Vaughn v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 177
| Decision Date | 09 December 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 177,177 |
| Parties | Howard B. VAUGHN et al., Appellants, v. ATLANTIC INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
James N. Phenix, Phenix, Keeling & Wilder, Henderson, for appellants.
Royal H. Brin, Jr., Strasburger, Price, Kelton, Miller & Martin, Dallas, for appellee.
Appellee, Atlantic Insurance Company, issued appellant, Howard B. Vaughn, a policy of insurance upon each of the two automobiles owned by him. Among other coverage, the policies provided for medical and hospital expense in the amount of $1,100.00 on each person injured in accordance with the terms of the policies. One of the policies covered a Ford automobile and the other covered a Chevrolet automobile.
While Vaughn, his wife and daughter, were driving the Ford automobile in the State of Arkansas, they were involved in a head-on collision in which Mrs. Vaughn was killed and appellant and his daughter were seriously injured. The Chevrolet automobile was not involved in the accident but remained at the home of the appellant in Gregg County, Texas.
Appellee admitted liability on the medical coverage provision of the policy covering the Food automobile and paid the full $1,000.00 coverage on appellant as well as his wife and daughter.
Appellant now contends that he is also entitled to the medical payment coverage as provided in the policy covering the Chevrolet automobile.
The basis of his claim is to be found in Part II of the policy covering the Chevrolet, which reads as follows:
'Coverage C Medical Payments.
'To pay all reasonable expenses incurred within one year from the date of accident for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray and dental services, including prosthetic devices, and necessary ambulance, hospital, professional nursing and funeral services:
(Emphasis ours.)
Appellant contends that he and his family were also covered by the medical payments provision in the policy on the Chevrolet because the insurance company contracted to pay if the loss was caused by being 'struck by another automobile' and since another automobile struck the Ford occupied by him and his family, he is entitled to recover on the policy on the Chevrolet.
The policy sued upon, that on the Chevrolet, expressly excluded any recover under its medical payments provision for bodily injury 'sustained by the named insured or a relative (1) while occupying an automobile owned by or furnished for the regular use of either the named insured or any relative, other than an automobile defined as an 'owned automobile."
The policy defines the term 'owned automobile' as being 'a private passenger, farm of utility automobile described in the policy' (emphasis supplied) and under certain circumstances, a newly acquired automobile. There is no contention that the Ford was a newly acquired automobile, nor that the Ford automobile was described in the policy covering the Chevrolet.
Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment based upon this exclusion and appellants likewise filed a motion for summary judgment. After due hearing and consideration of the arguments and trial briefs of both sides, the District Court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment and denied that of appellants, from which appellants perfected their appeal.
The facts are not in dispute and it is no contended that the terms and provisions of the policy are ambiguous. The case will therefore turn upon the legal effect to be accorded the language used in the policy.
The basis of appellant's contention is that the coverage provided for in Part II above provides two separate and distinct coverages, i. e. (1) for injuries sustained while occupying the automobile, and (2) for being struck by another automobile. The exclusion, he argues, which excludes the loss for injuries sustained by occupying another owned automobile, would only include injuries received in what is generally known as a 'one-car wreck,' such as a collision with a stationary object or overturning. Since the exclusion did not mention or specifically exclude coverage through 'being struck by another automobile,' he reasons that the exclusion would have no application to the additional ground of recovery for injuries sustained as the result of being struck by another automobile despite the fact that he and his family were then occupying...
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