Vaughn v. Davis, No. 2007-CA-02065-COA (Miss. App. 6/16/2009)
| Decision Date | 16 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 2007-CA-02065-COA.,2007-CA-02065-COA. |
| Parties | WILLIAM DANIEL VAUGHN, APPELLANT v. CONNIE LYNN DAVIS, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS MATERNAL GRANDMOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND OF DANIELLE LYNN VAUGHN, APPELLEE. |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
BEFORE LEE, P.J., GRIFFIS AND CARLTON, JJ.
CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶ 1. William Daniel Vaughn (Vaughn) appeals the judgment of the Rankin County Chancery Court awarding custody of his minor daughter, Danielle Lynn Vaughn (Danielle), to the child's maternal grandmother, Connie Lynn Davis (Connie).
FACTS
¶ 2. Danielle was born in October 2000 out of wedlock. Danielle and her mother, Theresa Davis (Theresa) lived with Connie, the maternal grandmother, since Danielle's birth. Theresa died as the result of a car accident in March 2002, when Danielle was approximately seventeen months old. Danielle's birth certificate lists Vaughn as her father. Vaughn's paternity was further established through a DNA test. Vaughn and Theresa never married. At the time of Theresa's death, Theresa and Danielle lived with the grandmother, Connie. Vaughn lived with two roommates in an apartment. He attended school and worked full time.
¶ 3. After Theresa's death, Vaughn and Connie discussed the physical custody arrangements for Danielle. Vaughn and Connie mutually agreed that Connie would keep Danielle until Vaughn had finished school and gotten back on his feet. After their agreement, Vaughn failed to visit Danielle regularly and paid only $100 of support for Danielle prior to Connie's filing her petition for custody. He also failed to voluntarily seek custody of his daughter when he got back on his feet.
¶ 4. At some point after Theresa's death, Connie tried to obtain medical insurance for Danielle. The insurance company denied coverage because Connie was not Danielle's legal guardian. On August 18, 2004, when Danielle was nearly four years old, Connie filed a petition for custody and emergency temporary relief. Vaughn and Connie signed an agreed temporary order dated August 20, 2004, granting Connie temporary custody of Danielle. The agreed order granted Vaughn liberal visitation rights with Danielle. At this point in time, approximately four years after Theresa's death, Vaughn had completed school, was married, and had another child.
¶ 5. The custody hearing encountered several delays so that a court-appointed psychologist could evaluate Danielle. The court also appointed a guardian ad litem for Danielle. During this time, Vaughn obtained full-time employment, married Melissa Vaughn, bought a home, and had a son with Melissa. The chancery court finally heard Connie's petition for custody on August 1, 2007, and entered a final order granting custody of Danielle to Connie. Danielle was nearly seven years old at the time of the hearing.
¶ 6. On appeal, Vaughn argues that the chancellor erred in not giving him the benefit of the natural-parent presumption, which arises in custody disputes between natural parents and third parties. Grant v. Martin, 757 So. 2d 264, 265 (¶5) (Miss. 2000). Utilizing the standard adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Grant, however, the chancellor reasoned that Vaughn relinquished the natural-parent presumption when he agreed to allow Danielle to remain in Connie's custody pending a hearing on Connie's petition for custody. Finding no error with the chancellor's judgment, we affirm the chancellor's judgment. We also find that the chancellor's decision is further buttressed by Vaughn's voluntary and extended failure to seek custody of Danielle. Hill v. Mitchell, 818 So. 2d 1221, 1225 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
DISCUSSION
¶ 7. This Court's standard of review in child custody cases is very limited. Parker v. South, 913 So. 2d 339, 344 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). We must affirm the chancellor's decision unless his decision is manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or he applied an erroneous legal standard. Norman v. Norman, 962 So. 2d 718, 720 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). There must be substantial evidence in the record to support the chancellor's custody decision. Id. The polestar consideration of this Court in reviewing a child custody award is the best interest of the child. Parker, 913 So. 2d at 343 (¶9) (citing Hensarling v. Hensarling, 824 So. 2d 583, 587 (¶8) (Miss. 2002)). We review questions of law de novo. Broome v. Broome, 832 So. 2d 1247, 1251 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
¶ 8. When there is no custody order or other agreement in place, our law presumes that "[g]randparents have no right to custody of a grandchild, as against a natural parent." Carter v. Taylor, 611 So. 2d 874, 876 (Miss. 1992). Vaughn argues that the chancellor erred in not giving him, as Danielle's natural parent, the benefit of the natural-parent presumption.1 However, natural parents forfeit the natural-parent presumption when they voluntarily relinquish custody of a minor child through a court of competent jurisdiction. Grant, 757 So. 2d at 266 (¶10). Because Vaughn voluntarily relinquished custody of Danielle to her grandmother for an extended period of time and through an agreed court order, he can only reclaim custody of her by showing clear and convincing evidence that the change in custody is in the child's best interest. Id.
¶ 9. In examining the supreme court cases setting forth the standard in cases where the natural parent relinquished custody, we turn to the supreme court's opinion in Grant. In that case, the natural parents of three young children relinquished custody of the children to the paternal grandparents through their divorce settlement. Id. at 264-65 (¶1). Years later, the children's mother sought custody of the children. Id. at 265 (¶3). Although the mother had not provided financial assistance to the children, she had visited with them regularly. Id. At the custody hearing, the mother offered no proof that remaining with the paternal grandparents would be in any way detrimental to the children. Id. at (¶4). The chancery court dismissed the mother's petition to modify custody and dissolve the guardianship because the mother had failed to show a material change in circumstances that would adversely affect the children. Id. at (¶5). The mother appealed, and this Court reversed the chancery court. Id. at 266 (¶7). This Court found no evidence that the mother had abandoned her children or was unfit to have custody of them. Id. Therefore, this Court reasoned, she was entitled to the natural-parent presumption. Id. However, the supreme court reversed this Court, finding the natural-parent presumption inapplicable. Id. at (¶11).
¶ 10. On certiorari, the supreme court articulated the following standard:
Our law clearly has a strong presumption that a natural parent's right to custody is superior to that of third parties, whether grandparents or others. This is as it should be. However, this Court has never before been asked to rule on whether the natural parents' consent to and joinder in court proceedings granting custody to such third parties should alter that presumption. Because stability in the lives of children is of such great importance, we have carefully weighed the impact of establishing an exception, or a new standard, for such instances. While we do not want to discourage the voluntary relinquishment of custody in dire circumstances where a parent, for whatever reason, is truly unable to provide the care and stability a child needs, neither do we want to encourage an irresponsible parent to relinquish their child's custody to another for convenience sake, and then be able to come back into the child's life years later and simply claim the natural parents' presumption as it stands today.
Therefore we adopt a new standard and hold that a natural parent who voluntarily relinquishes custody of a minor child, through a court of competent jurisdiction, has forfeited the right to rely on the existing natural parent presumption. A natural parent may reclaim custody of the child only upon showing by clear and convincing evidence that the change in custody is in the best interest of the child. This new rule not only reaffirms that the polestar consideration in all child custody cases is the best interest of the child, but also gives the chancellor the authority to make a "best interest" decision in voluntary relinquishment cases without being fettered by the presumption in favor of natural parents which applies in other child custody cases.
Id. at (¶¶9-10) (emphasis added).
¶ 11. Based on the facts of the case before us, we find no error in the chancellor's application of the Grant standard and refusal to apply the natural-parent presumption. We note that Vaughn never sought custody of Danielle from Connie even after he had completed school and had gotten back on his feet. Rather, he responded to Connie's complaint seeking custody of Danielle when Danielle was four years old. Until Connie filed her complaint, Vaughn was content with allowing Connie to support and care for Danielle indefinitely. Meanwhile, Vaughn had married, found a job, and fathered a son. Consequently, Vaughn forfeited the natural-parent presumption by voluntarily relinquishing his right to custody of Danielle through the agreed temporary custody order and through his failure to seek custody of his daughter for four years until he was faced with Connie's complaint, when his daughter was nearly four years old. See Hill, 818 So. 2d at 1228 (¶44). Then, he agreed to an order granting Connie temporary custody for another three years.
¶ 12. Another instructive case as to the relinquishment of the natural-parent presumption is the Hill case, involving a custody dispute between a child's paternal grandparents and her natural mother. Id. at 1222 (¶1). Paul...
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