Vause v. Vause Farm Equipment Co.
Citation | 233 N.C. 88,63 S.E.2d 173 |
Decision Date | 02 February 1951 |
Docket Number | No. 668,668 |
Parties | VAUSE, v. VAUSE FARM EQUIPMENT Co., Inc., et al. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina |
Nance & Barrington, Fayetteville, for plaintiff, appellee.
H. L. Anderson, Fayetteville, and Smith, Leach & Anderson, Raleigh, for defendants, appellants.
The decisive question presented here is: Was there any evidence before the Industrial Commission upon which it could make a finding of fact that plaintiff was injured by an accident arising out of his employment? A careful study of the record impels a negative answer. All of the evidence below points to the plaintiff's epileptic seizure as the sole cause of his injury.
The Workmen's Compensation Act expressly provides that a 'personal injury' entitling an employee to an award of compensation 'shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, and shall not include a disease in any form, except where it results naturally and unavoidably from the accident.' G.S. § 97-2(f); and G.S. § 97-3. The words 'out of' refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and the words 'in the course of' to the time, place, and circumstances under which it occurred. Withers v. Black, 230 N.C. 428, 53 S.E.2d 668; Taylor v. Town of Wake Forest, 228 N.C. 346, 45 S.E.2d 387; Plemmons v. White's Service, Inc., 213 N.C. 148, 195 S.E. 370; Ridout v. Rose's Stores, Inc., 205 N.C. 423, 171 S.E. 642; Harden v. Thomasville Furniture Co., 199 N.C. 733, 155 S.E. 728.
An injury arises 'out of' the employment when it occurs in the course of the employment and is a natural and probable consequence or incident of it, so that there is some causal relation between the accident and the performance of some service of the employment. Rewis v. New York Life Insurance Co., 226 N.C. 325, 38 S.E.2d 97. The term 'arising out of', says Chief Justice Stacy in Bolling v. Belk-White Co., 228 N.C. 749, 46 S.E.2d 838, 839, has been defined to mean as
In the enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Act in 1929, our Legislature recognized that the common law remedies for injuries arising out of industry, based on negligence, were cumbersome, inadequate, and unjust. Therefore, a substitute was provided which broadened the base and liberalized the scope of compensation benefits for industrial injuries. The Act contains elements of mutual concessions between the employer and the employee by which the question of negligence is eliminated. Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., 198 N.C. 723, 153 S.E. 266, 268, quoting from Stertz v. Industrial Ins. Commission, 91 Wash. 588, 158 P. 256.
The philosophy which supports the Workmen's Compensation Act is Cox v. Kansas City Refining Co., 108 Kan. 320, 195 P. 863, 865, 19 A.L.R., 90. However, it must be borne in mind that the Act was never intended to provide the equivalent of general accident or health insurance.
Hence, the fundamental fairness and logic of the requirement that to be compensable an injury must arise 'out of' the employment, i. e., it must in some reasonable sense spring from and be traceable to the employment. Accordingly, 'Where an injury cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause * * * it does not arise out of the employment.' Bryan v. T. A. Loving Co. & Associates, 222 N.C. 724, 24 S.E.2d 751, 754, and cases cited.
The hazards of employment do not have to set in motion the sole causative force of an injury in order to make it compensable. By the weight of authority it is held that where a workman by reason of constitutional infirmities is predisposed to sustain injuries while engaged in labor, nevertheless the leniency and humanity of the law permit him to recover compensation if the physical aspects of the employment contribute in some reasonable degree to bring about or intensify the condition which renders him susceptible to such accident and consequent injury. But in such case 'the employment must have some definite, discernible relation to the accident.' Cox v. Kansas City Refining Co., supra. See also 58 Am.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, Section 247.
Similarly, it is generally held that where an employee is seized with an epileptic fit or dizziness and falls due to such or like causes, even so compensation will be awarded if a particular hazard inherent in the working conditions also contributes to the fall and consequent injury. See Annotations and cases reported therewith: Cox v. Kansas City Refining Co., 108 Kan. 320, 195 P. 863, 19 A.L.R. 95; Gilcrest Lumber Co. v. Rengler, 109 Neb. 246, 190 N.W. 578, 28 A.L.R. 204; and Valeri v. Village of Hibbing, 169 Minn. 241, 211 N.W. 8, 60 A.L.R. 1299.
In Schneider's Workmen's Compensation, 3d. Ed. (1946) Text Vol. 5, Section 1376, p. 61 et seq., is found an exhaustive treatise on 'Falls Due to Dizziness, Vertigo, Epilepsy and Like Causes.' The text is grounded on an analysis and collation of what appears to be substantially all of the decided cases on the subject. It appears therefrom that the better considered decisions adhere to the rule that where the accident and resultant injury arise out of both the idiopathic condition of the workman and hazards incident to the employment, the employer is liable. But not so where the idiopathic condition is the sole cause of the injury.
While there must be some causal connection between the employment and the injury, nevertheless it is sufficient if the injury is one which, after the event, may be seen to have had its origin in the employment, and it need not be shown that it is one which should have been foreseen or expected. Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., supra.
A finding of fact of the Industrial Commission is conclusive on appeal if supported by the evidence. This is so, notwithstanding the evidence upon the entire record might support a contrary finding. Riddick v. Richmond Cedar Works, 227 N.C. 647, 43 S.E.2d 850. However, the findings of fact of the Industrial Commission are conclusive on appeal only when supported by evidence, and the Court, on appeal, may review the evidence to determine as a matter of law whether there is any evidence tending to support the findings. Hildebrand v. McDowell Furniture Co., 212 N.C. 100, 193 S.E. 294. Therefore, the determination of whether an accident arose out of the employment is a mixed question of fact and law. Plemmons v. White's Service, Inc., supra.
Examining the evidence below in the light of the foregoing principles, it apperars that the plaintiff while a student at State College years ago suffered a spine injury which since then has made him subject to epileptic convulsions at intermittent intervals. Dr. W. T. Rainey, who has treated the plaintiff for this condition for the past four or five years, characterized the seizures as 'traumatic epilepsy.' He said they produced unconsciousness and caused muscular spasms: 'that they varied, some of them just a short period of unconsciousness,--just a fleeting, hardly stop, to one in which he would have convulsions in which there would be muscular contractions.' The plaintiff testified he could feel one of these seizures when it was coming on. He said 'they give me pretty good warning.' Just before the events complained of, he felt one coming on: 'I became a little nauseated or had a funny feeling in my head.' Thus heeding the warning of the approaching seizure, the plaintiff drove the truck off on the side of the road and lay down with his head on the side of the seat opposite the steering wheel. He said: He then lost consciousness. He said the next thing he knew his body was hanging out of the truck: ...
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...the employer is liable. But not so where the idiopathic condition is the sole cause of the injury." Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., Inc., 233 N.C. 88, 92-93, 63 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1951). The general rule is that where an employee falls from a building, scaffold, ladder, or other place of dang......
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