Vaughn v. State, 50771

• Decision Date: 07 October 1975
• Docket Number: No. 3,No. 50771,50771,3
• Citation: 136 Ga.App. 54,220 S.E.2d 66
• Parties: J. M. VAUGHN v. The STATE
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 66

220 S.E.2d 66

136 Ga.App. 54

J. M. VAUGHN v. The STATE.

No. 50771.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 3.

Oct. 7, 1975.

Harold E. Martin, Jackson, for appellant.

Edward E. McGarity, Dist. Atty., Kenneth Waldrep, Asst. Dist. Atty., McDonough, for appellee.

DEEN, Presiding Judge.

To warrant a conviction based solely on fingerprint evidence 'the fingerprints corresponding to those of the accused must have been found in the place where the crime was committed, under such circumstances that they could only have been impressed at the time when the crime was committed.' (Emphasis supplied.) Anthony v. State, 85 Ga.App. 119, 121, 68 S.E.2d 150, 151. The cases require the state to prove to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis, that the fingerprints could only have been impressed at the time the crime was committed. Miller v. State, 122 Ga.App. 553, 177 S.E.2d 838; Mooney v. State, 122 Ga.App. 650, 178 S.E.2d 281; Brown v. State, 133 Ga.App. 56, 209 S.E.2d 721. Here appellant was brought to the scene by the police at a time when he was not under suspicion; he testified that he touched the glass at that time. It is true that the officer was not certain whether or not appellant touched the glass but 'the defendant's explanation of the fingerprint is at least as reasonable as that of the state.' Mooney v. State, 122 Ga.App. at 653, 178 S.E.2d at 283, supra. However the state has failed to prove that there was no way the appellant could not have made the impressions at the time he said he did.

We are aware that the legal principles discussed above are predicated upon a situation in which fingerprints constitute the sole evidence linking a defendant with the crime. The state urges that there were other related circumstances which, when cumulated with the fingerprint evidence, raise a jury question. Brown v. State, 133 Ga.App. 56(4), 209 S.E.2d 721, supra. These 'other related circumstances' relied upon by the state are: (1) that appellant was observed walking near the scene of the crime within fifteen minutes after the crime was committed; and (2) that appellant's automobile had been observed for approximately one and a half hours prior to the burglary parked within two blocks of the scene but was moved a short time after the crime. A pair of shoes found at the scene and a footprint were found not to belong to appellant. With regard to appellant's location near the scene of the crime shortly thereafter, the evidence shows that he lived near the area where he was picked up, he first approached the officer to report the theft of tapes from his car and the policeman himself testified that it was not unusual to observe appellant walking late at night. With regard to the location of his car, appellant testified he was stopped by friends and parked his car to join them at a dance and upon returning was unable to crank his car. He then testified that he walked to his home, got some gasoline to fill his car's empty tank and returned to move his car.

These 'other related circumstances' are purely circumstantial evidence and it is clear that in this state 'to warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.' Graham v. State, 183 Ga. 881, 189 S.E. 910. 'In making a determination of whether any other reasonable hypothesis exists, the defendant's explanation must be taken into consideration insofar as it is consistent with the circumstantial evidence properly admitted. Redwine v. State, 207 Ga. 318, 324, 61 S.E.2d 481. Elam v. State, 125 Ga.App. 427, 430, 187 S.E.2d 920, 922. Thus when all the evidence, fingerprints, location of appellant and his car, is reviewed together...