Vaughn v. Butler

• Citation: 103 Ga.App. 884,121 S.E.2d 72
• Decision Date: 01 June 1961
• Docket Number: No. 3,38869,Nos. 38844,s. 38844,3
• Parties: C. S. VAUGHN v. Eva. L. BUTLER et al. Eva. L. BUTLER et al. v. C. S. VAUGHN
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 72

121 S.E.2d 72

103 Ga.App. 884

C. S. VAUGHN v. Eva. L. BUTLER et al.

Eva. L. BUTLER et al. v. C. S. VAUGHN.

Nos. 38844, 38869.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 3.

June 1, 1961.

Rehearing Denied June 19, 1961.

Syllabus by the Court

The verdict for the plaintiff and against the defendants was authorized and no error was shown by the amended motion for new trial.

Clarence S. Vaughn sued Mrs. Eva Lee Butler and Mrs. Marjorie Green Townsend to recover for injuries and damages allegedly sustained when a vehicle owned by the defendant Mrs. Butler and being driven by the defendant Mrs. Townsend pulled across a highway immediately into the path of the plaintiff's automobile. The negligence alleged as to each defendant was as follows: 'That the defendant Marjorie Green Townsend was guilty of negligence in the following particulars: (a) In failing to stop the vehicle which she was driving at the entrance to a through highway, the same being negligence as a matter of law; (b) In failing to yield the right of way to plaintiff's vehicle which was approaching on said highway, the same being negligence as a matter of law; (c) In failing to maintain a proper lookout so as to observe plaintiff's vehicle approaching on said highway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard, the same being negligence as a matter of law; (d) In driving said automobile into and through highway and into the path of the oncoming vehicle of plaintiff without first stopping, the same being negligence as a matter of law; (e) In failing to have said vehicle under proper control so as to avoid the collision with plaintiff's vehicle, the same being negligence as a matter of law.

'That defendant Mrs. Eva Lee Butler was guilty of negligence in the following particulars: (a) In permitting an inexperienced minor to operate her automobile, when she knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that said driver was incompetent to operate said vehicle upon the highways of this state, the same being negligence as a matter of fact; (b) In permitting an inexperienced person to operate her automobile, when she knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that said person was inexperienced as a driver and lacked the skill and judgment to operate said vehicle in a safe and prudent manner, the same being negligence as a matter of fact; (c) In permitting Margorie Green Townsend to operate her automobile with her full knowledge, consent and permission when she knew that said driver was not qualified to operate said vehicle and that by the exercise of ordinary care should have known that the operation thereof by said unqualified and inexperienced driver would likely cause injury or damage to other users of the highway, the same bing negligence as a matter of fact.'

On the trial, no demurrers having been filed, according to the record in the case, and the jury having returned a verdict for the plaintifef, Mrs. Butler, having made a motion for a directed verdict which was overruled, made a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto which was granted. The defendants also filed a joint motion for new trial on the usual general grounds to which Mrs. Butler filed an amendment assigning error on two excerpts of the charge. The trial court granted the motion non obstante veredicto but overruled the joint motion for new trial. In case number 38844 the plaintiff assigns error on the judgment granting Mrs. Butler a judgment non obstante veredicto while in case number 38869 the defendants assign error on the judgment overruling the motion for new trial.

J. T. Pope, Jr., Pittman, Kinney & Pope, Dalton, Joseph E. Cheeley, Buford, for C. S. Vaughn.

Hardin, McCamy & Minor, Dalton, for Eva L. Butler and another.

NICHOLS, Judge.

1. The evidence adduced on the trial of the case authorized a finding that Mrs. Butler was the owner of the automobile and the real question presented by the motion for judgment non obstante veredicto is whether the verdict found by the jury as to Mrs. Butler was otherwise authorized.

The evidence, construed most favorably in support of the verdict, authorized a finding that Mrs. Butler turned the automobile over to her nephew, J. C. Green, that he permitted Mrs. Townsend to drive it although she had no driver's license, was only sixteen years old, and was inexperienced in operating automobiles, that while Mrs. Butler did not know that J. C. Green was permitting Mrs. Townsend to drive the automobile before Mrs. Townsend first operated the vehicle she did have such knowledge before the date of the collision between the plaintiff's automobile and the automobile owned by Mrs. Butler and being driven by Mrs. Townsend, and that no action was taken by Mrs. Butler to forbid Mrs. Townsend from continuing to drive such automobile.

The defendant Mrs. Butler cites the cases of Mason v. Powell, 92 Ga.App. 496, 88 S.E.2d 734; and Young v. Kickliter, 213 Ga. 42, 96 S.E.2d 605, and similar cases to support her contention that the judgment of the trial court granting her a judgment...