Velazquez v. Water Taxi, Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 February 1980
• Citation: 403 N.E.2d 172,426 N.Y.S.2d 467,49 N.Y.2d 762
• Parties: , 403 N.E.2d 172 Rosa VELAZQUEZ, Appellant, v. WATER TAXI, INC., et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 467

426 N.Y.S.2d 467

49 N.Y.2d 762, 403 N.E.2d 172

Rosa VELAZQUEZ, Appellant, v. WATER TAXI, INC., et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 12, 1980.

Dimitrios C. Fotopoulos, New York City, for appellant.

Jacob M. Dinnes, Victor Roger Rubin and William Dinkes, New York City, for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.

Plaintiff was injured when the taxi in which she was riding, owned by defendant Water Taxi, Inc., collided with a "hit and run" driver. She commenced arbitration proceedings pursuant to the uninsured motorist indorsement, and a legal action against Water Taxi, the driver Campbell and the driver's employer, Ramp Maintenance Corp. In the proceeding as well as in the action, plaintiff sought $1,000,000 in damages. The arbitrator rendered an award for $2,500 noneconomic loss, which was reduced to judgment which in turn was satisfied by Water Taxi, a self-insurer. Defendants in the legal action then moved for summary judgment, contending that the arbitration award bars this action. We agree.

It is well settled that the satisfaction of a judgment rendered against one tort-feasor discharges all joint tort-feasors from liability to the plaintiff (Bundt v. Wallach's Auto Rental, 21 N.Y.2d 1032, 291 N.Y.S.2d 12, 238 N.E.2d 502, affg. sub nom. Bundt v. Embro, 27 A.D.2d 931, 278 N.Y.S.2d 770; Restatement, Judgments, § 95; see Goines v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 6 A.D.2d 531, 533, 179 N.Y.S.2d 960, 962; cf. Walsh v. New York Cent. & Hudson Riv. R. R. Co., 204 N.Y. 58, 62-63, 97 N.E. 408, 409-410). ^* Here, the arbitration award, which was reduced to judgment and satisfied, represented a recovery against one of the joint tort-feasors, the hit-and-run driver. The arbitrator was authorized to award all sums which plaintiff would have been entitled to recover from the hit-and-run driver or owner, not to exceed $10,000 (Insurance Law, § 167, subd. 2-a). As a joint tort-feasor, of course, the hit-and-run driver was legally responsible for the total amount of damages suffered, and not merely those stemming from his own conduct (see, e. g., Klinger v. Dudley, 41 N.Y.2d 362, 367, 393 N.Y.S.2d 323, 327, 361 N.E.2d 974, 978; Restatement, Torts, § 875). Thus, the damages awarded by the arbitrator must be considered, prima facie, to be the total damages due plaintiff for her noneconomic loss.

Contrary to plaintiff's contention, there is no indication that the arbitrator limited his award to those damages directly caused by the hit-and-run vehicle. The award itself stated:

"1. WATER TAXI, INCORPORATED hereinafter referred to as Respondent, shall pay to ROSA VELAZQUEZ the sum of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($2,500.00).

"2. The award is for non-economic loss. No issue as to economic loss was submitted to this arbitration." There is an outright direction that Water Taxi pay to Velazquez $2,500 with no limitation. Stipulation "2" is irrelevant for present purposes and at most explains that the award covers loss of a "non-economic" nature, since no claim or proof as to "economic loss was submitted to this arbitration."

Had plaintiff established that the arbitrator did adjudicate only the dollar value of the hit-and-run vehicle's apportioned share of the liability, this might well be a different case. In a similar vein, there is no indication that the $10,000 maximum on uninsured motorist awards influenced the amount of damages set by the arbitrator. If the arbitrator had found that total damages were in excess of $10,000, surely he would not have awarded plaintiff the significantly lesser sum of $2,500.

MEYER, Judge (dissenting).

Because the majority fails to take account of the difference between plaintiff's common-law cause of action against Water Taxi for the negligence of its own driver and plaintiff's right against Water Taxi as a self-insurer answerable in compulsory arbitration for the negligence of the hit-and-run driver whose vehicle collided with the taxi in which plaintiff was a passenger, and improperly imposes upon plaintiff rather than Water Taxi the burden of establishing what the arbitrator in fact decided, I respectfully dissent. The thrust of the majority memorandum is that the taxi driver and the hit-and-run driver were joint tort-feasors, that recovery from one joint tort-feasor bars recovery from any other and that having accepted payment of the judgment based on the arbitration award plaintiff has barred herself from recovery unless she can show that the arbitrator considered only the hit-and-run driver's liability. Though not disputing the first two legs of the syllogism, I cannot accept the third which in my view runs counter to the purpose of the Legislature in enacting uninsured motorist coverage and to our own prior decisions concerning burden of proof in collateral estoppel cases.

The facts as stated in the majority memorandum are correct so far as they go but require supplementation in the following respects: The collision occurred on May 25, 1974. The civil action which is the subject of this appeal was begun by service of summons on August 19, 1974, and the complaint dated September 12, 1974 was apparently served on defendants' attorneys on September 19, 1974. Plaintiff's notice of intention to make a claim under the uninsured motorist indorsement was served September 6, 1974. Plaintiff's demand for arbitration, served September 28, 1974, stated that the claim was "for personal injuries by Rosa Velazquez in the sum of $1,000,000.00" but also checked the box next to the words "HIT-. defendants moved to stay arbitration on a number of grounds, including that this civil action was pending. Their motion was denied by order entered December 11, 1974, on the basis of a decision in which Mr. Justice Nathaniel Helman pointed to the separateness of the causes of action against Water Taxi in its "two distinct capacities" as the basis for holding that arbitration of the hit-and-run claim was not waived by the bringing of the civil action. The matter then proceeded to arbitration with the result detailed in the majority memorandum, followed by denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the Appellate Division's reversal of that denial, the subject of the present appeal.

While it is the general rule that causes of action cannot be split and that, therefore, satisfaction of a judgment obtained against one joint tort-feasor will bar action against any other, that rule, like other phases of the rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel, is predicated upon the policy of conserving judicial resources and preventing harassment of one party by another (cf. White v. Adler, 289 N.Y. 34, 42, 43 N.E.2d 798, 801). As with many rules of law, especially those based in policy, the rule is not without exception. Thus it has long been held in New York that when a defendant's wrongful act causes injury to plaintiff in both person and property, the separate injuries give rise to separate and distinct causes of action and that, therefore, satisfaction of a judgment obtained for one is not a bar to maintenance of an action for the other (Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt Paving Co., 170 N.Y. 40, 62 N.E. 772; Timian v. Whelan, 128 Misc. 192, 218 N.Y.S. 108, affd. on opn. below 219 App.Div. 859, 221 N.Y.S. 913; Finnerty v. Consolidated Tel. & Elec. Subway Co., Sup., 82 N.Y.S.2d 529; see Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N.Y. 235, 111 N.E. 837; and Hunterfly Realty Corp. v. State of New York, 74 Misc.2d 345, 346 N.Y.S.2d 455, both holding injury to realty and to personalty to create separate causes of action; see, also, Rosenberg, Collateral Estoppel in New York, 44 St. John's L.Rev. 165, 168, "seriatim suits may be brought (for personal injury and property damage) without the danger of merger, bar, or the related obstacle of splitting the cause of action"). The basis for the exception we are told in the...