Vansickle v. Hazeltine

• Citation: 29 Idaho 228,158 P. 326
• Parties: MARY E. VANSICKLE, Appellant, v. CORA HAZELTINE et al., Respondents
• Decision Date: 15 June 1916
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho

158 P. 326

29 Idaho 228

MARY E. VANSICKLE, Appellant, v. CORA HAZELTINE et al., Respondents

Supreme Court of Idaho

June 15, 1916

NONRESIDENT DECEDENT-COMMUNITY PERSONAL PROPERTY-DISTRIBUTION OF-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

1. The succession of community property is provided for by sec 5713, Rev. Codes, as amended by Sess. Laws 1911, p. 29. That section must be construed with other sections of the statutes in regard to descent and distribution of the property of a deceased person.

2. Sec 5628, Rev. Codes, provides for the settlement of ancillary administration.

3. Sec 3095, Rev. Codes, provides that if there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile; and the general rule is that the succession to and distribution of personal property wherever situated is governed by the lex domicilii of the owner or intestate at the time of his death, without regard to the location of the property or the place of his death. However, so far as creditors are concerned, each state will deal with the property of a decedent within its jurisdiction according to its own laws.

4. Held, that the distribution of the Gutches estate in accordance with the laws of the state of Washington does not conflict with any statute in this state, and does not contravene the public policy of the state.

[As to right of alien or nonresident to act as executor or administrator, see note in Ann.Cas. 1912A, 747]

APPEAL from the District Court of the Second Judicial District for Latah County. Hon. Edgar C. Steele, Judge.

An action to determine the descent and distribution of community personal property of a nonresident decedent. Judgment for the nonresident claimant. Affirmed.

Judgment of the district court affirmed, with costs in favor of the respondents.

Orland & Lee, for Appellant.

Sec. 5713, as amended by the act of 1911, was evidently intended to and undoubtedly does fix the status of community property, both real and personal, in its succession, without regard to the residence of the owners, and the evident intent and policy of the laws of Idaho is to control the succession of community property, and the rule of the common law has no application in Idaho governing the devolution of community property, be the same real or personal.

Courts will not enforce the laws of a sister state or of a foreign country when such laws are in contravention of the laws of the state wherein it is sought to be enforced, or contrary to its institutions and policy as shown by legislative will. (Smith v. McAtee, 27 Md. 420, 92 Am. Dec. 641; Palmer v. Palmer, 26 Utah 31, 99 Am. St. 820, 72 P. 3, 61 L. R. A. 641; Conklin v. United States Shipbuilding Co., 123 F. 913.)

"The court may refuse to recognize the rule that the law of the decedent's domicile controls devolution of his personal or movable property, where its enforcement would be repugnant to the laws of inheritance prevailing in the forum or contrary to the policy there obtaining." (22 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 1358.)

Our code determines the succession of all the property acquired by the marital community within this state, and situated therein at the time of the dissolution; it makes no distinction between the property acquired and owned within the state by a resident marital community and the property acquired and owned by a nonresident marital community. Statutes of this kind are real statutes, and regulate property within the state and provide for the succession thereto upon the dissolution of the marital community by death. (Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. (N. S.) (La.) 569, 16 Am. Dec. 212; Cole's Widow v. His Executors, 7 Mart. (N. S.) (La.) 41, 18 Am. Dec. 241.)

A. L. Morgan, for Respondents.

"The succession to and the disposition and distribution of personal property, wherever situated, is governed by the lex domicilii of the owner or intestate at the time of his death without regard to the location of the property or the place of the death." (14 Cyc. 21-C; Apple's Estate, 66 Cal. 432, 6 P. 7; Goodrich v. Treat, 3 Colo. 408; sec. 3095, Rev. Codes.)

The above rule is absolute in the absence of a positive statute of the state where the property is located expressly regulating the succession of personal property within the state without regard to the domicile of the owner. (Apple's Estate, supra; In re Lathrop's Estate, 165 Cal. 243, 131 P. 752; State v. Dunlap, 28 Idaho 784, 156 P. 1141.)

Personal property acquired during coverture is governed and controlled by the law of the domicile. (Douglas v. Douglas, 22 Idaho 336, 125 P. 796.)

It is not correct to say that our law, on account of comity, gives way to the law of another state. It is a part of the law of Idaho that personal property should be distributed according to lex domicilii. (Whitney v. Dodge, 105 Cal. 192, 38 P. 636.)

SULLIVAN, C. J. Budge, J., concurs. Morgan, J., did not sit at the hearing and took no part in the decision of this case.

OPINION

SULLIVAN, C. J.

This is an appeal from a decree or judgment of the district court affirming an order or decree of the probate court of Latah county made in the distribution of a part of the estate of Lincoln Gutches, deceased.

The following facts appear from the record: Lincoln Gutches, deceased, was a resident of the state of Washington at the time of his death, which occurred on May 10, 1914, and the appellant, Mary E. Vansickle, was the wife of the deceased at the time of his death. She thereafter married a man by the name of Vansickle. Gutches left an estate in Latah county, a portion of which was personal property, all of which had been acquired during the existence of the marital relations by the joint efforts of the spouses, and was therefore community property. There were six children, five of whom were minors at the time of the death of Gutches, and who were represented in the district court and probate court by guardians ad litem. The respondent Cora Hazeltine was the married daughter. Administration was taken out in Latah county and the administrator petitioned the probate court to distribute the entire estate, it being community property, to the widow, Mrs. Vansickle. Mrs. Hazeltine filed her petition in the probate court and prayed that one-half of the personal property in Latah county be distributed to the children of Gutches and one-half to the wife. A. L. Morgan, Esq., as guardian ad litem on behalf of the minor children, filed a similar petition in the probate court asking that one-half of said estate be distributed to the children. The probate court denied the petition of the appellant asking that all of the property be set aside to her and thereafter distributed the personal property of said deceased, one-half to the children of the deceased and one-half to the appellant.

An appeal was thereafter taken to the district court, and upon a hearing the order of the probate court distributing the estate was affirmed, and from the judgment entered this appeal is taken.

There is but one question in this case, which involves the law governing the devolution of community property upon the decease of one of the spouses, regardless of his or her residence; or, in other words, shall the community personal property of a deceased husband or wife, situated and being within the state of Idaho, be distributed according to the laws of Idaho or according to the laws of the domicile of the deceased, in this case the domicile being the state of Washington?

The property here involved is admitted to be personal, community property, and was situated within the state of Idaho at the time of the death of Gutches.

It is contended by counsel for appellant that under the provisions of sec. 5713, Rev. Codes, as amended by Sess. Laws 1911, p. 29, that the succession of community property situated in the state of Idaho is positively fixed, and that all personal property of the deceased must be distributed to the heirs of the deceased in accordance with the laws of this state.

It is claimed by counsel for respondent that such property should be distributed according to the laws of the state of Washington, for the reason that the deceased resided at the time of his death in that state, and it is contended that the common law relative to the distribution of personal property of a deceased person prevails in this state, and that the succession to the estate follows the laws of the domicile at the time of the death. Counsel for...