Rich v. Dixon

• Decision Date: 13 July 1965
• Citation: 153 Conn. 52,212 A.2d 417
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: H. Clark RICH v. Ruth J. DIXON, Temporary Administratrix (ESTATE of Jerome L. DIXON). Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 417

212 A.2d 417

153 Conn. 52

H. Clark RICH v. Ruth J. DIXON, Temporary Administratrix (ESTATE of Jerome L. DIXON).

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 13, 1965.

Donald C. Lunt, Wallingford, for appellant (plaintiff).

William L. Hadden, Jr., New Haven, for appellee (defendant).

Before KING, C. J., and MURPHY, ALCORN, SHANNON and HOUSE, JJ.

HOUSE, Acting Justice.

This action arises out of an automobile accident on the Massachusetts Turnpike on June 9, 1960. The plaintiff, riding as a passenger in a car which he owned, was injured, and the defendant's decedent, who was driving the car, was killed, when the car veered off the road into a bridge abutment. The suit, seeking recovery for the injuries which the plaintiff received, was instituted against the defendant in her capacity as temporary administratrix of the decedent's estate. The complaint alleged and the parties stipulated that written notice of the claim for damages was given to the defendant, as temporary administratrix, prior to the service of the complaint. It is not alleged, nor does it appear, that letters of administration have been granted on the estate as provided by § 45-195 of the General Statutes. ¹

The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant and denied the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict. It is from the judgment rendered on the latter motion that this appeal is taken. Practice Book §§ 605, 600; Felix v. Hall-Brooke Sanitarium, 140 Conn. 496, 498, 101 A.2d 500.

The memorandum of decision on the motion to set aside the verdict indicates that the court directed a verdict because the plaintiff failed to establish negligence on the part of the defendant's decedent and because this action cannot be maintained against a temporary administratrix.

The appointment of a temporary administrator is authorized by General Statutes § 45-197. ² The powers and duties of a temporary administrator are set forth in General Statutes § 45-198. ³ We have not previously had occasion to interpret these two statutes or determine the limits of the authority of a temporary administrator in the circumstances presented by this appeal.

Since the tort which is the subject of the suit is alleged to have been committed in Massachusetts, the law of that state created such right as the plaintiff may have, but the law of Connecticut where the suit is brought determines the remedy. Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S. 387, 388, 54 S.Ct. 211, 78 L.Ed. 378; Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 176, 139 A. 691; see Bohenek v. Niedzwiecki, 142 Conn. 278, 283, 113 A.2d 509. The basic question before us is whether this plaintiff may bind the estate of the decedent by notice of a claim to, and suit against, a temporary administratrix of the tort-feasor's estate appointed pursuant to the authority of General Statutes §§ 45-197 and 45-198, or whether such notice of claim must be given to, and suit brought against, an administrator who had been granted general letters of administration pursuant to § 45-195.

Our general law governing the process of administration of the estates of deceased persons is contained in chapters 786 through 796 of the General Statutes. The statutes included within these chapters provide a logical and definite procedure whereby the property of a decedent is taken into the custody of the law by placing it in the hands of an executor or administrator who, under the control and supervision of the Probate Court, inventories and marshals the assets, receives claims within such period of time as the court may fix, pays the expenses of administration, inheritance taxes and claims and ultimately distributes the remainder to those entitled thereto. 2 Locke & Kohn, Conn. Probate Practice § 261. Consequently, in construing the relevant statutes, we must not only consider them in the light of their history, their language, the purpose they were designed to serve and the circumstances surrounding their enactment but, in determining their purpose and scope, make every part operative and harmonious with every other part so far as is possible. Feldman v. Administrator, 138 Conn. 724, 727, 89 A.2d 210. 'We are called upon to look beyond the literal meaning of the words to the history of the law, its language, considered in all its parts, the mischief the law was designed to remedy, and the policy underlying it. Giammattei v. Egan, 135 Conn. 666, 668, 68 A.2d 129. We must look, also, to the basic policy as disclosed by pre-existing legislation and the circumstances which brought about the enactment of the law under consideration. Cedar Island Improvement Ass'n v. Clinton Electric Light & Power Co., 142 Conn. 359, 364, 114 A.2d 535.' Lee v. Lee, 145 Conn. 355, 358, 143 A.2d 154, 155.

The language of General Statutes §§ 45-197 and 45-198 is clear and specific. These sections contain restrictions and qualifications implicit in the statutory designation of 'temporary administrator' not contained in § 45-195, which concerns the general administration of estate. Unlike the administrator of an estate appointed with general letters of administration pursuant to § 45-195, a temporary administrator may be appointed without notice. He may be appointed only if the Probate Court finds that 'the granting of administration on * * * [the estate of a deceased person] or the probating of the will of such deceased * * * will be delayed, or that it is necessary for the protection of the estate of such deceased * * * to hold and preserve the estate until the appointment of an administrator or * * * the probating of the will.' Implicit in this language is the concept that the temporary appointee is a mere custodian for the preservation of assets 'until the appointment of an administrator.' This interpretation is strengthened by the further provision that, if the Probate Court deems it more expedient, it may order any deputy sheriff or constable to take possession of the estate until the appointment of an administrator, executor or trustee.

When an administrator is appointed, legal title to the personal property of the decedent vests in him. Lynch v. Skelly, 138 Conn. 376, 379, 85 A.2d 251; Blodgett v. Bridgeport City Trust Co., 115 Conn. 127, 144, 161 A. 83. A temporary administrator, on the other hand, is only authorized by the statute to take possession 'to hold and preserve the estate.'

The temporary appointee is given but limited powers, all consistent with a temporary and emergency authority to protect and preserve the assets of the estate, but not extending beyond that. Thus, he may be authorized by the court to sell personal property perishable in nature, to complete fabrication of goods or materials in an unfinished state, or to continue any business 'so far as may be necessary for the preservation of the same.' He is authorized to take possession of the estate's assets, collect debts and rents 'and do such further acts necessary for the preservation of [the] estate as the court authorizes and approves.' Significantly, there is no statutory authority for the temporary appointee to receive or pay claims or perform most of the multitudinous obligations of a general administrator of an estate. His only function is to hold and preserve the assets of the estate in either of the two circumstances set out in the statute and then '[u]pon the appointment and qualification of the administrator' exhibit to the court an account of his trust and 'deliver to the administrator, executor or administrator with the will annexed all of the estate of [the] deceased remaining in his hands.'

The legislative history of §§ 45-197 and 45-198 confirms a conclusion that the office of temporary administrator is distinct from that of the administrator of an estate to whom letters of administration are granted under § 45-195. It serves a limited purpose in an emergency. The term 'temporary administrator' first appears in the 1911 Public Acts when 'An Act concerning Temporary Administrators of Estates of Deceased Persons' was enacted. Public Acts 1911, c. 168. This act refers to the temporary appointee as 'a special or temporary administrator' and contains all of the provisions presently contained in §§ 45-197 and 45-198 of the General Statutes. The 1911 act was incorporated into the 1918 Revision of the statutes in §§ 4973, 4974 and 4975 with no material change except that the words 'special or' were deleted. In the 1930 Revision, these three sections along with § 5026 of the 1918 Revision, which provided for the temporary appointment of 'any proper officer' to preserve the assets of the estate of decedents or insolvent debtors pending the granting of administration or appointment of the trustee of the estate of an insolvent debtor, were consolidated into §§ 4906 and 4907. These consolidated statutes are now General Statutes §§ 45-197 and 45-198.

It is significant that, when the General Assembly in 1911 first provided for the office of special or temporary administrator with limited custodial powers, there existed in the 1902 Revision in substantially their present form the statutes for the appointment of administrators (§ 318), the presentation of claims to them (§ 326) and the prohibition against the commencement of any suit against an administrator within the period...