Vaughan v. Harp

• Decision Date: 21 May 1887
• Citation: 4 S.W. 751
• Parties: VAUGHAN <I>v.</I> HARP.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

4 S.W. 751

VAUGHANv.

HARP.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

May 21, 1887.

Appeal from circuit court, Pulaski county.

T. J. Oliphint, for appellant. Blackwood & Williams and Z. P. H. Farr, for appellee.

BATTLE, J.

During the present term of the court, the judgment in this action was affirmed without a written opinion setting forth the reasons of the court for so doing being filed. The appellant now says the court erred in so doing, and for that and other reasons moves the court for a reconsideration; and, in support of his motion, cites sections 1318 and 1321 of Mansfield's Digest, which provides that "every opinion of the supreme court shall be reduced to writing," and that "it shall be the duty of the supreme court to adjudicate and decide all points presented in error that legitimately arise in the case, notwithstanding that some one or more points, less than the whole, may be sufficient to determine the case." The sections cited by appellant are taken from the Revised Statutes of this state. Since their enactment the Code of Civil Practice has been enacted, which provides that this "court must deliver written opinions in all cases involving a principle of law not previously settled by the court and reported." This repeals so much of the Revised Statutes as requires every opinion of this court to be reduced to writing, and makes it unnecessary to reduce to writing any opinion not required by the Code to be in writing. Code Civil Pr. § 888.

But a more important question arises. The judiciary and legislative are co-ordinate departments of the state government. Each, in the line of its duties, is independent of the other. This being true, has the legislature authority to require this court to give the reasons of its decisions in writing? Mr. Justice FIELD, in delivering the opinion of the court in Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 25, so fully and satisfactorily expresses our view upon this question that we quote at length what he says upon the subject. In speaking for the court, he says: "If the power of the legislature to prescribe the mode and manner in which the judiciary shall discharge their official duties be once recognized, there will be no limit to the dependence of the latter. If the legislature can require the reasons of our decisions to be stated in writing, it can forbid their statement in writing, and enforce their oral announcement, or prescribe the paper upon which they shall be written, and the ink which shall be used. And yet no sane man will justify any such absurd pretension. But where is the limit to this power if its exercise in any particular be admitted? The truth is, no such power can exist in the legislative department, or be sanctioned by any court which has the least respect for its own dignity and independence. In its own sphere of duties, this court cannot be trammeled by any legislative restrictions. Its constitutional duty is discharged by the rendition of decisions. The legislature can no more require this court to state the reasons of its decisions than this court can require, for the validity of the statutes,...