Vardeman v. State

• Decision Date: 03 March 1933
• Docket Number: A-8461.
• Citation: 20 P.2d 194,54 Okla.Crim. 329
• Parties: VARDEMAN v. STATE.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

20 P.2d 194

54 Okla.Crim. 329

VARDEMAN v. STATE.

No. A-8461.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

March 3, 1933

Rehearing Denied April 1, 1933.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The manner and extent of examination of jurors, touching their qualifications, cannot be prescribed by any definite unyielding rule, but rests to a large extent in the sound discretion of the trial judge. In the examination, such latitude should be given the parties as will enable them to procure a jury free from outside influence, bias, or personal interest.

2. Every defendant jointly indicted or informed against is charged, under the statute (St. 1931, § 3066), with notice that the state may, if it so desires, use a codefendant as a witness against him. The appearance of the name of the witness on the face of the information or indictment as a codefendant answers every requirement of the statute (St. 1931, § 2829) that the name of the witness be indorsed on the information or indictment before trial.

3. A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless he be corroborated by such other evidence as tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime; where the acts and conduct of the witness are undisputed or admitted, it is for the court to say as a matter of law whether or not the witness is an accomplice. But where the evidence is conflicting, the question is one of fact for the jury, to be submitted under proper instructions.

Appeal from District Court, Okfuskee County; John L. Norman, Judge.

Wade Vardeman was convicted of grand larceny, and he appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

Rogers & Klein, of Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.

J Berry King, Atty. Gen., and Smith C. Matson, Asst. Atty Gen., for the State.

CHAPPELL Judge.

Plaintiff in error, hereinafter called defendant, was convicted in the district court of Okfuskee county of the crime of grand larceny, and his punishment fixed by the court at imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a period of two years.

It is contended that the failure of the court to permit counsel for defendant to examine generally each prospective juror individually was prejudicial to him.

The record discloses that on the general examination of prospective jurors the court said: "Not a single member in the box knew the defendant, and not one knew anything about the facts in the case."

After the court has asked jurors as to their legal qualifications it is hardly necessary for the state or defendant's counsel to ask them the same questions, although sometimes this is done. When any part of the questioning is denied or excluded, in order to preserve the question the proper procedure for defendant's counsel is to dictate into the record the questions he desires to ask the jurors, and obtain a ruling of the court thereon, thereby enabling this court to determine if the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to permit counsel to ask the questions. It further appears from the record that the trial court had permitted defendant's counsel to ask the jurors general questions, and had offered to permit further individual examination if counsel so desired, but this offer was refused.

The manner and extent of examination of jurors, touching their qualifications, cannot be prescribed by any definite, unyielding rule, but rests to a large extent in the sound discretion of the trial judge. In the examination, such latitude should be given the parties as will enable them to procure a jury free from outside influence, bias, or personal interest. Jones v. State, 20 Okl. Cr. 154, 201 P. 664.

The purpose of a voir dire examination of prospective jurors is to aid in the selection of a fair and impartial jury, and to enable defendant to exercise his peremptory challenges.

A speedy administration of justice makes it necessary that the trial court have discretion to control the examination of jurors. Otherwise, defendant's counsel might conduct a filibuster similar to those sometimes conducted in Congress, thereby materially delaying the trial or even preventing the obtaining of a jury. But the court should be very careful not to abuse this discretion, allowing defendants' counsel the necessary latitude to enable him to determine against whom he will exercise his peremptory challenges.

There is nothing in the record in the case at bar showing abuse of judicial discretion in the rulings of the trial court in connection with the voir dire...