Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 22 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | 12-CV-6158 (SJF) |
| Parties | CARLOS VEGA, Plaintiff, v. HEMPSTEAD UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, DAGOBERTO ARTILES and CHY DAVIDSON (sued in their individual and official capacities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983), Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Defendants Hempstead Union Free School District ("District"), Dagoberto Artiles ("Artiles"), and Chy Davidson ("Davidson") (collectively, "defendants") have moved for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 12(c), on plaintiff Carlos Vega's ("plaintiff") amended complaint. For the following reasons, defendants' motion is GRANTED and plaintiff's amended complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
Plaintiff, a math teacher for twenty-four (24) years, has been employed by defendant District for sixteen (16) years and was tenured in 1999. Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 7. Plaintiff is of Hispanic ethnicity and speaks fluent English and Spanish. Id. at ¶ 8. The District is an employer as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Id. at ¶ 9. Since 2011, the District has employed defendant Artiles as a principal in one of its four (4) high schools. Id. at ¶10. As principal, Artiles is responsible for personnel decisions in the District, including hiring, firing, evaluating and disciplining employees. Id. at ¶11. Defendant Davidson was employed by the District as aprincipal in one of its high schools from approximately 2006 to 2011 and was responsible for personnel decisions, including hiring, firing, evaluating and disciplining employees. Id. at ¶¶ 14, 15.
"After the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). " 'In deciding a Rule 12(c) motion, we apply the same standard as that applicable to a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), accepting the allegations contained in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.' " Byrd v. City of New York, No. 04 Civ. 1396, 2005 WL 1349876, at *1 (2d Cir. June 8, 2005) (quoting Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 56 (2d Cir.1999)). However, it is "well settled that conclusory allegations merely stating general legal conclusions necessary to prevail on the merits of a claim, unsupported by factual averments will not be accepted as true." ECOR Solutions, Inc. v. Malcolm Pirnie, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 1103, 2005 WL 1843253, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. July 29, 2005). On FRCP 12(b)(6) motions, the court must assess the legal feasibility of the complaint and whether a plaintiff pleaded claims for which he or she is entitled to discovery. Sims v. Artuz, 230 F.3d 14, 20 (2d Cir. 2000); Chance, 143 F.3d at 701. The Supreme Court has held that a "plaintiff's obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitlement to relief" requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009), the Supreme Court held that courts should entertain a motion to dismiss by following a two-pronged approach:
[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a "short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading set forth facts that the pleader is entitled to relief and provide a defendant with fair notice. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(1)(a) ("Title VII") provides that it "shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer- (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." The language of the statute " Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
In a Title VII discrimination case "where there is no direct or overt evidence of discriminatory conduct," a court applies the "three part burden shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)." Weinstock v. Columbia University, 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 2000).
"First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she is qualified for her position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination." Id. at 42 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
Once a plaintiff articulates a prima facie case of discrimination under the statute, the "burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the disparate treatment. McDonnell Douglas Corp, 411 U.S. at 802. " '[T]he defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence,' reasons for its actions which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993) (quoting Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981)). The burden then shifts back to plaintiff to prove " 'that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision,' and that race was." Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256) (internal citations omitted). The "ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendantintentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
The "same analytical framework applies to . . . disparate treatment claims whether brought under § 1983 or Title VII." Das v. Consol. Sch. Dist. of New Britain, 369 F. App'x 186, 188 (2d Cir. 2010). Once "action under color of state law is established . . . an equal protection claim parallels . . . a Title VII claim, [e]xcept, of course, that unlike a Title VII claim a Section 1983 claim can be brought against individuals." Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 159 & n.20 (2d Cir. 2004). "The elements of one are generally the same as the elements of the other and the two must stand or fall together." Id. at 159. See Tilghman v. Waterbury Bd. of Educ., 154 F. App'x 221, 223 (2d Cir. 2005) (); Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 225-27 (2d Cir. 2004) ().
The first and second factors are undisputed. Plaintiff is of Hispanic ethnicity and is therefore a member of a protected class. As to the second factor, plaintiff is a tenured math teacher who has been employed by defendant District for sixteen (16) years during which he received positive reviews and evaluations. Thus, he was qualified for his position.
The third inquiry is whether plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action. A plaintiff sustains an adverse employment action if he or she endures a "materially adverse change" in the terms and conditions of employment. Galabya v. New York City Bd. of Educ, 202 F.3d 636,640 (2d Cir. 2000). "An 'adverse employment action' is one which is 'more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.' " Feingold, 366 F.3d at 152 (quoting Galabya, 202 F.3d at 640). "A materially adverse change might be indicated by a termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation." Crady v. Liberty Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Indiana, 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993).
"A showing of disparate treatment—that is, a showing that the employer treated plaintiff 'less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside his protected group'—is a recognized method of raising an inference of discrimination for purposes of making out a prima facie case." Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 379 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000)). A plaintiff relying on disparate treatment evidence "must show she was similarly situated in all...
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