Velsor v. Allstate Ins. Co., 74--1263
| Decision Date | 17 March 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 74--1263,74--1263 |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Clark Summer VELSOR and Georgia Lee Velsor, Appellants, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY and Ronald Miller, Appellees. |
William R. Hapner, Mulholland & Hapner, and David A. Maney, Gordon & Maney, Tampa, for appellants.
Edward M. Waller, Jr., Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal & Banker, Tampa, for appellees.
This negligence action comes to us in an unusual posture. Appellant, Mrs. Velsor, sought damages from appellees for injuries sustained by her in an automobile accident. Mr. Velsor sought necessarily incurred medical expenses for his wife's injuries and for his loss of consortium. After trial, the jury first returned a verdict in the amount of $10,000 for the wife but awarded 'zero' damages for the husband. The trial court told the jury that if they found the wife had been compensably injured, then the husband would be entitled to recover some medical expenses as the evidence may have demonstrated. The court thereupon fully re-instructed the jury on the question of damages legally recoverable by the wife and the husband and sent them back to reconsider the verdict. In less than fifteen minutes the jury returned with their verdicts; again in the amount of $100,000 for the wife but this time in the amount of $35,000 for the husband.
The trial judge had the jury removed from the courtroom and told counsel that he was of the view that the jury had ignored his instructions and that he was going to set aside the verdicts and grant a new trial. Plaintiffs' counsel objected and requested that the jury be polled.
The jury was returned and the judge asked the foreman how they arrived at the first verdict. The foreman replied that it had included 'doctor bills and hospital bills and for her suffering and everything, but we didn't include anything for him.' The second verdict of $35,000 for the husband, he said, was for the husband's 'suffering.' The court then inquired of juror number two who stated that with respect to the second verdict of $35,000 for the husband that '. . . for him it is for the doctor (sic) bill and the aggravation he had to go through while she was sitting in the hospital.' No further inquiry was made of any of the other jurors by the court. Instead he discharged the jury and thereafter obviously believing that the jury had erroneously failed to reduce the verdict for the wife by the amount of the medical bills, he entered a written order granting a new trial concluding that:
We think the court erred. He expressed no dissatisfaction with the size of the verdict nor did he suggest in any way that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 1 Rather, he sought to inquire into the reasoning processes of the jury in arriving at their final verdicts. This is impermissible in that it seeks to impeach the verdict by the very matters which inhere in it, viz., the subjective decision-making process of the jury. 2 If a verdict is pronounced in the presence of all jurors which presumptively has satisfied the enlightened conscience of each of them it is against public policy to inquire into the motives and influences by which their deliberations were governed. 3 The rule is founded on the sound policy of preventing litigants or the public from invading the privacy of the...
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Sentinel Star Co. v. Edwards
...of an alternate juror and the interview of regular jurors under the rule. Respondent also cites the case of Velsor v. Allstate Ins. Co., 329 So.2d 391 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) for the proposition that public policy dictates that inquiry into the thought processes, motives or influences of jurors ......
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Maler By and Through Maler v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 89-756
...were governed. The rule is founded on the sound policy of preventing litigants or the public from invading the privacy of the jury room." Id. at 392-93 (footnotes omitted) (quoted with approval in Schofield v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 461 So.2d 152, 155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), rev. denied, 472 So......
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Schofield v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.
...founded on the sound policy of preventing litigants or the public from invading the privacy of the jury room. Velsor v. Allstate Insurance Co., 329 So.2d 391, 393 (Fla. 2d DCA) (footnotes omitted), cert. dismissed, 336 So.2d 1179 (Fla.1976). Where the record does not reveal any misconduct o......
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State v. Hamilton
...rule also rests on a policy "of preventing litigants or the public from invading the privacy of the jury room." Velsor v. Allstate Ins. Co., 329 So.2d 391, 393 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. dismissed, 336 So.2d 1179 However, jurors are allowed to testify about "overt acts which might have prejudicia......
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Juror misconduct: balancing the need for secret deliberations with the right to a fair and impartial trial.
...Star Co. v. Edwards, 387 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1980), rev. denied, 399 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1980); Velsor v. Allstate Insurance Co., 329 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1976). See also Powell v. Allstate Insurance Company, 652 So. 2d 354, 358 (Fla. 1995), which sets forth the numerous public ......