Vector Engineering and Mfg. Corp. v. Pequet
| Decision Date | 28 January 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-781,3-781 |
| Citation | 431 N.E.2d 503 |
| Parties | VECTOR ENGINEERING AND MANUFACTURING CORP., Appellant, v. A. David PEQUET (sic), Appellee. A 171. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
A. David Peuquet was employed by Vector Engineering and Manufacturing Corporation as a sales manager. Peuquet received a base salary and commissions from sales he made. After Peuquet was terminated, he filed suit alleging that Vector had breached its contract with him by withholding sales commissions due him. At a bench trial, the trial court awarded Peuquet $11,332.44 plus costs and prejudgment interest at the rate of 8% per annum. The judgment was rendered as a general judgment.
On appeal Vector raises the following issues:
(1) Whether the judgment is contrary to law because the trial court misconstrued the contract?
(2) Whether the judgment of the trial court is contrary to the evidence and against the weight of the evidence?
(3) Whether the judgment of the trial court was prejudicially tainted by the admission of incompetent, irrelevant, and improper evidence?
We affirm.
The trial court entered a general judgment. The general judgment is presumed to be based upon findings supported by the evidence. If the action of the trial court is sustainable on any legal theory, it must be affirmed. Ray v. Goldsmith (1980), Ind.App., 400 N.E.2d 176, 177. This Court will neither weigh conflicting evidence nor resolve questions concerning the credibility of witnesses. This Court may consider only that evidence most favorable to the appellee, Peuquet, together with all the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. If from that viewpoint there is evidence of probative value to sustain the judgment of the trial court, that judgment will not be disturbed. Id.
Vector is a job shop. It designs and produces specialized parts for machinery. When Vector offered Peuquet the position of sales manager, it gave him a letter summarizing the duties of the sales manager and the compensation. It stated the salary and benefits as follows:
"SALARY AND BENEFITS
-----------------------------------------------
"Salary First 4 months 2166 dollars/month
with no commissions
From 4 to 40 months
Base 1200 dollars/month
1. Plus 2.5% Jobbing Sales up
to 125,000 dollars per
customer per year
2. Plus 1.5% Jobbing Sales over
125,000 dollars per customer
per year
3. Plus 1.5% Special Equipment
Sales
4. Plus 1500 dollars is (sic) sales
increase more than 35% in
any one year.
5. Less .5% for accounts paid
after 45 days, and less 1% for
accounts paid after 75 days."
Peuquet's commissions were computed on the basis of what had been shipped rather than the orders that had been turned in.
On appeal, Vector argues that Peuquet should not receive commissions on orders taken but not shipped before Peuquet's termination because a sale had not taken place within the meaning of the employment contract. Vector argues that the trial court has misconstrued the contract by allowing Peuquet to receive such commissions. Peuquet argues that he was entitled to commissions on orders he had secured before his termination even though payment was deferred until after shipping.
As a general rule, a person employed on a commission basis to solicit sales orders is entitled to his commission when the order is accepted by his employer. The entitlement to commissions is not affected by the fact that payment for those orders may be delayed until after they have been shipped. Oken v. National Chain Company (1981), R.I., 424 A.2d 234, 235, Marcin v. Darling Valve and Manufacturing Company (W.D.Pa.1966), 259 F.Supp. 720, 723; Weick v. Rickenbaugh Cadillac Company (1956), 134 Col. 283, 303 P.2d 685, 688; see Richer v. Khoury Brothers, Inc. (7th Cir. 1965), 341 F.2d 34; see Diana v. Burnside Motors, Inc. (1973), 30 Conn.Supp. 561, 304 A.2d 222; see Kowal v. Sportswear by Revere, Inc. (1967), 351 Mass. 541, 222 N.E.2d 778; see Lundeen v. Cozy Cab Manufacturing Company (1970), 288 Minn. 98, 179 N.W.2d 73; see Elliott v. Clyde Garfield Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc. (1966), 107 N.H. 363, 222 A.2d 215. This general rule may be altered by a written agreement by the parties or by the conduct of the parties which clearly demonstrates a different compensation scheme. If Vector had desired to deny commissions to Peuquet subsequent to his termination as an employee,...
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