Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church

• Citation: 3 Cal.5th 1077,404 P.3d 1196,224 Cal.Rptr.3d 846
• Decision Date: 13 November 2017
• Docket Number: S235412
• Parties: Aleksandr VASILENKO et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. GRACE FAMILY CHURCH, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)

3 Cal.5th 1077
404 P.3d 1196
224 Cal.Rptr.3d 846

Aleksandr VASILENKO et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
GRACE FAMILY CHURCH, Defendant and Respondent.

S235412

Supreme Court of California

Filed November 13, 2017

224 Cal.Rptr.3d 848

Torrano Law, Frank J. Torrano ; Jaramillo & Borcyckowski and Robert D. Borcyckowski for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

C. Athena Roussos ; Law Office of Louinda V. Lacey and Louinda V. Lacey for California Walks as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

McKay, de Lorimier & Acain, Paul A. de Lorimier, Janet S. Yoon ; The Thomas Law Firm, Mason Thomas, Bradley S. Thomas and Kelly Thomas for Defendant and Respondent.

Horvitz & Levy, Mitchell C. Tilner, Eric S. Boorstin, Lacey L. Estudillo ; Gorden & Rees and Don Willenburg for Association of Southern California Defense Counsel and Association of Defense Counsel of Northern California and Nevada as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Frank J. Torrano, Torrano Law, 8801 Folsom Boulevard, Suite 230, Sacramento, CA 95826, (916) 801-5577, Paul A. de Lorimier, McKay, de Lorimier & Acain, 3250 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 603, Los Angeles, CA 90010-1578, (213) 386-8900, Eric S. Boorstin, Horvitz & Levy, 3601 West Olive Avenue, 8th Floor, Burbank, CA 91505-4681, (818) 995-0800

404 P.3d 1198

LIU, J.

3 Cal.5th 1081

Plaintiff Aleksandr Vasilenko was struck by a car as he crossed a public street between the main premises of defendant Grace Family Church (the Church) and the Church's overflow parking area. Vasilenko contends that the Church owed him a duty of care to assist him in safely crossing the public street and that the Church was negligent in failing to do so. The Church argues that it had no control over the public street and therefore did not owe Vasilenko a duty to prevent his injury under the principle that landowners have no duty to protect others from dangers on abutting streets unless the landowner created the dangers. (See Sexton v. Brooks (1952) 39 Cal.2d 153, 157–158, 245 P.2d 496 ( Sexton ).)

The parties do not dispute that the Church did not control the public street and did not create the dangers on the street. But the Church, by locating its

3 Cal.5th 1082

parking lot on the other side of the street and directing Vasilenko to park there, foreseeably increased the likelihood that Vasilenko would cross the street at that location and thereby encounter harm. Thus the circumstances here are different from when a landowner merely owns property abutting a public street.

We conclude, however, that a landowner does not have a duty to assist invitees in crossing a public street when the landowner does no more than site and maintain a parking lot that requires invitees to cross the street to access the landowner's premises, so long as the street's dangers are not obscured or magnified by some condition of the landowner's premises or by some action taken by the landowner. Because Vasilenko does not allege that the Church did anything other than maintain a parking lot on the other side of that street, we find that the Church did not owe him a duty to prevent his injury.

I.

The Grace Family Church was located on Marconi Avenue across from the Debbie Meyer Swim School in an unincorporated area of Sacramento County. Marconi Avenue was five lanes wide, with two lanes in each direction separated by a universal left turn lane. The nearest intersection to the Church was at Root Avenue, about 50 to 100 feet east; there were no traffic signals or crosswalks at the intersection. The Church had an agreement to use the swim school lot for overflow parking when the Church's main lot was full.

224 Cal.Rptr.3d 849

Vasilenko sought to attend a seminar at the Church on a rainy evening in November 2010. When he arrived, a church member volunteering as a parking attendant informed him that the main lot was full and told him to park at the swim school lot across the street. The attendant did not tell him where to cross Marconi Avenue to reach the Church and did not tell him that the Church had posted crossing volunteers at the intersection of Marconi and Root Avenues. Vasilenko, along with two others, attempted to cross in the middle of the block directly opposite the Church. Midway across, he was hit and injured by an oncoming car.

Vasilenko and his wife sued the Church for negligence and loss of consortium. He alleged that the Church created a foreseeable risk of harm by maintaining an overflow parking lot in a location that required invitees to cross Marconi Avenue, and that the Church was negligent in failing to protect against that risk. He also alleged that the Church was negligent in failing to adequately train or supervise its parking attendants. The Church moved for summary judgment on the ground that it did not have a duty to assist Vasilenko with crossing a public street it did not own, possess, or control.

3 Cal.5th 1083

The trial court granted the Church summary judgment; a divided panel of the Court of Appeal reversed. We granted review.

II.

A plaintiff in a negligence suit must demonstrate " ‘a legal duty to use due care, a breach of such legal duty, and the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.’ " ( Beacon Residential Community Assn. v. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill LLP (2014) 59 Cal.4th 568, 573, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 752, 327 P.3d 850 ( Beacon ).) In this case, we decide only whether the Church had a legal duty to prevent the injuries Vasilenko alleges. The existence of a duty is a question of

404 P.3d 1199

law, which we review de novo. ( Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 770, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 313, 248 P.3d 1170 ( Cabral ).)

Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a)"establishes the general duty of each person to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others." ( Cabral , supra , 51 Cal.4th at p. 768, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 313, 248 P.3d 1170.) " ‘Courts ... invoke[ ] the concept of duty to limit generally "the otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow from every negligent act...." ’ " ( Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 397, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 51, 834 P.2d 745 ( Bily ).) We have said that "in the absence of a statutory provision establishing an exception to the general rule of Civil Code section 1714, courts should create one only where ‘clearly supported by public policy.’ " ( Cabral , supra , 51 Cal.4th at p. 771, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 313, 248 P.3d 1170, quoting Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 ( Rowland ).)

In determining whether policy considerations weigh in favor of such an exception, we have looked to "the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved." ( Rowland , supra , 69 Cal.2d at p. 113, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561.) We do not ask whether these factors (the Rowland factors) "support an exception to the general duty of

224 Cal.Rptr.3d 850

reasonable care on the facts of the particular case before us, but whether carving out an entire category of cases from that general duty rule is justified by clear considerations of policy." ( Cabral , supra , 51 Cal.4th at p. 772, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 313, 248 P.3d 1170 ; see Rest.3d Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, § 7, com. a, p. 78 ["No-duty rules are appropriate only when a court can promulgate relatively clear, categorical, bright-line rules of law applicable to a general class of cases."].)

3 Cal.5th 1084

In this respect, duty differs from the other elements of a tort. Breach, injury, and causation must be demonstrated on the basis of facts adduced at trial, and a jury's determination of each must take into account the particular context in which any act or injury occurred. Analysis of duty occurs at a higher level of generality. (See Cabral , supra , 51 Cal.4th at p. 774, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 313, 248 P.3d 1170.) Here, because "the general duty to take ordinary care in the conduct of one's activities" applies to choosing the location of a parking lot for one's invitees and to training one's employees, "the issue is ... properly stated as whether a categorical exception to that general rule should be made" exempting those who own, possess, or control premises abutting a...