Vega v. Sec'y, DOC
| Decision Date | 02 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 2:11-cv-413-FtM-38CM |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
| Parties | WALTER VEGA, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DOC and P. J. MECUSKER, Respondents. |
Petitioner Walter Vega ("Petitioner") initiated this action for habeas corpus relief by filing a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #1). Upon consideration of the petition, the Court ordered Respondents to show cause why the relief sought by Petitioner should not be granted (Doc. #22). Thereafter, Respondents filed a response in compliance with this Court's instructions and with Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (Doc. #42). Petitioner filed an "Amended Brief" and a reply (Doc. #21; Doc. #87).
Petitioner raises ten claims in his petition. Petitioner alleges that: (1) the trial court erred by allowing the victim to testify that, since the night of the incident, she was scaredand would not let anyone touch her; (2) the trial court erred by not granting Petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal; (3) the trial court erred by failing to strike the testimony of the victim's former boyfriend based on a violation of the rule of sequestration; (4) the trial court erred by admitting the hearsay testimony of Officer Steven Gruber; (5) the trial court erred by allowing Officer Gederain to give his interpretation of Petitioner's statement; (6) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately prepare for trial; (7) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the court's lack of jurisdiction; (8) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach the prosecution witnesses or to call into question the chain of custody of DNA evidence; (9) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the use of "cumulative hearsay" evidence; and (10) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's shifting of the burden of proof (Doc. #1 at 1-14). Petitioner also filed a non-permissive "Amended Brief" in which he alleges that his due process rights were violated because he was denied an interpreter at trial; he was not timely brought to trial under Florida's speedy trial law; the prosecutor did not execute a proper oath of office; the state's DNA expert testified that there was not a 100% match of the victim's DNA to the DNA on Petitioner's hand; and a review of the testimony of the victim and her boyfriend show that they lied at trial (Doc. #21 at 2-5).
Because this Court can adequately assess Petitioner's claims without further factual development, an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted. Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003). Upon due consideration of the petition, the response, the reply, and the state court record, this Court concludes that Claims One through Five of the petition are due to be dismissed as unexhausted and procedurally barred. Claims Six through Ten are denied pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Court also dismisses the claims raised in Petitioner's "Amended Brief" as unexhausted and procedurally barredor as lacking in merit.
On November 2, 2005, Petitioner was charged by information with sexual battery in violation of Florida Statute § 794.011(5) (Vol. 1 at 9).2 A jury trial was held on June 13 and 14, 2006, after which Petitioner was found guilty as charged and sentenced to thirteen years and 183 days in prison (Vol. II). Florida's Second District Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence (Ex. 5); Vega v. State, 980 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).
On May 20, 2008, Petitioner filed a motion pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Rule 3.850 motion") (Ex. 12). Petitioner filed supplements to the Rule 3.850 motion on July 10, 2008, July 31, 2008, December 22, 2008, March 13, 2008, April 16, 2009, and July 1, 2009 (Ex. 16 at 30, 438, 456, 461, 501, and 511). The post-conviction court denied all but one of Petitioner's five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and ordered an evidentiary hearing on the remaining claim (Ex. 14). The post-conviction court also concluded that the claims raised in Petitioner's supplemental pleadings were either procedurally barred because they should have been raised on direct appeal, or were unsupported by the record. Id. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief on Petitioner's remaining Rule 3.850 claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (Ex. 15). Florida's Second District Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed (Ex. 19); Vega v. State, 64 So.3d 1273 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
On, or about February 22, 2010, Petitioner filed an amended state petition for writof habeas corpus in which he reiterated the claims of trial court error and ineffective assistance of trial counsel he had raised on direct appeal, in his Rule 3.850 motion, and in the supplements to the Rule 3.850 motion (Ex. 22). The petition was denied on March 8, 2010 without elaboration (Ex. 4); Vega v. State, 30 So.3d 505 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).
Petitioner filed the instant petition on July 25, 2011 (Doc. #1).
Pursuant to the AEDPA, federal habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court's summary rejection of a claim, even without explanation, qualifies as an adjudication on the merits which warrants deference. Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir. 2008).
"Clearly established federal law" consists of the governing legal principles, rather than the dicta, set forth in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court at the time the state court issues its decision. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). A decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court either: (1) applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law; or (2) reached a different result from the Supreme Court when faced with materially indistinguishable facts. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003).
A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of the Supreme Court's precedents if the state court correctly identified the governing legal principle, but applied it to the facts of the petitioner's case in an objectively unreasonable manner, Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 134 (2005); Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11th Cir. 2000) or, "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Bottoson, 234 F.3d at 531 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 406). The unreasonable application inquiry requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous, rather, it must be "objectively unreasonable." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-77 (2003) (citation omitted); Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 17-18; Ward, 592 F.3d at 1155.
Finally, the Supreme Court has clarified that: "a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (dictum). When reviewing a claim under § 2254(d), a federal court must bear in mind that any "determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct[,]" and the petitioner bears "the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340 ().
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court established a two-part test fordetermining whether a convicted person is entitled to relief on the ground that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). A petitioner must establish that counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. Because both parts of the Strickland test must be satisfied in order to demonstrate a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a district court need not address the performance prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, or vice versa. Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000).
The focus of inquiry under Stricklands performance prong is "reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89. In reviewing counsel's performance, a court must adhere to a strong presumption that "counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. Indeed, the petitioner bears the burden to "prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsel's performance was unreasonable[.]" Jones v. Campbell, 436 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006). A court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct," applying a "highly deferential" level of judicial scrutiny. Roe v. Flores-Ortega,...
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