Velardi v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc.

• Citation: 178 Conn. 371,423 A.2d 77
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 17 July 1979
• Parties: Harry A. VELARDI v. RYDER TRUCK RENTAL, INC., et al.

Page 77

423 A.2d 77

178 Conn. 371

Harry A. VELARDI v. RYDER TRUCK RENTAL, INC., et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 2, 1979.

Decided July 17, 1979.

Alexander Winnick, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, was Arthur Riccio, Jr., New Haven, for appellant (plaintiff).

David W. Cooney, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Edmund T. Curran, Hartford, for appellee (defendant Frank Valla).

Before COTTER, C. J., and LOISELLE, LONGO, PETERS and PARSKEY, JJ.

LONGO, Associate Justice.

Section 31-284 of the General Statutes, in part, provides, as a basic tenet of our workmen's compensation law, that "(a)n employer shall not be liable to any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment." Section 31-293a, provides, in part, that "no action may be brought against ... (a) fellow employee except for negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle." In this case, we are called upon to decide whether the trial court erred when, in construing these statutes, it determined that the defendant Frank Valla, doing business as Frank Valla Catering, was not liable to a suit for negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle as a fellow employee of the plaintiff, and in concluding that the plaintiff's sole remedy for his injuries was, pursuant to §§ 31-284 and 31-293a, a claim for workmen's compensation.

The plaintiff, Harry A. Velardi, instituted this action in the Superior Court to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment. The action was instituted against five defendants, including the appellee Frank Valla, doing business as Frank Valla Catering, hereinafter the defendant. The plaintiff, in the fifth count of his complaint, alleged that at the time of his injuries he and the defendant were "fellow employees," within the meaning of § 31-293a of the General Statutes, of Frank Valla Catering, a concern which operated a catering business, and that the injuries to his legs and other parts of his body were caused, inter alia, by the negligence of the defendant Frank Valla in failing properly to park his rented truck, causing it to roll forward and strike the plaintiff.

In his answer to the plaintiff's complaint, the defendant denied liability for the plaintiff's injuries, and, in addition, filed a motion for summary judgment in which he alleged, in effect, that the plaintiff and he were not fellow employees; that the plaintiff was employed by him in the catering business which the defendant operated individually as a sole proprietorship under the business name of Frank Valla Catering that the plaintiff had made a claim for workmen's compensation benefits and was paid $3394.57 in benefits; and that the plaintiff was barred from bringing an action against his employer, the defendant, since his sole remedy was under the Workmen's Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31-284, a remedy which the plaintiff had already pursued. The trial court granted summary as to the defendant for the reasons advanced in support of the motion, and the plaintiff has appealed from the judgment rendered thereon.

The plaintiff principally argues that a genuine issue of material fact existed requiring an evidentiary hearing on the scope of the services performed by the defendant to determine whether the defendant was a "fellow employee" within the meaning of § 31-293a of the General Statutes, ¹ whose alleged negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle could form the basis of an action by the plaintiff at law, exclusive of the remedy provided by workmen's compensation. He contends that the defendant was, in fact, his "fellow employee," since they both worked together at the time of the accident and since, it is claimed, the defendant and the plaintiff were both employees of Frank Valla Catering at the time the plaintiff was injured. The court decided, however, that for the purposes of opposing a motion for summary judgment, the bald assertion by the plaintiff that the defendant was an employee, like the plaintiff, of Frank Valla Catering, was not legally sufficient to create the existence of a controverted material fact and that merely because the defendant employer worked together with the plaintiff did not change the defendant's status from employer to "fellow employee." We agree.

Within the framework of the pleadings in the present case, the sole manner in which the plaintiff could maintain an action at law against the defendant is if the defendant was a "fellow employee," amenable to suit within the exception provided in General Statutes § 31-293a. Our attention to this issue is not diverted by the plaintiff's argument that the granting of summary judgment by the trial court was procedurally erroneous on the ground that the defendant's status in relation to the plaintiff created a material issue of fact. While we agree with the salutary principle that the summary judgment procedure is ill-adapted to negligence cases, since the conclusion of negligence is normally one of fact; Spencer v. Good Earth Restaurant Corporation, 164 Conn. 194, 198, 319 A.2d 403 (1972); Cappiello v. Haselman, 154 Conn. 490, 495, 227 A.2d 79 (1967); it is nonetheless evident that the present case could not, as a matter of law, have proceeded unless the trial court had determined that the plaintiff's claim was not preempted by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, in particular General Statutes § 31-284, which makes workmen's compensation benefits an employee's sole remedy against an employer for personal injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment. See Farrell v. L. G. DeFelice & Son, Inc., 132 Conn. 81, 42 A.2d 697 (1945). Thus, it was entirely proper for the court initially to perceive the case as involving a question of law. The mere assertion of the legal conclusion that the defendant was a "fellow employee" of the plaintiff was not sufficient to defeat the...