Vara v. Vara
| Decision Date | 31 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 08-20-00087-CV |
| Citation | 645 S.W.3d 818 |
| Parties | Veronica Chavez VARA, Appellant, v. Mark VARA, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
PRO SE APPELLANT: Veronica Chavez Vara, 768 Woodland Ave., El Paso, TX 79922.
PRO SE APPELLEE: Mark Vara, 17L Nim Road, Singapore, 804994.
Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Alley, JJ.
Appellant Veronica Chavez Vara (Veronica) appeals from the trial court's order dismissing a petition that she filed seeking clarification and enforcement of a 2008 divorce decree when she and Appellee Mark Vara (Mark) were originally divorced. Veronica contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her petition and in denying her motion for default judgment against Mark. Because we find that Veronica's petition had no basis in law and was invalid on its face, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
The procedural history of this case is detailed in our prior opinion in Vara v. Vara , 558 S.W.3d 782, 784-85 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2018, pet. denied). We will therefore give an abbreviated history as it pertains to Veronica's current appeal.
Veronica and Mark entered an agreed decree of divorce (the Original Decree), which the 261st District Court for Travis County signed in 2008. The Original Decree contained provisions relating to the sale of the parties’ residence, which, among other things, stated that: (1) the parties were to enter into a listing agreement to sell the house by a certain date; (2) the house was to be sold at a price agreeable to both parties; (3) Veronica had the right to stay in the house until the close of escrow; (4) Mark was to make the mortgage, taxes, and insurance payments on the house, while Veronica was to pay for routine maintenance, and the parties were to split the cost of any necessary structural or mechanical repairs on the house until it was sold; and (5) the proceeds from the sale were to be used to first pay off $20,000 owed on a credit card in Veronica's name, and to then reimburse Mark for a portion of the mortgage payments he made, as well as the resulting pay down in equity on the house, with the remainder to be divided equally between the parties.
Mark subsequently filed a motion for clarification and enforcement of the Original Decree, complaining that Veronica had failed to sign a listing agreement by the date set forth in the decree. He further urged the court to clarify the date on which Veronica was to vacate the house. In response, a Travis County family law associate judge, Andrew Hathcock, entered a temporary order on October 21, 2008, which found, among other things, that the Original Decree only gave Veronica the unambiguous right to remain in the house until October 28, 2008. The order required Veronica to vacate the premises pending a hearing and further orders of the court. The district court judge approved associate Judge Hathcock's order.
Following a de novo hearing, a different Travis County district court judge, Judge Rhonda Hurley, entered an "Order on Motions for Clarification and Enforcement" on December 22, 2009, in which she "clarified" the Original Decree, providing that Veronica was to "re-vacate" the home by November 22, 2009. Both parties were also to "agree" on the amount in a listing agreement that she ordered them to sign. And both parties signed that order, conveying their agreement with it. Neither party challenged the December order at that time, and the house was thereafter sold for $450,000 and the proceeds divided in accordance with the provisions set forth in the Original Decree.1
Approximately six years later, after Veronica moved to El Paso, and jurisdiction of her case was transferred here, she moved to vacate the December 2008 order. Her motion contended that the sales provisions in the Original Decree were not ambiguous and that it was therefore improper for the court to have modified those provisions. Judge Laura Strathmann of the 388th Judicial District Court in El Paso agreed and in 2017 vacated the December 2009 order. In her order, Judge Strathmann expressly stated that she was reinstating the Original Decree, and that Veronica could file a motion for clarification and enforcement of the decree under Chapter 9 of the Texas Family Code.
Veronica thereafter filed her "Second Amended Petition for Enforcement of Property Division of the Original Decree of Divorce" (the Enforcement Petition) in the same court. In her Enforcement Petition, Veronica argued that Mark did not abide by the terms of the sales provisions in the Original Decree by: (1) restricting her access to the parties’ house from October 2008 to February 2010 when the house was sold; and (2) by selling the house for $450,000, without her agreement. She sought damages of $1.8 million. Mark, who had since moved to Singapore, did not answer the Enforcement Petition, and Veronica moved for a default judgment. Judge Strathmann, however, denied the motion for a default judgment and dismissed the Enforcement Petition, concluding that Veronica did not come forward with sufficient evidence to support her claim for damages. Veronica appealed the judgment to this Court. We agreed with Judge Strathmann and therefore affirmed the judgment. See Vara , 558 S.W.3d at 789.
Veronica then filed a "Second Amended Original Petition for Clarification and Enforcement of the Property Division of the Original Decree of Divorce via Reduction to Money Judgment with Motion to Vacate" (the Clarification Petition).2 In her Clarification Petition, Veronica first sought to vacate Associate Judge Hathcock's October 2008 temporary order, arguing that Judge Strathmann only vacated the December 2008 order, which she believed effectively reinstated Judge Hathcock's earlier order. She then sought a ruling that Judge Hathcock's October order was void and should be vacated, as it impermissibly amended, altered, or modified the Original Decree. Veronica argued that once Judge Hathcock's temporary order was vacated, and the Original Decree effectively reinstated, it was necessary to clarify, or "distinguish" various aspects of the sales provisions in the decree. Specifically, Veronica requested that the decree include the following: (1) Veronica could remain in the parties’ house before its sale and do so at no cost to her; (2) Mark had to make payments to cover the expenses on the house before its sale, and was required to pay her at least $3,500 a month; (3) the parties were to agree upon a sales price for the house but that agreed-upon sales price was to be set at $1.65 million; and (4) the proceeds from the sale were to be distributed to ensure that Veronica was "free and clear" of all debts to Mark.
And finally, if the court agreed to "clarify" the Original Decree in this way, Veronica sought enforcement of the newly clarified sales provisions against Mark and sought damages for his alleged violation of those provisions. Veronica's request for enforcement was nearly identical to the request that she made in her earlier Enforcement Petition, as she once again sought $59,500 in damages for Mark's actions in restricting her access to the house for 17 months before its sale, and $600,000 in damages for his actions in selling the house for $450,000, rather than for the $1.65 million "agreed-upon" price that she wanted placed in the clarified order. And because Mark failed to file an answer to her Clarification Petition, she once again filed a motion for a default judgment against him.
This matter was assigned to retired visiting Judge Guadalupe Rivera. At a hearing that was held at Veronica's request, Judge Rivera informed Veronica that she believed her pleadings were frivolous and groundless, and failed to state a valid claim for relief. Specifically, Judge Rivera advised Veronica that she had "long ago" accepted the benefits of the property division when the house was sold, and that she had already litigated these same issues in the prior enforcement proceeding that ended with this Court's earlier opinion. She therefore orally directed Veronica not to file any future challenges to the sales provisions in the decree raising these same issues.
In her written order, Judge Rivera denied Veronica's motion for default judgment; denied Veronica's motion to declare the October 2008 temporary order void; and dismissed her Clarification Petition. Veronica thereafter requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, and filed a series of motions seeking to modify, correct or reform Judge Rivera's rulings, as well as seeking a new trial, all of which were overruled by operation of law. This appeal followed.
Veronica lists six issues on appeal, many of which overlap.3 In Issues One, Three, and Five, she contends that Judge Rivera erred by dismissing her Clarification Petition, and by denying her motion for default judgment. In Issues Four and Six, she contends that Judge Rivera erred in dismissing her petition with prejudice and in ordering her not to refile her claims in any future proceedings. And in Issue Two, she contends that Judge Rivera erred by denying her motion to vacate Judge Hathcock's October 2008 order. We start our analysis with Issue Two.
In Issue Two, Veronica argues that Judge Rivera erred in denying her motion to vacate Judge Hathcock's October 2008 order, contending that once Judge Strathmann vacated Judge Hurley's December 2008 order, the October 2008 order was effectively reinstated. In turn, she contends that the October 2008 order improperly clarified the Original Decree and was therefore void and should have been vacated. We conclude, however, that Judge Hathcock's October 2008 order no longer had any force after Judge Hurley issued her December 2008 order, and that the October order was therefore not...
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