Velazquez ex rel. Velazquez v. Jiminez

• Decision Date: 29 May 2002
• Citation: 172 N.J. 240,798 A.2d 51
• Parties: Conor VELAZQUEZ, an infant by his mother and natural guardian, Charmaine VELAZQUEZ, Charmaine Velazquez, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Conor Velazquez, and Jose Velazquez, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Conor Velazquez, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Teresa JIMINEZ, M.D., St. Peter's Medical Center, Ellen Maak, R.N., Jeanine Healy, R.N., and John Does, M.D., Defendants, and Angela C. Ranzini, M.D., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

798 A.2d 51

172 N.J. 240

Conor VELAZQUEZ, an infant by his mother and natural guardian, Charmaine VELAZQUEZ, Charmaine Velazquez, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Conor Velazquez, and Jose Velazquez, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Conor Velazquez, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Teresa JIMINEZ, M.D., St. Peter's Medical Center, Ellen Maak, R.N., Jeanine Healy, R.N., and John Does, M.D., Defendants, and Angela C. Ranzini, M.D., Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued January 2, 2002.

Decided May 29, 2002.

Donald P. Jacobs, Summit, argued the cause for appellant (Budd Larner Gross Rosenbaum Greenberg & Sade, attorneys; Cynthia A. Walters, of counsel; Mr. Jacobs and Scott E. Reynolds, on the briefs).

James M. Andrews argued the cause for respondents (Blank Rome Comisky & McCauley, attorneys; Mr. Andrews, Michelle F. McGovern, Cherry Hill, and James Llewellyn Matthews, on the brief). The opinion of the Court was delivered by LONG, J.

New Jersey's Good Samaritan Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-1, provides:

Any individual, including a person licensed to practice any method of treatment of human ailments, disease, pain, injury, deformity, mental or physical condition, or licensed to render services ancillary thereto, or any person who is a volunteer member of a duly incorporated first aid and emergency or volunteer ambulance or rescue squad association, who in good faith renders emergency care at the scene of an accident or emergency to the victim or victims thereof, or while transporting the victim or victims thereof to a hospital or other facility where treatment or care is to be rendered, shall not be liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency care.

The issue of first impression presented here is whether that statute can be invoked to immunize a hospital physician who assists a patient at the hospital during a medical emergency. We hold that it cannot.

I

In July 1994, Charmaine and Jose Velazquez (collectively, plaintiffs), individually and as representatives of the estate of their deceased son, Conor, sued St. Peter's Medical Center (Medical Center) and its staff members, Teresa Jiminez, M.D., Angela C. Ranzini, M.D., Ellen Maak, R.N., Jeanine Healy, R.N., and unnamed residents, for damages resulting from their negligence during Conor's delivery.

Before trial, Dr. Jiminez, the Medical Center and the nurses settled with plaintiffs who, in turn, voluntarily dismissed the residents. Dr. Ranzini moved for summary judgment under the Good Samaritan Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-1 to -2. The trial court denied the motion as a matter of law, holding that the Act does not immunize physicians responding to emergencies within a hospital. Dr. Ranzini went to trial alone.

The facts established at trial are detailed in the Appellate Division opinion, Velazquez v. Jiminez, 336 N.J.Super. 10, 18-28, 763 A.2d 753 (2000), and are incorporated as if more fully set forth. Mrs. Velazquez was a patient at the Medical Center for the purpose of delivering a baby. Dr. Jiminez was her attending physician. Complications occurred during the delivery because Mrs. Velazquez's baby was suffering from bilateral shoulder dystocia (both of his shoulders were lodged against his mother's pubic bone). After delivering the baby's head, Dr. Jiminez was unable to deliver the rest of the baby's body. She rang for assistance and Dr. Ranzini responded.

Dr. Ranzini had no prior relationship with or connection to Mrs. Velazquez. Dr. Ranzini was an Assistant Professor of Clinical Obstetrics and Gynecology at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (UMDNJ), assigned to the Maternal Fetal Care Unit (MFCU) at the Medical Center. She specializes in maternal fetal medicine and was responsible both for attending to high-risk patients in the MFCU and for supervising resident physicians who cared for their own UMDNJ clinical patients at the Medical Center. Mrs. Velazquez was neither an MFCU nor a clinical patient. Rather, she was the patient of Dr. Jiminez, an attending physician with staff privileges at the Medical Center.

Dr. Ranzini first attempted to complete the delivery vaginally. When those efforts proved unsuccessful, Dr. Ranzini assisted in preparing Mrs. Velazquez and the baby—who was, by virtue of his position, at risk of suffering from hypoxia (a loss of oxygen)—for an emergency Caesarean section. The baby, Conor, ultimately was born severely brain damaged, spent his life in a dependent state and died of pneumonia before reaching his third birthday.

As might be expected in a medical malpractice case, the trial essentially was a battle of experts. Plaintiffs' experts testified that Dr. Ranzini deviated from the standard of care. Dr. Ranzini's experts testified, in essence, that her conduct conformed to all applicable medical standards and that Conor's condition resulted from the negligence of Dr. Jiminez. The details of that testimony need not be recounted here because the issue before us is Dr. Ranzini's amenability to suit and not the substance of the care that she rendered.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs and assigned three percent of the liability to Dr. Ranzini. The trial court, sua sponte, entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.) in favor of Dr. Ranzini. The court ruled that under Scafidi v. Seiler, 119 N.J. 93, 574 A.2d 398 (1990), Dr. Ranzini's liability could not be regarded as a substantial factor in the harm that resulted to Conor. In so ruling, the court reiterated that the Good Samaritan Act did not operate to insulate Dr. Ranzini from suit.

Plaintiffs appealed, challenging the j.n.o.v., among other trial errors. Dr. Ranzini cross-appealed from the trial court's ruling that the Good Samaritan Act did not immunize her from suit. The Appellate Division reversed the j.n.o.v. (an issue not before us) and rejected Dr. Ranzini's cross-appeal on the ground that, as a matter of law, the Good Samaritan Act does not apply to physicians working within a hospital. Velazquez, supra, 336 N.J.Super. at 16, 52, 763 A.2d 753.

We granted Dr. Ranzini's petition for certification regarding the applicability of the Good Samaritan Act to emergencies involving a patient occurring within a hospital. 169 N.J. 604, 782 A.2d 422 (2001).

II

Dr. Ranzini argues that the Appellate Division erred in concluding that the protections of the Good Samaritan statute stop at the door of the hospital. According to her, the location of an emergency is of no consequence; a physician is immunized so long as he or she acts in the absence of a prior duty to do so. She further contends that the weight of out-of-state authority supports her interpretation, which she claims will encourage physicians to assist in a hospital emergency. Finally, she argues that she had no prior duty to Mrs. Velazquez and thus was entitled to the shield of N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-1 as a volunteer.

Plaintiffs counter that Dr. Ranzini's construction of the Act is inconsistent with its plain meaning and legislative purpose. They contend that it would be illogical for the Legislature to have intended the original "scene of an accident or emergency" language to include care rendered in a hospital if, in 1987, it conferred an additional grant of immunity to Good Samaritans while they transport victims from the scene to the hospital. Plaintiffs additionally dispute that most other jurisdictions have immunized physicians in hospitals. Finally, plaintiffs assert that Dr. Ranzini had a pre-existing duty to assist Mrs. Velazquez.

III

The term "Good Samaritan" derives from a New Testament parable in which a Samaritan was the only passer-by to aid a man who had been left half dead by a group of thieves. Luke 10:30-37 (King James).¹ Although the Good Samaritan is viewed as a behavioral model, the common law devolved no duty on a bystander to provide affirmative aid to an injured person, even if he or she had the ability to do so. Lundy v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 34 F.3d 1173, 1178 (3d Cir.1994) (citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 56, at 375 (5th ed.1984)); see also Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal.2d 356, 232 P.2d 241, 247 (1951) ("[N]o one is obliged by law to assist a stranger, even though he can do so by a mere word, and without the slightest danger to himself.") (alteration in original) (quoting Silva v. Providence Hosp., 14 Cal.2d 762, 97 P.2d 798, 804 (1939)); Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058, 1058 (1901) (holding that only physician available in town not liable for refusing request to come to assist seriously ill person who subsequently died from lack of medical attention). However, once a bystander endeavored to help, the common law recognized a duty to do so reasonably, and the volunteer could be held liable for injuries caused by his or her negligent assistance. Malloy, supra, 232 P.2d at 247; cf. United States v. DeVane, 306 F.2d 182, 186 (5th Cir.1962) (holding that Coast Guard's decision to undertake or abandon rescue is discretionary, "[b]ut having undertaken the rescue and engendering reliance thereon, the obligation arose to use reasonable care in carrying out the rescue"). Dean Prosser aptly summarized the common law: "The result of all this is that the Good Samaritan who tries to help may find himself mulcted in damages, while the priest and the Levite who pass by on the other side go on their cheerful way rejoicing." William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 56, at 341-42 (4th ed.1971).

In fact, however, prior to 1959, "there could be found no instance, in California or any other state, of a physician being sued for negligence in rendering aid at the scene of an emergency." Frank B. Mapel, III & Charles J. Weigel, II, Good Samaritan Laws—Who Needs Them?: The Current State of Good Samaritan Protection in the United States, 21 S. Tex. L.Rev. 327, 330 (1981) (citing Chayet, This Summer...