Vaughn, Inc. v. Beck
Decision Date | 02 November 2001 |
Docket Number | Record No. 003042. |
Citation | 262 Va. 673,554 S.E.2d 88 |
Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Parties | VAUGHN, INC., v. Howard J. BECK, Jr., et al. |
Edward A. Natt (Osterhoudt, Prillaman, Natt, Helscher, Yost, Maxwell & Ferguson, on brief), Roanoke, for appellant. Monica Leigh Taylor (J. Rudy Austin; Gentry Locke Rakes & Moore, on brief), Roanoke, for appellees.
Present: LACY, HASSELL, KEENAN, KOONTZ, KINSER, and LEMONS, JJ., and STEPHENSON, S.J.
In this appeal, we consider the issue whether under Code § 55-70.1, a purchaser of a new home is required to notify the builder of a defect in construction within the statutory warranty period before bringing an action against the builder for breach of that warranty.
Howard J. Beck, Jr., and his wife, Lauren S. Beck (collectively, the Becks), entered into a contract with Vaughn, Inc. (Vaughn) to purchase certain real estate, including a house and a well, in a residential development in Roanoke County. The Becks obtained title and took possession of the property on December 9, 1996.
Within one year of that date, the Becks began to experience problems with an inadequate flow of water from their well. As a result of the inadequate water flow, the Becks did not have sufficient water to perform routine household functions, such as washing dishes, washing clothes, and bathing. In addition, the Becks were not able to provide water for their lawn and shrubbery. Because of the inadequate water flow, the Becks were required to dig and install a second well.
The Becks did not notify Vaughn of their difficulties with the original well because they thought that the problem was caused by a faulty water pump, which Vaughn would not have been obligated to correct. At a later date, however, the Becks concluded that Vaughn was responsible for correcting the defect in the well, but they took no action to notify Vaughn of the defect.
On December 7, 1998, within two years of the date that the Becks obtained title and took possession of the property, they filed a motion for judgment in the trial court against Vaughn. The Becks alleged that the defect in the well installed by Vaughn was caused by Vaughn's failure to drill, construct, and prepare the well in a workmanlike manner, free from structural defects. The Becks asserted, among other things, that based on Vaughn's actions and omissions regarding the well, Vaughn breached the statutory warranty for new dwellings provided by Code § 55-70.1.
Vaughn filed an answer in which he admitted that "[t]he warranties given are the statutory warranties" under Code § 55-70.1. However, Vaughn denied any breach of those warranties and asserted as an affirmative defense the Becks' failure to provide Vaughn notice of the defect within the one-year statutory warranty period. In response, the Becks conceded that they had not given Vaughn notice of the defect within one year from the date on which they obtained title to the property and took possession of the dwelling.
The case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Becks in the amount of $20,000, and the trial court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict. Vaughn appeals from this judgment.
Vaughn argues that Code § 55-70.1 required the Becks to give Vaughn notice of the defect in the well within the one-year statutory warranty period as a condition precedent to maintaining an action against Vaughn for breach of the statutory warranty. Vaughn asserts that a notice requirement is implied from the statutory language, and that a contrary result would be unreasonable because it would deprive a builder of the opportunity to determine whether a homeowner's claim for damages has any merit. Vaughn also contends that in Davis v. Tazewell Place Associates, 254 Va. 257, 492 S.E.2d 162 (1997), this Court recognized a builder's right under Code § 55-70.1 to receive such notice of a defect that forms the basis of an action for breach of the statutory warranty. We disagree with Vaughn's arguments.
Under basic rules of statutory construction, we examine the language of Code § 55-70.1 in its entirety and determine the intent of the General Assembly from the words contained in the statute, unless a literal construction of the statute would yield an absurd result. Cummings v. Fulghum, 261 Va. 73, 77, 540 S.E.2d 494, 496 (2001); Earley v. Landsidle, 257 Va. 365, 369, 514 S.E.2d 153, 155 (1999). When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that language. Cummings, 261 Va. at 77, 540 S.E.2d at 496; Earley, 257 Va. at 370, 514 S.E.2d at 155; Ragan v. Woodcroft Vill. Apartments, 255 Va. 322, 326, 497 S.E.2d 740, 742 (1998). Thus, when the General Assembly has used words of a plain and definite import, courts cannot place on them a construction that amounts to holding that the General Assembly meant something other than that which it actually expressed. See Advanced Marine Enters., Inc. v. PRC Inc., 256 Va. 106, 125, 501 S.E.2d 148, 159 (1998); Abbott v. Willey, 253 Va. 88, 91, 479 S.E.2d 528, 530 (1997).
We also consider the fact that Code § 55-70.1 is a statute in derogation of the common law. At common law, a purchaser of a dwelling did not acquire an implied warranty in conjunction with the sale of that dwelling. Davis, 254 Va. at 261, 492 S.E.2d at 164; see Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, 219 Va. 287, 289, 247 S.E.2d 400, 402 (1978). Because Code § 55-70.1 changed the common law by creating certain statutory warranties, those warranties are limited to the provisions expressly stated in the statute or necessarily implied by its language. See Mitchem v. Counts, 259 Va. 179, 186, 523 S.E.2d 246, 250 (2000); Boyd v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 346, 349, 374 S.E.2d 301, 302 (1988).
Code § 55-70.1 provides, in relevant part:
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