Vaughn v. State

• Decision Date: 11 February 1981
• Docket Number: No. 36799,36799
• Citation: 247 Ga. 136,274 S.E.2d 479
• Parties: Helen VAUGHN v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 479

274 S.E.2d 479

247 Ga. 136

Helen VAUGHN v. The STATE.

No. 36799.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Feb. 11, 1981.

Kenneth D. Kondritzer, Asst. Public Defender, Louisville, for vaughn.

H. Reginald Thompson, Dist. Atty., Swainsboro, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., for State.

CLARKE, Justice.

Helen Vaughn was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The victim, Ray Gene Oglesby, an Emanuel County farmer, died of acute arsenic poisoning. Appellant and her husband, Junior Vaughn, were employees of Oglesby and lived on his place. There was testimony at trial that the Vaughns owed the victim money on their house and that they were delinquent in paying it.

Approximately one week after the burial of the victim, the appellant called the Emanuel County sheriff and asked him to come out to the Vaughns' resident. When the sheriff arrived, the Vaughns were standing in the yard, and he suggested that they get into his car to talk with him because it was cold. All three got into the car, and the sheriff gave them their Miranda rights. Junior Vaughn told the sheriff that he had killed Oglesby. After he confessed, and explained how the poisoning took place, the sheriff asked appellant if Junior was telling the truth. She said yes. The sheriff took Junior into custody. Three days later, he returned to the Vaughn place and asked appellant to accompany him to Statesboro. The sheriff testified at trial that he explained to appellant that she did not have to come with him and that her coming was strictly voluntary. He testified that Mrs. Vaughn was not in custody at the time and would have been allowed to leave at any time she wished. Prior to making any statements, she was advised of her rights. After she was advised of her rights, she said, according to the sheriff's testimony, "I might as well go ahead and take my part of Ray Gene Oglesby's death." After questioning of some thirty-five to forty minutes duration by the sheriff and a GBI agent, she made a statement confessing to her participation in the murder.

At the trial of the case, a Jackson-Denno hearing was held outside the presence of the jury concerning the voluntariness of the appellant's confession. At the end of the hearing, the district attorney offered the statement in evidence. The defendant objected on the grounds that the statement was the fruit of an illegal arrest and that the arrest tainted the statement. The defense argued that under Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), the statement should be suppressed. The prosecutor responded that there was no evidence that the appellant was in custody prior to the time she gave the statement and argued that the statement was admissible under Fourth Amendment as well as Fifth Amendment considerations. The court overruled the defense objection and admitted the statement.

Appellant's sole enumeration of error is that under the standard set forth in Brown v. Illinois, supra, her confession should have been suppressed. Appellant insists that she was in custody at the time she made the statement and that her arrest was without a warrant having been issued and was without probable cause.

The question of when a warrantless arrest is authorized has caused some confusion in this state. Code Ann. § 27-207 provides for three exceptions to the requirement that a warrant be obtained prior to an arrest. These exceptions are: (1) the offense is committed in the officer's presence; (2) the offender is endeavoring to escape; (3) for some other cause there is likely to be a failure of justice for want of an officer to issue a warrant. The federal constitutional standard, on the other hand, is not as stringent. In Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964), the Court considered the constitutionality of a search incident to an arrest and found that the validity of the search depended upon the constitutional validity of the arrest. "Whether that arrest was constitutionally valid depends in turn upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it whether at the moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense." Id. at 91, 85 S.Ct. at 225. Relying upon this language in Beck v. Ohio, supra, and upon the authority of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), the Court of Appeals found that an arrest which met the above standards of probable cause was valid whether or not Code Ann. § 27-207 was violated. Peters v. State, 114 Ga.App. 595, 152 S.E.2d 647 (1966). Peters, supra, was later disapproved in Davidson v. State, 125 Ga.App. 502, 188 S.E.2d 124 (1972), in which the court found that the higher standard of the Georgia statute must be adhered to in this state. However, this court in Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 219 S.E.2d 768 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976, 96 S.Ct. 2177, 48 L.Ed.2d 800 (1976), approved the Court of Appeals' holding in Peters and reiterated the applicability of the constitutional standard of Beck v. Ohio, ...