Vasquez v. Leprino Foods Co.
| Decision Date | 22 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:17-cv-00796-AWI-BAM |
| Parties | ISAIAS VASQUEZ and LINDA HEFKE, on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. LEPRINO FOODS COMPANY, a Colorado Corporation; LEPRINO FOODS DAIRY PRODUCTS COMPANY, a Colorado Corporation; and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE (DOC. NOS 273-291)
This class action lawsuit, brought before the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), involves an employment dispute between Plaintiff class representatives Isaias Vasquez and Linda Hefke (“Plaintiffs”) and Defendants Leprino Foods Company and Leprino Foods Dairy Products Company (collectively, “Leprino” or “Defendants”).[1] On March 30, 2020, the Court certified Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants required their non-exempt workers to remain “on-call” during their meal and rest breaks in violation of California law.[2] Pending before the Court are 10 motions in limine filed by Defendants and 9 motions in limine filed by Plaintiffs.[3] Doc. Nos. 273-291. This order resolves the parties' respective motions.
“A motion in limine is a procedural mechanism to limit in advance testimony or evidence in a particular area.” United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2009). Motions in limine may be “made before or during trial, to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually offered.” Stevenson v. Holland, 504 F.Supp.3d 1107, 1114 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984)). “Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize in limine rulings, the practice has developed pursuant to the district court's inherent authority to manage the course of trials.” Id. (citing Luce, 469 U.S. at 41 n.4); see also City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 866 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2017) ().
In Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank, the Ninth Circuit cited with approval the following “standards applicable to motions in limine”:
Judges have broad discretion when ruling on motions in limine. However, a motion in limine should not be used to resolve factual disputes or weigh evidence. To exclude evidence on a motion in limine, the evidence must be inadmissible on all potential grounds. Unless evidence meets this high standard, evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context. This is because although rulings on motions in limine may save time, costs, effort and preparation, a court is almost always better situated during the actual trial to assess the value and utility of evidence.
735 F.3d 1158, 1162 fn. 4 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
By resolving a motion in limine, the court may prevent the presentation of potentially prejudicial evidence to the jury which also eliminates the need to try to neutralize a prejudicial taint after the evidence has already been presented. Stevenson, 504 F.Supp.3d at 1114 (citing Brodit v. Cambra, 350 F.3d 985, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2003)). Notwithstanding a motion in limine ruling, a court may change course at trial in the event that testimony or other evidence “bring[s] facts to the district court's attention that it did not anticipate at the time of its initial ruling.” Id. at 1114-15 (citing United States v. Bensimon, 172 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1999)).
Evidence is relevant if (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action. Fed.R.Evid. 401. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. “Relevancy is not an inherent characteristic of any item of evidence but exists only as a relation between an item of evidence and a matter properly provable in the case.” Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 387 (2008) (). Even if relevance is established, the court may exclude evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 403. Additionally, hearsay statements are inadmissible unless they are defined as non-hearsay or fall within an exception to the hearsay rule. Calmat Co. v. United States DOL, 364 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004). “Hearsay” is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted by the out-of-court declarant. Id.
Defendants move to exclude testimony by Plaintiffs and their class member witnesses regarding their individualized experiences and interpretations of Leprino's policies and practices. According to Defendants, such individualized testimony should be excluded because it is not common proof and thus not helpful to the jury. While individual testimony may be probative as to that particular class member's claim, it does not prove that the class was subject to on-call breaks because each individual's experience was different. Furthermore, Defendants assert that such evidence is needlessly cumulative, confusing to the jury, and unfairly prejudicial because it would take the focus away from the common policies and practices at issue.
Plaintiffs oppose Defendants' motion on the ground that the challenged witness testimony relates not to the witnesses' individualized experiences but rather to their common experience of being on-call during breaks. According to Plaintiffs, the mere fact that some employees had uninterrupted breaks or that Leprino's official policies affected some class members differently than others does not mean that individualized issues will predominate in the case. Furthermore, Plaintiffs assert that the trial will not devolve into numerous individual mini-trials because each witness's testimony will provide relevant examples and instances of the effects of Leprino's common policies on class members.
Plaintiffs' prospective class member witness list names 13 class member witnesses and 7 class member rebuttal witnesses. See Doc. Nos. 268 & 270. Defendants argue that the testimony of these witnesses regarding their meal and rest break experiences will be overly individualized such that “jurors will not be able to extrapolate these class member witnesses' claims to the entire class.” Although Defendants point to several statements from class members suggesting they each had different experiences regarding breaks, Defendants' argument ultimately goes to the weight of the witnesses' testimonies, not their admissibility.
The jury will determine whether an on-call policy existed at Leprino's Lemoore West facility. The testimony of Plaintiffs' class member witnesses will be relevant to that determination because, like the rest of the class, they all worked at the same Lemoore West facility and were subjected to the same policies and practices, even if their individual experiences were not necessarily identical. Defendants' references to select statements by Isaias Vasquez, Jeremy Hernandez, Armindo Colouro, Fili Monzon, and Courtney Mateos do not establish that their testimony will be overly individualized and irrelevant. Other statements made by these same individuals contradict Defendants' references, Doc. No. 305 at 6-8, and their overall testimony has a tendency to make the existence of an on-call policy more or less probable than it would be without their testimony. Fed.R.Evid. 401. How much weight to give the class member witnesses' testimony is a question for the jury to decide.
Furthermore, the challenged testimony of Plaintiffs' class member witnesses will not be unduly prejudicial to Defendants because their testimony will not take the focus away from the common policies and practices at issue. Rather, their testimony will be probative as to how Leprino's policies were implemented in practice and whether they effectively put class members on-call during their breaks. Again, Plaintiffs contend that Leprino has an unwritten policy that effectively mandates that employees are “on-call” during breaks. Individual instances in which an employee class-member was required to perform work related tasks during their break demonstrate not only that the employee class member did not receive a full meal or rest break, it can also show that all employees were subjected to an “on-call” policy, even if not all employees were actually interrupted. Cf. Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Ct., 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1029, 1049 (2012) (), with Augustus v. ABM Sec. Servs., Inc., 2 Cal. 5th 257, 270 (2016) (). To the extent Defendants take issue with this testimony, Defendant may attack it though cross examination and contrary evidence at trial.
Defendant's second motion in limine is denied.
Defendants move to exclude Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs' witnesses, and Plaintiffs' attorneys from introducing or referencing any evidence concerning any class members taking late meal or rest breaks or not taking meal and rest breaks at all....
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