Vargas v. Rigid Global Buildings, LLC
| Decision Date | 28 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 14-20-00309-CV |
| Parties | Antonio VARGAS, Appellant v. RIGID GLOBAL BUILDINGS, LLC, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
James Erdle Jr., Christopher Chapaneri, Joseph David Zopolsky, David Wilson Dodge, Dallas, for Appellee.
Scott P. Armstrong, Joshua Lee, for Appellant.
Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Spain, and Wilson
A personal-injury claimant appeals the trial court's confirmation of an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act in favor of the claimant's former employer, asserting that the trial court erred in denying the claimant's petition to vacate the arbitration award. In the petition to vacate, the claimant asserted that the arbitrator exceeded his powers as well as various other alleged grounds for vacatur of the award. Concluding that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers and that the other complaints raised by claimant on appeal do not fit within any of the exclusive grounds available to challenge an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act, we affirm.
Appellant Antonio Vargas was employed by appellee Rigid Global Buildings, LLC. As a condition of his employment with Rigid, Vargas signed an Arbitration Agreement and Notice of Arbitration Policy ("Arbitration Agreement") on May 26, 2017.1 In the Arbitration Agreement, Vargas agreed that "All Claims related to [Vargas's] employment with [Rigid] arising in any part after the Effective Date [of the Arbitration Agreement], save and except any benefit claims under [Rigid's] Occupational Injury Benefit Plan and any claims made not arbitrable by governing statute or rule, will be resolved only through mandatory binding arbitration." Rigid is a non-subscriber under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act.
"Claims" covered under the Arbitration Agreement "include, but are not limited to the following: (i) claims arising from any injury suffered by [Vargas] while in the Course and Scope of Employment with [Rigid], including but not limited to claims for negligence, gross negligence, and all claims for personal injuries ...; (ii) all claims relating to [Vargas's] application with, employment with, or termination from [Rigid]." The term "Course and Scope of Employment" means an activity of any kind that has to do with the work, business, trade, or profession of [Rigid] and is performed by [Vargas] while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of [Rigid], whether conducted on [Rigid's] premises or elsewhere."
Under the Arbitration Agreement, "[a]ny dispute as to whether a claim is arbitrable shall be resolved by the Arbitrator under this Arbitration Agreement." Vargas agreed that Rigid is engaged in interstate commerce and that the Federal Arbitration Act (the "FAA") governs all aspects of the Arbitration Agreement. In section 9 of the Arbitration Agreement Vargas also agreed to a one-year time limit for filing a claim for arbitration (the "Time Limit"):
All parties must file a Claim for arbitration within one (1) year after the date of the incident or occurrence giving rise to the Claim.2 Failure to do so will result in the Claim being barred as at that one-year date. Should this time limitation become unenforceable because of applicable statute or case law, [Rigid and Vargas] agree the arbitrator may determine the appropriate limitations period in a pre-arbitration hearing[.]
The Arbitration Agreement provides that generally all parties may allege any claim, obtain any remedy, and assert any legal or equitable defense available in a Texas state or federal court and that all parties may file any motions permitted under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
Vargas alleges that on or about August 19, 2017, while he was working in the course and scope of his employment with Rigid, a beam fell off a group of stacked beams and came down on Vargas's foot, causing severe injuries to Vargas's right toe and foot. Vargas alleges that the negligence of Rigid's agents, servants, and employees proximately caused his personal injuries. Vargas did not file a lawsuit asserting this negligence claim against Rigid. Vargas agrees that he had to arbitrate his negligence claim under the Arbitration Agreement and that the FAA governs this arbitration.
On February 21, 2019, more than 18 months after the date of the occurrence giving rise to Vargas's negligence claim, Vargas initiated an arbitration proceeding under the Arbitration Agreement in which he asserted his claims against Rigid, including his negligence claim. Vargas does not dispute that he initiated the arbitration more than a year after the date of the occurrence giving rise to Vargas's negligence claim.
After an arbitrator was appointed, Rigid filed an answer and then a motion for summary judgment in the arbitration, asserting that under the Time Limit Vargas's negligence claim was barred because Vargas did not file his claim within one year after the date of the incident or occurrence giving rise to the claim. Vargas responded in opposition to Rigid's summary-judgment motion, agreeing that the decision as to the applicable statute of limitations was for the arbitrator and arguing that the Time Limit is contrary to public policy, substantively unconscionable, unenforceable, and void under section 16.070 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Vargas also argued that the Arbitration Agreement is ambiguous as to whether Vargas must file his claims within one year after the date of the incident or occurrence giving rise to the claim or within two years after that date, under section 16.003 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
The Arbitrator granted Rigid's motion for summary judgment, concluding as follows:
Vargas filed a motion for reconsideration of the arbitrator's ruling. The arbitrator denied this motion. Vargas initiated this case in the trial court by filing a petition to vacate the arbitration award in favor of Rigid (the "Award"). In his petition to vacate the Award, Vargas also asserted a claim for breach of the Arbitration Agreement. Rigid filed an answer and moved to confirm the Award. Vargas amended his petition, and Rigid amended its motion. After an oral hearing, the trial court denied Vargas's petition to vacate the Award and granted Rigid's motion to confirm the Award. Vargas filed a notice of appeal, in which he stated that he was appealing the trial court's final judgment.
On appeal, this court determined that the trial court's judgment did not actually dispose of Vargas's breach-of-contract claim and that the judgment was interlocutory. We abated this appeal to permit the trial court to take action to make its interlocutory judgment final. See Tex. R. App. P. 27.2, 27.3. During the abatement period the trial court signed a final and appealable judgment in which the court (1) denied in all respects Vargas's petition to vacate the Award; (2) ordered that all of Vargas's claims against Rigid be dismissed with prejudice; and (3) ordered that the Award be confirmed in all respects. This final judgment and all documents relating to it have been included in a supplemental clerk's record in this appeal. We treat this appeal as from this final judgment, and we treat all actions relating to the appeal of the trial court's initial interlocutory judgment as relating to the appeal of the final judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 27.3.
We review de novo a trial court's decision to confirm or vacate an arbitration award. Valdes v. Whataburger Restaurants, LLC , No. 14-16-00222-CV, 2017 WL 2602728, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jun. 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). Review of an arbitration award is "extraordinarily narrow" and "exceedingly deferential." Id. Consistent with the deferential and narrow scope of review of an arbitration award, we indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of the Award and none against it. Id. We review Vargas's challenge to the Award under a "heavy presumption" in favor of confirming the award. See id.
Under the FAA, an arbitration award must be confirmed unless it is vacated, modified, or corrected under specifically enumerated statutory grounds. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9 – 11 ; Valdes , 2017 WL 2602728, at *2. Under the FAA, courts may vacate an arbitrator's decision "only in very unusual circumstances." Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter , 569 U.S. 564, 568, 133 S.Ct. 2064, 2068, 186 L.Ed. 2d 113 (2013). Significantly, the grounds on which a trial court may vacate an arbitration award under the FAA are limited to those expressly identified in section 10 of the FAA, to the exclusion of all other potential grounds. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. , 552 U.S. 576, 584, 128 S.Ct. 1396, 1403, 170 L.Ed.2d 254 (2008) ; Valdes , 2017 WL 2602728, at *2. Section 10(a) of the FAA provides that a trial court may vacate an arbitration award for any one of the following reasons:
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