Vaughn v. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. of Miss.
Decision Date | 12 November 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 2013–CT–01179–SCT.,2013–CT–01179–SCT. |
Citation | 182 So.3d 433 |
Parties | Kayla VAUGHN v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF MISSISSIPPI. |
Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Jim Warren, III, Jacob Thomas Evans Stutzman, Joshua Reid Daniel, attorneys for appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Jane L. Mapp, attorney for appellee.
EN BANC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
KING, Justice, for the Court:
¶ 1. Kayla Vaughn appeals the decisions of Mississippi's Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS), the Hinds County Circuit Court, and the Court of Appeals, in which she says she was denied the benefits due to a member of PERS. The retiree died prior to collecting benefits, and her beneficiary died prior to collecting all of the retiree's benefits. As the surviving family member of the beneficiary, but not of the retiree, Kayla asserts that she is entitled to the remaining benefits. While PERS, the Hinds County Circuit Court, and the Court of Appeals erred by applying the current versions of the PERS statutes, rather than the version in force when the retiree made her elections, we ultimately find that such error was harmless, and thus affirm the judgments of each of these entities in result only.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1
¶ 2. Marjorie Kahn was a state employee and consequent member of PERS. In October 1999, she applied for disability retirement. Like other applicants, she was given a choice of payment options. She chose "Option 4–B." See Miss.Code Ann. § 25–11–115(1) (Rev.1999). Under this option, Marjorie would receive "[a] reduced retirement allowance" throughout her life in exchange for "the further guarantee of payment to the named beneficiary, beneficiaries, or to the estate, for a specified number of years certain." Id. And if she or her last designated beneficiary died "prior to receiving all guaranteed payments due," then "the actuarial equivalent of the remaining payments would be paid to the estate of the retired as intestate property." Id.
Vaughn v. Pub. Emp.'s Ret. Sys., 182 So.3d 446, 448–49, 2015 WL 528336, at *1–2 (Miss.Ct.App.2015).
¶ 3. In the appeal to the Court of Appeals, the parties focused on the language of the current versions of Section 25–11–115(1) and Section 25–11–117.1. At oral argument before the Court of Appeals, the issue was raised that the current language of these two sections did not go into effect until July 1, 2000, eight and one-half months after Marjorie selected Option 4–B on her application for disability retirement and six months after she died. Thus, the Court of Appeals ordered supplemental briefing on the following issues:
The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the judgments of the circuit court and PERS. It held that Marjorie's intent that the remaining payments be paid into her estate were Heather to die before all benefits were paid was clear. Vaughn, 182 So.3d at 448–49, 2015 WL 528336, at *2. It found that paying Heather's heirs instead of Marjorie's heirs "would have unconstitutionally impaired Marjorie's contractual right to have her heirs receive the remainder of her retirement if both she and Heather died before all guaranteed payments were made." Id. at 450, at *3. It consequently rejected any interpretation of Section 25–11–117.1 that conflicted with Marjorie's clear intent, and then went on to hold that "PERS's interpretation [of the new statutes] has the additional advantage of being supported by the statute's language." Id. The Court of Appeals then interpreted the current Sections 25–11–115 and 25–11–117.1, and found that under these sections, the benefits should be awarded to Marjorie's statutory beneficiaries, rather than Heather's statutory beneficiaries. Kayla filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the statute as it was in 1999 because the statute did not have a savings clause and the Court of Appeals could not discern Marjorie's intent, and further arguing that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Section 25–11–117.1 contravenes the plain language of the statute. We granted the petition primarily to address the Court of Appeals' decision to interpret Section 25–11–117.1, the interpretation of which is a matter of first impression in this Court.
ANALYSIS
¶ 4. When this Court reviews an administrative agency's decisions, the Court may not overturn the agency's judgment unless the agency's decision is not supported by substantial evidence, is arbitrary or capricious, is beyond the scope or power granted to the agency, or violates constitutional rights. Pub. Emp.'s Ret. Sys. v. Porter, 763 So.2d 845, 847–48 (Miss.2000).
¶ 5. The Court of Appeals was correct in applying the version of the statute in place when Marjorie chose her option and when she died. However, it did not need to go the extra step to interpret the meaning of Section 25–11–117.1. Marjorie simply gets the benefit of the contract that she made; Section 25–11–117.1 has no relevance.
¶ 6. "No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts...." U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. Additionally, the Constitution of the State of Mississippi provides that "[e]x post facto laws, or laws impairing the obligation of contracts, shall not be passed." Miss. Const. art. 3, § 16. "The Contract Clauses of the state and federal constitutions are substantially similar." Porter, 763 So.2d at 849. They forbid the Legislature from passing laws that will impair the obligation of contracts. Id. at 850. "[T]he ‘obligation’ of a contract, in a constitutional sense, depends on the law in effect when that contract was made." Id. "[T]he legislature may alter a retirement system member's contractual rights; but if doing so subjects the member to a substantial disadvantage, a substantial new advantage must also be conferred upon that member in order to pass constitutional muster." Id. The statutory revisions at issue deprived Marjorie of a significant contractual right, the right to choose how her benefits were to be disbursed and to whom, without conferring any additional benefits to her.See id. At the time Marjorie...
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