Vaughn v. Tealey

• Decision Date: 27 November 1900
• Citation: 63 S.W. 236
• Parties: VAUGHN v. TEALEY.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

63 S.W. 236

VAUGHN v. TEALEY.

Court of Chancery Appeals of Tennessee.

November 27, 1900.

Appeal from chancery court, Davidson county; H. H. Cook, Chancellor.

Suit by Hiram Vaughn, administrator, against Addie R. Tealey. Error to review an order setting aside a former order. Reversed.

Jas. Trimble, for A. L. Demoss. J. S. Pilcher, for Thomas S. Weaver, receiver.

NEIL, J.

This case comes to us on writ of error from the chancery court of Davidson county. It was before us at the last term on appeal from the action of the chancellor in setting aside of his own motion an order made at a previous term. The appeal was sustained, the chancellor's decree being reversed. The subject-matter of the order or decree which the chancellor set aside was the compensation of Hon. A. L. Demoss, as solicitor of the defendant. We held that the matter came before us in such a shape as that we could not pass upon the question of the amount of his compensation, but only upon the validity of the chancellor's action in setting aside the decree referred to at a subsequent term. The case now comes before us in such form as that we may consider the amount of compensation due, and, indeed, that is the only question in the case.

On the former hearing we filed a full written opinion, containing our finding of facts (58 S. W. 487), and also a supplemental opinion on the petition for additional findings (63 S. W. 233). The case is now tried before us on the same record. We can add nothing to the findings above referred to. They contain all of the facts in the record, and we refer to those two opinions for the facts, and by such reference incorporate them herein.

We found as a matter of law, in the opinion referred to, that inasmuch as the defendant was a ward of the court, and her estate was being administered as a trust under the control of the court, the chancellor had the power to appoint an attorney for the receiver, who was acting as trustee, and therefore that the order of June 6, 1895, appointing Mr. Demoss as solicitor, was within the power of the chancellor. We also held that it was within his power to fix the compensation, and hence that the orders of July 11, 1898, and February 4, 1899, were not ipso facto void. We are now to determine whether the amount of $125 per annum fixed therein was a reasonable amount.

Upon a careful re-examination of the facts, we are constrained to hold that the action of the chancellor in fixing the amount referred to was an improvident...