Veeder v. Veeder

• Citation: 189 Iowa 912,179 N.W. 136
• Decision Date: 02 October 1920
• Docket Number: No. 32098.,32098.
• Parties: VEEDER v. VEEDER.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

189 Iowa 912

179 N.W. 136

VEEDER

v.VEEDER.

No. 32098.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 2, 1920.

Appeal from District Court, Wright County; R. M. Wright, Judge.

Plaintiff sought and was denied divorce. Defendant filed cross-petition, and thereupon obtained divorce. Plaintiff appeals both from the denial of a divorce to her and the granting of one to the defendant. Affirmed on appeal of plaintiff from refusal to grant her a divorce. Reversed on appeal of plaintiff from granting divorce against her on cross-petition.Berry & Hill, of Clarion, for appellant.

Healy & Thomas, of Ft. Dodge, and Ladd & Rogers, of Clarion, for appellee.

SALINGER, J.

[1] I. One charge is that the excessive sexual demands of the husband constituted cruel and inhuman treatment. We may assume that such demands may be such treatment. We may assume that the testimony of the plaintiff shows such treatment. But a most careful reading of the record fails to disclose any corroboration. We recognize that in the very nature of things corroborative evidence supporting such an accusation is difficult to obtain; but that, of course, will not change the statute. Upon that charge, or any others, there may not be a decree of divorce without corroboration. That the corroborative evidence may be difficult to obtain is a misfortune of plaintiff, which, however, cannot repeal the statute. Indeed, it may not be amiss to add that there was at least one occasion when corroborative testimony in some degree could have been obtained, and would naturally have been obtained, and yet was not gotten. Plaintiff testifies that on one occasion she was driven from her bed by the conduct of the defendant, and sought refuge with a nurse sleeping in another room. It would have been most natural to make some declaration as to the alleged cause for coming into this room and retiring there with the nurse, and not wholly unnatural to at least intimate the reason now asserted for it. But not a suggestion of the sort, which might possibly have been admissable as res gestæ, was made. On the contrary, the explanation given was that she was disturbed by the snoring of one of the children sleeping in the room of herself and husband, because of pressure of company. This charge fails for lack of corroboration.

[2] II. Appellee contends that the sole basis of plaintiff's application for a decree of divorce is cruel and inhuman treatment, worked by alleged excessive demands on part of defendant. We do not so read the petition. Such treatment is further claimed to have been suffered because, at the time when plaintiff was away from the home of defendant and pregnant, and she became ill with chills and fever, and was confined to her bed at the home of her parents, that on the forenoon of a given day defendant came there, and while plaintiff was confined in bed, as aforesaid, he cursed and abused her, threatened and accused her of committing an abortion, called her a murderer and destroyer of a child, and threatened her with prosecution for murder. She further alleges that the aforesaid abuse and threats caused her much pain and suffering; that she became very weak and nervous; that during the afternoon of that day she suffered a miscarriage, effected by said abuse, cursing, and threats; that the miscarriage caused her much pain and suffering, both mentally and physically, and compelled her to obtain medical treatment; that she was confined to her bed for several days; that the defendant repeated his visit while the plaintiff was still confined in bed, and again called her a murderer, a destroyer of a child, and threatened to prosecute her for murder; that said treatment caused her a relapse, and to suffer much pain, mentally and physically, to such an extent that it actually endangered her life.

The testimony shows the alleged conduct, and there is corroboration. But the record satisfies us that, even if the accusations were in fact unfounded, the husband had reasonable ground for believing them to be true. Their making under excitement and agitation caused by that belief do not constitute the cruel treatment that will base a divorce. No case has gone beyond treating certain accusations, made without belief in their truth or wantonly, as such cruelty.

[3] (a) The appellee urges that the marriage of the plaintiff to him was the result of a conspiracy on her part to obtain his property; that she entered into marriage while telling others that she was filled with hate of the defendant; and that this fact has large bearing in sustaining the court in having granted a decree of divorce to defendant on his cross-petition. The appellant responds that this alleged mental attitude of the wife is immaterial and irrelevant, if it were conceded that the evidence proves the existence of such an attitude. So far as the petition of the plaintiff is concerned, it is not immaterial that she failed to enter the marriage relation in good faith, and was actuated by ulterior and improper motives only. A court of equity might well deny relief to a suitor seeking a divorce, because it found he did not enter the court with clean...