Vaught v. Struble

• Decision Date: 24 June 1943
• Docket Number: 7086
• Citation: 139 P.2d 456,65 Idaho 26
• Parties: J. K. VAUGHT, Appellant, v. S. W. STRUBLE, Respondent
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

139 P.2d 456

65 Idaho 26

J. K. VAUGHT, Appellant, v. S. W. STRUBLE, Respondent

No. 7086

Supreme Court of Idaho

June 24, 1943

Rehearing Denied July 27, 1943.

1. Executors and administrators

Under statute providing that when general letters of administration on decedent's estate are granted, special administrator's powers cease and he must forthwith deliver property of estate to general administrator, special administrator's term ceases on granting of such letters. (I.C.A., sec. 15-357.)

2. Executors and administrators

The authority of special administrator, appealing from order granting general letters of administration to another, did not continue pending termination of such appeal, but he retained no authority except to account for and pay over and deliver property in his hands to general administrator. (I.C.A., secs. 15-352, 15-357.)

3. Executors and administrators

The powers of special administrator of decedent's estate are limited to those granted him by statute, and it cannot be concluded that probate court intended to or did grant him powers not authorized by statutes in letters of administration. (I.C.A., secs. 15-352, 15-353.)

4. Executors and administrators

It is policy of law to keep administration of decedent's estates in hands of regularly appointed administrators and to rely on special administrators only in cases of emergency and for limited time.

5. Executors and administrators

Statutory provisions as to executors' and administrators' powers, duties and liabilities are not applicable generally to special administrators.

6. Executors and administrators

A special administrator of decedent's estate may sell perishable, but not other, property of estate. (I.C.A., sec 15-356.)

7. Executors and administrators

The statute providing that special administrator, appointed pending appeal from order appointing general administrator shall have same powers as general administrator, does not grant special administrator powers of general administrator but court may invest special administrator with only such powers as are incidental to and in line of enumerated powers granted him by statute. (I.C.A., secs. 15-352, 15-353, 15-356.)

8. Executors and administrators

A special administrator of decedent's estate is not permitted to speculate with property of estate.

9. Executors and administrators

The mode of special administrator's preservation of property of decedent's estate, as required by statute, is left to his discretion. (I.C.A., sec. 15-352.)

10. Executors and administrators

The duty of executor or administrator as to matters of discretion within general scope of his powers is to act with fidelity and degree of prudence or diligence which a man of ordinary judgment would be expected to bestow on his own affairs of like nature under existing circumstances.

11. Executors and administrators

Where special administrator, surrendering to warehouse certificate evidencing decedent's deposit of wheat therein and receiving therefor market value of such wheat at time of transaction, less amount owed warehouse by decedent for storage, accounted for sum received and made no private or personal gain by transaction and estate lost no money because of it, transaction should be approved by court, though certificate might have become more valuable at later time. (I.C.A., secs. 15-352, 15-356.)

Rehearing Denied July 27, 1943.

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Camas. Hon. D. H. Sutphen, Judge. From a decree awarding compensation as special administrator, and fees to his attorneys, and partially disallowing special administrator's account, the appellant appeals.

Affirmed in part. Reversed in part and remanded with instructions.

Leo M. Bresnahan and Frank Croner, for appellant.

The main question presented here is whether or not Mr. Vaught was special administrator of the Peterson estate, from the time of his appointment on May 10, 1940, until the decision of the Supreme Court had been handed down which became effective sometime in January, 1942. Putting it another way, did the appeal taken by Vaught from the order appointing Struble administrator remove Vaught as special administrator?

"Pending an appeal from the grant of permanent letters the special administrator may exercise his authority." (Briarfield Iron Works Co. v. Foster, 54 Ala. 622; Gresham v. Pyron, 17 Ga. 263; Mayer v. Schneider, 112 Ill.App. 628, 72 N.E. 436; American Surity Co. v. Haskill, 85 Vt. 358, 82 A. 218.)

Charles Scoggin and Bissell & Bird, for respondent.

The appointment of a special administrator is not intended to bring about a general administration of the estate, his authority is temporary, special and limited by statute, and automatically ceases upon the-appointment and qualification of a general administrator. (Sec. 15-356, I.C.A.; sec. 15-357, I.C.A.; 2 Bancroft's Prob. Prac. 705; In re Williams' Estate, 55 Mont. 63, 173 P. 790; 1 Bancroft's Prob. Prac. 627.)

The attempted sale of wheat by the special administrator was without authority, without notice and both courts have refused to confirm it; Therefore, such attempted sale has not taken effect, and title to said wheat remains in the estate. (2 Bancroft's Prob. Prac. 704; 15-702, secs. 15-707, 15704, I.C.A.; Patterson v. Fidelity & D. Co., 181 Ga. 61, 181 S.E. 776, 106 A.L.R. 425; Cummings v. Lowe, 52 Ida. 1, 10 P.2d 1059.)

DUNLAP, J. Holden, C.J., Ailshie, Budge, and Givens, JJ., concur.

OPINION

DUNLAP, J.

Nels Peterson died intestate at Boise, Ada County, Idaho on May 10, 1940, leaving estate in Camas County, Idaho. Following his death, and on the same day, appellant J. K. Vaught, upon his application was by the Probate Court of Camas County, Idaho, appointed special administrator of the estate and duly qualified as such. Thereafter and on or about June 5, 1940, respondent S.W. Struble, as public administrator of Camas County, filed in said court his application for appointment as general administrator of said estate. Appellant had also filed with said court an application for his appointment as general administrator. The applications were heard on the 17th day of June, 1940, and upon the hearing, the application of appellant for appointment was denied, and an order was made by the court appointing respondent, public administrator of Camas County, administrator of said estate and he forthwith qualified as such by subscribing the oath of office and furnishing bond as required by court, which bond was filed on June 27, 1940, on which date letters of administration were issued to him.

Appeal from these orders and other orders made by the Probate Court in said proceeding was taken by appellant to the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in and for Camas County, and the District Court held against appellant and confirmed the appointment of respondent. That judgment was thereafter appealed to this court, and upon hearing was confirmed by decision of this court made December 16, 1941. (Vaught v. Struble, 63 Ida. 352, 120 P.2d 259.)

On May 21, 1940, appellant, then the duly qualified and acting special administrator of said estate, without first obtaining an order of the Probate Court so authorizing, surrendered to the Camas County Growers Association of Fairfield, Idaho, its warehouse receipt issued to decedent for 3140 bushels of wheat, appellant receiving in consideration therefor at said time compensation in the sum of $ 1326.79, which was at the rate of 52c per bushel, less deductions for certain charges of the warehouse company. Fifty-two cents per bushel was the market value of the wheat at Fairfield, Idaho, at the date of surrender of receipt.

On January 12, 1942, and after the prior decision of this court, appellant as special administrator rendered his final account and on said date filed a petition for discharge. In this account appellant accounted for the net proceeds of the warehouse receipt.

Written objections to certain of the items contained in said final account were filed with the Probate Court by S.W. Struble, administrator, respondent here, and by the heirs of said deceased. After hearing and consideration of such objections, the Probate Court entered its order March 25, 1942, fixing the fee of the special administrator and fixing the fees of the special administrator's attorneys and holding that the disposal of said wheat by the special administrator was without authority, the court not being petitioned for permission to make the sale, no necessity appearing for said sale and the same not having been confirmed or approved by the Probate Court and that the title of said wheat remained in the estate. Other objections made against the special administrator's account were overruled.

Appellant appealed from this order to the District Court and on the appeal the court entered its judgment and decree in substance as follows: (1) approving the allowances for fees as made by the Probate Court for the services of appellant as such special administrator and to his attorneys for their services to him in that capacity; (2) that 3140 bushels of wheat which J. K. Vaught as such special administrator attempted to sell May 21, 1940, is the property of the estate of Nels Peterson, deceased, and the pretended sale thereof is without force and effect; (3) that the fees of the special administrator and his attorneys mentioned above, shall not be paid by the administrator until all of the property and effects of the decedent in the possession of, or under the control of, the special administrator and his attorneys shall have been fully delivered to S.W. Struble, administrator.

The appeal to this court is from the judgment of the District Court.

Appellant's brief on appeal does not...