9

Vanderford based his requests on an alleged discrepancy between VanRan's income as reported on one of its internal financial documents for 2008 and its income as reported on VanRan's federal income tax return for the same year. He claimed that VanRan either incorrectly reported revenue information in its internal records or falsely reported revenue to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).

...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • Schinnerer v. Wellstar Health, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • October 20, 2022
    ...component necessarily negates any argument that the bonus amount could be “objectively ascertainable.” See id.; VanRan Comms. Servs., Inc., 313 Ga.App. at 498-99 (finding a promise to pay a bonus unenforceable when even in part on an exercise of discretion). Accordingly, the PPP is not enfo......
1 books & journal articles
  • 2012 Georgia Corporation and Business Organization Case Law Developments
    • United States
    • State Bar of Georgia Georgia Bar Journal No. 18-6, April 2013
    • Invalid date
    ...was unfair, raising questions about allocating the burden of proof in such cases. In VanRan Communications Services, Inc. v. Vanderford, 313 Ga. App. 497, 722 S.E.2d 110 (2012) a petition for removal of directors under O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-940 and 14-2-941 was denied where plaintiff failed to s......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT