Vaule v. Miller
| Decision Date | 21 October 1897 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 10,776 - (180).,s. 10,776 - (180). |
| Citation | 69 Minn. 440 |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
| Parties | OLE J. VAULE v. DAVID MILLER.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> |
Ole J. Vaule, in pro. per.
Martin O'Brien, for respondent.
This is an action commenced June 1, 1895, upon a judgment for the sum of $58.15, recovered in a justice court on June 18, 1885, in an action wherein John Ovre was plaintiff and the defendant herein, David Miller, was defendant. The judgment was assigned to the plaintiff herein. The answer in this action was in the nature of a counterclaim to the effect that the justice court was without jurisdiction to render the judgment, because (a) the summons was never served upon the defendant, personally or otherwise, and he never appeared in the action; (b) no bond was filed before the entry of the judgment as required by law (G. S. 1894, § 5024), — and prayed as affirmative relief that the judgment be canceled.
On the first trial of this action the district court dismissed it, and on appeal to this court a new trial was granted. Vaule v. Miller, 64 Minn. 485, 67 N. W. 540.
On the last trial of the case the plaintiff introduced in evidence the docket of the justice, showing the entry of the judgment; also the following entry, among others:
The summons and constable's return thereon, and a written assignment of the judgment, were also given in evidence by the plaintiff, who then rested. The return on the summons was in these words:
The docket contained an entry in these words:
The defendant, over the objection and exception of the plaintiff, gave oral evidence for the purpose of showing that no bond was given before the entry of the judgment, and that the summons was never served as certified by the officer or otherwise. The defendant admitted that he learned of the existence of the judgment in July, 1885. At the close of the evidence the plaintiff requested the court to instruct the jury to return a verdict in his favor for $77.65 and interest, the amount of the judgment and the $19.50 accrued costs on the execution. This was denied, and he then requested that the jury be instructed to return a verdict for him in the sum of $58.15 and interest. This request was also denied. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. Thereupon the plaintiff made a motion for judgment in his favor for $77.65 and interest, notwithstanding the verdict, which was denied. Judgment was entered for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed.
It was held on the former appeal in this action that the return of the officer on the summons was sufficient, that the justice acquired jurisdiction, prima facie, at least, to hear and determine the case; and that it was not essential to the validity of the judgment that his docket should show the fact that a security bond was filed before the judgment was entered. This decision is the law of this case. Bradley v. Norris, 67 Minn. 48, 69 N. W. 624. It was not decided on the former appeal whether the defendant could or could not impeach the judgment by showing that the summons was not in fact served upon him. Nor was it decided, except inferentially, what would be the effect upon the judgment of a failure to file the bond. We now hold that the failure to file a security bond is not a jurisdictional defect rendering the judgment void, but is an irregularity only.
But, as already suggested, it was decided in this case on the former appeal that it does appear by the docket of the justice and the judgment itself that the justice did have jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action and the parties thereto at the time of rendering the judgment. We have, then, a judgment of a justice court in an action wherein it is shown by the docket and on the face of the judgment that the justice had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties at the time of rendering the judgment, and it is sought by the defendant, nearly ten years after the rendition of the judgment and notice thereof to him, to impeach the judgment by showing by extrinsic evidence jurisdictional defects. It seems to be conceded by both parties hereto that such an attack upon this judgment is a collateral attack. If the concession be correct, then, under the provisions of G. S. 1894, § 5029, this judgment could not be so impeached. The statute, so far as here material, is in these words:
"In all cases where a judgment has been rendered by a justice of the peace, and the same has not been appealed from, or reversed, or annulled, and has remained undisturbed for a period of not less than two years, such justice of the peace shall be presumed to have had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action and the parties thereto at the time of rendering such judgment, where it appears by the docket * * * that, at the time of rendering such judgment, he did acquire such jurisdiction."
The defendant claims that this statute cannot be construed as raising a conclusive presumption of the validity of such judgment in a collateral action or proceeding after the lapse of two years, because, if such was the intention of the legislature, it would have been expressly so stated therein. The presumption which this statute raises is either conclusive or simply prima facie. If the latter, the statute is unnecessary and meaningless, for, without it, a judgment, where the docket of the justice shows upon its face that at the time of rendering it he had acquired jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action and of the parties, is presumed, prima facie, to be valid. To construe the statute as raising after the lapse of two years only a disputable presumption as to the jurisdiction of the justice would defeat its purpose, and render it a nullity, for such a construction would leave the presumption after the lapse of two years precisely the same as the presumption existing during the two-years limitation, — simply prima facie in each case. It cannot be so construed. It is a remedial statute, and must be construed so as to effect the manifest purpose of its enactment, which was to prevent the mischief and injustice resulting from collateral attacks upon such judgments of a justice court as are shown by the record thereof to be valid. This result is accomplished by fixing a limitation of two years after which such judgments...
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