Venes v. Community School Bd. of Dist. 26

• Decision Date: 14 February 1978
• Citation: 373 N.E.2d 987,402 N.Y.S.2d 807,43 N.Y.2d 520
• Parties: , 373 N.E.2d 987 In the Matter of Tillie VENES, Appellant, v. COMMUNITY SCHOOL BOARD OF DISTRICT 26 et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 807

402 N.Y.S.2d 807

43 N.Y.2d 520, 373 N.E.2d 987

In the Matter of Tillie VENES, Appellant, v. COMMUNITY SCHOOL BOARD OF DISTRICT 26 et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 14, 1978.

A. Michael Weber, New York City, Thomas C. Greble, Mineola, and James R. Sandner, New York City, for appellant.

W. Bernard Richland, Corp. Counsel, New York City (L. Kevin Sheridan, New York City, of counsel), for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

GABRIELLI, Judge.

In this case we are called upon to determine whether the doctrine of res judicata prevents a school board from reconsidering its prior determination not to dismiss a probationary employee. We hold that it does not.

The essential facts are undisputed. Petitioner was employed on a probationary basis as a licensed school secretary. She was assigned to two schools within respondent school district, working two days a week in one and three days a week in the other. In March, 1973, after working in the two schools for several months, petitioner received unsatisfactory ratings from the principals of the two schools. Both recommended that she be dismissed. Following a meeting with petitioner, the superintendent of the school district adopted the principals' recommendation that petitioner be dismissed. Petitioner was then provided with a hearing pursuant to section 105-a of the by-laws of the board of education. On October 30, 1973, the hearing panel recommended petitioner's discontinuance.

The district superintendent then forwarded to the school board the recommendation that petitioner be dismissed. A resolution to that effect was introduced at a school board meeting on January 17, 1974, but did not obtain the majority vote required by section 2573 of the Education Law for dismissal of a probationary employee. The resolution was reintroduced at the February 21, 1974 meeting of the board, and at that time it was adopted by a majority of the board. Petitioner subsequently commenced this article 78 proceeding seeking reinstatement. Special Term granted her petition, finding that the January 17 decision of the board was res judicata and barred subsequent reconsideration of the resolution to terminate petitioner. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the doctrine of res judicata was not applicable, and today we affirm the order of the Appellate Division.

Res judicata is a doctrine associated with dispute-resolution rather than administrative determinations in general. Its application to administrative proceedings is remarkably elusive, for it has in large part been developed not in decisions applying res judicata to administrative adjudications but rather by courts which, for one reason or another, found the doctrine inapplicable to the cases before them (see e. g., Matter of Evans v. Monaghan, 306 N.Y. 312, 323-324, 118 N.E.2d 452, 457-458; Matter of Sullivan v. Board of Educ., 264 App.Div. 207, 34 N.Y.S.2d 900, affd. without opn. 289 N.Y. 672, 45 N.E.2d 174; Matter of Siegel v. Mangan, 258 App.Div. 448, 16 N.Y.S.2d 1000, affd. without opn., 283 N.Y. 557, 27 N.E.2d 280; see, also, Matter of Irish Int. Airlines (Levine), 48 A.D.2d 202, 369 N.Y.S.2d 24, affd. 41 N.Y.2d 819, 393 N.Y.S.2d 397, 361 N.E.2d 1045; but see People ex rel. Finnegan v. McBride, 226 N.Y. 252, 258-259, 123 N.E. 374, 376; Matter of Cupo v. McGoldrick, 278 App.Div. 108, 103 N.Y.S.2d 633). The rationale underlying the New York cases was perhaps best expressed by Judge Van Voorhis in Matter of Evans v. Monaghan, 306 N.Y. at pp. 323-324, 118 N.E.2d at pp. 457, 458 supra : "Security of person and property requires that determinations in the field of administrative law should be given as much finality as is reasonably possible. The cases cited indicate that the rule of res judicata is applicable to such determinations as well as to the courts wherever consistent with the purposes of the tribunal, board or officer. (Cf. Res Judicata in Administrative Law, 49 Yale L. J. 1250.) Such departures from the rule as there may be in administrative law appear to spring from the peculiar necessities of the particular case or the nature of the precise power being exercised, rather than from any general distinction between courts and administrative tribunals." A similar view has been expressed by Kenneth Culp Davis, an authority in the field of administrative law: "The common-law doctrine of res judicata, including the subsidiary doctrine of collateral estoppel, is designed to prevent the relitigation by the same parties of the same claims or issues. The reasons behind the doctrine as developed in the court system are fully applicable to some administrative proceedings, partially applicable to some, and not at all applicable to others. As a matter of principle, therefore, the doctrine should be applied to some administrative proceedings, modified for some, and rejected for others." (Davis, Administrative Law Text (3d ed.), § 18.10, p. 371.)

Before applying the doctrine of res judicata to an administrative determination, it is necessary to determine whether to do so would be consistent with the function of the administrative agency involved, "the peculiar necessities of the particular case", and "the nature of the precise power being exercised" (Matter of Evans v. Monaghan, 306 N.Y., at p. 324, 118 N.E.2d, at p. 458, supra ). There is language in some of the older cases which might be interpreted as indicating that res judicata normally will apply to administrative decisions (see id.). We need not decide whether such a generalization would be valid today, in light of the vast proliferation in both number and type of...