Vendo Co. v. Stoner
Decision Date | 27 September 1974 |
Docket Number | Nos. 46228,46231,s. 46228 |
Citation | 321 N.E.2d 1,58 Ill.2d 289 |
Parties | , 1974-2 Trade Cases P 75,254 The VENDO COMPANY, Appellant and Appellee, v. Harry B. STONER et al., Appellants and Appellees. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Barnabas F. Sears, James E. S. Baker and James N. Kosmond, Chicago (James A. Hardgrove, Thomas L. Brejcha, Jr., Boodell, Sears, Sugrue, Giambalvo & Crowley and Sidley & Austin, Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.
Reid, Ochsenschlager, Murphy & Hupp, Aurora, and Hillix, Brewer & Myers, Kansas City, Mo. (Lambert M. Ochsenschlager, John M. Lamont, Wayne F. Weiler, Aurora, Albert F. Hillix, Kansas City, Mo., William C. Murphy, and Stephen J. Mrkvicka, Aurora, of counsel), for appellee.
This appeal is the outgrowth of litigation which commenced in 1965 with the filing of a complaint in the circuit court of Kane County by plaintiff, The Vendo Company, against Harry B. Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc., a company of which Stoner is the president and whose sole stockholders are Stoner and his wife.
The case was tried without a jury and resulted in a judgment against Stoner in the amount of $250,000 and a judgment against Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc., of $1,100,000. An appeal was taken by defendants to the Appellate Court for the Second District, and that court reversed the judgment in part and remanded the cause for further hearings with respect to the amount of damages properly recoverable by the plaintiff. (Vendo Co. v. Stoner (1969), 105 Ill.App.2d 261, 245 N.E.2d 263.) Plaintiff filed a petition for leave to appeal which was denied by this court.
Following the hearings on remand the circuit court entered a judgment against Stoner for $170,835 and a judgment against both defendants for $7,345,500. The case was again appealed to the appellate court by defendants. That court affirmed the judgment awarding damages against Stoner individually, but it reversed the judgment rendered against the two defendants jointly for $7,345,500, and remanded the cause for additional hearings as to the amount of damages. (Vendo Co. v. Stoner (1973), 13 Ill.App.3d 291, 300 N.E.2d 632.) Each party filed a petition for leave to appeal, and each petition was allowed.
The intricate and prolonged litigation now before us concerns the development and marketing of a new and successful type of candy-vending machine by a concern called Lektro-Vend, allegedly with the active support of each defendant, during the period when Stoner was an employee and a director of plaintiff. Before, discussing the two decisions hitherto rendered and the contentions now made by the parties, it is necessary to review various events which took place in 1959 and thereafter.
In April of 1959 the defendant Harry B. Stoner was the president and the controlling owner of Stoner Manufacturing Corporation, an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Aurora, Illinois, and a predecessor of the corporate defendant here. Stoner Manufacturing Corporation had been engaged for many years in the business of making and selling candy-vending machines throughout the United States. The plaintiff, a Missouri corporation located in Kansas City, Missouri, was at that time engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling vending machines designed to handle beverages, ice cream, and various other products. It did not make a machine for vending candy, but at least as early as 1958 it had considered the possibility of making a candy-vending machine, and had undertaken some research into that matter.
In April, 1959, plaintiff and Stoner Manufacturing Corporation entered into a contract for the purchase by plaintiff of the assets of the corporation, including inventions, patents, drawings, designs, and research and development work. Plaintiff's purpose in making the acquisition was in part to add a candy-vending machine to its line. So far as Harry B. Stoner was concerned, the motive for the sale appears to have arisen from a concern that the poor state of his health would prevent him from continuing in the active direction of his company.
Under the sale agreement plaintiff was to pay the Stoner Manufacturing Corporation $3,400,000 in cash and to deliver to it 60,000 shares of plaintiff's stock. The land and the property constituting the Stoner Manufacturing Corporation plant was leased to plaintiff at a stipulated rental for 10 years with an option of renewal for a like period. Plaintiff was also given an option to purchase the property on or after December 31, 1961.
Plaintiff agreed to pay annually, for a period of 10 years or until such time as it might exercise its option to purchase the plant, all profits in excess of $250,000 realized from the use of the assets being purchased. Any amount theretofore paid by plaintiff out of profits was to be credited upon the purchase of the plant. Plaintiff further agreed to pay, for a period of 10 years, 25% Of the income received from foreign sales realized from the use of the assets being purchased.
The corporation agreed to use its best efforts to preserve its business organization intact, and to keep available to plaintiff the services of its present officers and employees.
The sales contract contained several restrictions on competition by the selling corporation. The contract specified:
On June 1, 1959, Stoner executed an employment contract with plaintiff. The contract recited plaintiff's desire to employ Stoner's services, and it stated that the value of his services consisted of his 'advice and counsel in the operation of the Aurora, Illinois, facility, and his know-how, experience and reputation in the vending machine field.'
A paragraph of the employment contract also contained a limitation on competition. It provided:
The candy-vending machine which was being manufactured by Stoner Manufacturing Corporation at the time it sold its assets to plaintiff in 1959 was a model which is called a 'drop shelf' machine in the jargon of the trade. The 'Lektro-Vend' model subsequently developed by the Lektro-Vend Company possessed three significant advantages over the drop-shelf model which made it popular and successful with companies, known as 'operators,' who purchase and service vending machines. The first of these advantages was that the machine could sell candy bars in the same order in which it had been stocked, a method called 'FIFO,' standing for first-in, first-out. The FIFO design produced savings to the operator by reducing the risk of having to vend or to discard stale items, and reducing the frequency of service calls to restock the machine. The second advantage of the Lektro-Vend model was that it permitted a continuous visible display of the item which was next to be vended. Thirdly, the Lektro-Vend employed a type of construction which permitted more than one type of product to be stocked on a single conveyor, thus eliminating the need to exhaust one product line before replacing it with a second. While each of these traits had been in existence for some years, Lektro-Vend was the first to combine all of them in a single machine having a practical design.
As the result of research into the possibility of developing a vending machine of this character, plaintiff, in August, 1959, had built two developmental models, sketches of which were shown to Stoner. Representatives of plaintiff, while agreeing on the desirability of developing a machine with such capabilities, considered this particular prototype to be defective in certain mechanical respects and also as being too expensive to produce....
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Vendo Company v. Lektro Vend Corporation
...the latter court affirmed a judgment in favor of petitioner and against respondents in an amount exceeding $7 million. Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 58 Ill.2d 289, 321 N.E.2d 1. The Supreme Court of Illinois predicated its judgment on its holding that Stoner had breached a fiduciary duty owed to pet......
-
Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Corp.
...and Stoner Investments had breached those covenants; and, that the grant of injunctive relief was proper. Vendo Company v. Stoner, 105 Ill.App.2d 261, 245 N.E.2d 263 (2nd Dist. 1969). Additionally, the Court held that the trial court had erred in striking the affirmative defense based on th......
-
Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co.
...The court enjoined the defendants from further acts of competition. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court, in Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 105 Ill.App.2d 261, 245 N.E.2d 263 (1969), ruled that Vendo had not proven theft of trade secrets, but that the covenants not to compete were enforceable and ......
-
Dowd and Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason
...of damages by a trial court sitting without a jury will not be set aside unless it is manifestly erroneous. Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 58 Ill.2d 289, 311, 321 N.E.2d 1 (1974). In the instant case, the damages award is based on the detailed testimony and exhibits provided by Dowd's expert witness.......