Venezuelan Meat Export Co. v. United States

• Citation: 12 F. Supp. 379
• Decision Date: 09 October 1935
• Docket Number: No. 1945.,1945.
• Parties: VENEZUELAN MEAT EXPORT CO., Limited, v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

12 F. Supp. 379

VENEZUELAN MEAT EXPORT CO., Limited, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 1945.

District Court, D. Maryland.

October 9, 1935.

Kirlin, Campbell, Hickox, Keating & McGrann, of New York City, and Ritchie, Janney, Ober & Williams, of Baltimore, Md., for libelant.

Bernard J. Flynn, U. S. Atty., and C. Ross McKenrick, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Baltimore, Md., and F. R. Conway, Office of Solicitor, Department of Commerce, of Washington, D. C.

WILLIAM C. COLEMAN, District Judge.

This suit is brought under the Suits in Admiralty Act of March 9, 1920, as amended by the Act of June 30, 1932 (46 U. S. C. § 745 46 USCA § 745), against the United States, to recover for damage to a cargo of hides, the property of libelant, shipped from Puerto Cabello, Venezuela, in March 1919, to Havre, France, on the steamship Balosaro. The parties have entered into a stipulation with respect to all of the material facts, which will be presently recited.

In September 1919, shortly after the delivery of the hides, libelant instituted proceedings to recover damages in the Tribunal of Commerce at Havre, against the master as representing the vessel. He intervened on behalf of the ship and defended the suit, and the French court rendered a judgment against him which has never been satisfied, amounting to 1,769,543 francs. In March, 1921, libelant instituted a suit in admiralty in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, but, before any trial on the merits, this suit was discontinued in April, 1924, and thereafter, in August, 1924, libelant commenced a suit against the United States under the Tucker Act (24 Stat. 505) in the Court of Claims, in which the French judgment was pleaded. In December, 1930, the Court of Claims dismissed this suit on the ground that there was no contract, express or implied, with the government of the United States, and that therefore the Court of Claims had no jurisdiction. See 58 Ct. Cl. 76. Then, on January 6, 1930, in the case of Johnson v. U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, 280 U. S. 320, 50 S. Ct. 118, 74 L. Ed. 451, the Supreme Court decided that the remedy provided by the Suits in Admiralty Act (see 46 USCA § 741 et seq.) was exclusive and this decision occasioned the amendatory legislation under which the present suit is brought. Briefly stated, the object of this legislation, to wit, the amendment of June 30, 1932 (46 U. S. C. § 745 46 USCA § 745), to the Suits in Admiralty Act, was to correct an apparent injustice which would result from this decision were the statutory period provided in the original Act not extended; that is to say, 10 years after the Suits in Admiralty Act had been passed, the Supreme Court held for the first time that suits in admiralty were the sole and exclusive remedy against the United States and the Fleet Corporation for the adjudication of claims arising out of the operation of United States merchant ships. As a result, many actions brought by claimants who had relied on the earlier uniform decisions of the various courts, and who had not brought their actions either in the manner or within the time provided in the Suits in Admiralty Act, were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. This prevented such claimants from having any adjudication of their claims on their merits.

The text of the amendment is as follows (46 U. S. C. § 745 46 USCA § 745): "Suits as authorized in this chapter shall be brought within two years after the cause of action arises: Provided further, That the limitations in this section contained for the commencement of suits hereunder shall not bar any suit against the United States or the United States Shipping Board Merchant Fleet Corporation, formerly known as the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, brought hereunder on or before December 31, 1932, if such suit is based upon a cause of action whereon a prior suit in admiralty or an action at law or an action under subdivision (1) of section 250 of Title 28, was commenced prior to January 6, 1930, and was or may hereafter be dismissed because not commenced within the time or in the manner prescribed in this section, or otherwise not commenced or prosecuted in accordance with its provisions: Provided further, That such prior suit must have been commenced within the statutory period of limitation for common-law actions against the United States cognizable in the Court of Claims: Provided further, That there shall not be revived hereby any suit at law, in admiralty, or under subdivision (1) of section 250 of Title 28 heretofore or hereafter dismissed for lack of prosecution after filing of suit."

Thus it will be seen that the amendment of June 30, 1932, provides in substance that those claimants who actually brought suit before January 6, 1930, that is, the date of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Johnson Case, and within the statutory period of limitation for common-law actions, but not in the manner and within the time provided by the Suits in Admiralty Act, should have their day in court on the merits as prescribed by the Suits in Admiralty Act. No suits which were dismissed for lack of prosecution may be revived by the amendment, nor is any interest allowed on claims prior to the time of the institution of the new actions.

The first point which is raised by the government and which must be disposed of relates to the jurisdiction of this court, and is to the effect that, under section 5 of the Suits in Admiralty Act (46 USCA § 745) just quoted, the libelant has no greater rights in the present suit than what he would have had if he had not been left without remedy by the unforeseen and belated construction placed by the Supreme Court on the Suits in Admiralty Act; that is to say, the government maintains that this court has jurisdiction to render only such decree as the Court of Claims could have rendered had its jurisdiction not been ousted by the decision in the Johnson Case; and that, since the Court of Claims had jurisdiction only in contract and not in tort, libelant in the present suit may recover, if at all, only upon a contractual liability. On the other hand, libelant asserts that the use of the phrase "cause of action" in the legislative amendment is to be taken in its broad sense; namely, the subject-matter of the controversy. See Chesapeake & Ohio Railway v. Dixon, 179 U. S. 131, 21 S. Ct. 67, 45 L. Ed. 121; United States v. California & Oregon Land Co., 192 U. S. 355, 24 S. Ct. 266, 48 L. Ed. 476; United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62, 53 S. Ct. 278, 77 L. Ed. 619.

We feel that the broader construction asserted by libelant is the proper one. The original concept of the Suits in Admiralty Act was to substitute an equivalent remedy in personam against the United States for a right in rem against the vessel, and the United States assumed thereby the same liability with respect to the operation of vessels in the merchant service that any private shipowner or operator assumed. See Blamberg Bros. v. United States, 260 U. S. 452, 43 S. Ct. 179, 67 L. Ed. 346; Nahmeh v. United States, 267 U. S. 122, 45 S. Ct. 277, 69 L. Ed. 536; Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 675, 47 S. Ct. 289, 71 L. Ed. 472. But we are told by the government that there is nothing in the language of the amendment which should persuade us that Congress intended to do more than to place suitors in as good a position as they would have been in had the Supreme Court not rendered its decision in the Johnson Case too late for new actions to be brought in compliance therewith — namely, which would not be barred by the two-year limitation provided in the act. Further, we are told that there was no hardship or surprise involved with respect to actions sounding in tort, because it was well established, long before libelant filed suit in the Court of Claims, that suitors were confined to contractual claims there. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 287, 48 S. Ct. 306, 72 L. Ed. 575; Alabama v. United States, 282 U. S. 502, 51 S. Ct. 225, 75 L. Ed. 492; see, also, Baltimore Mail S. S. Co. v. United States (C. C. A.) 76 F.(2d) 582, and cases cited.

We find no reported decision of the precise question before us. The nearest approach is to be found in such cases as Adders v. United States (C. C. A.) 70 F.(2d) 371, or Phoenix Ins. Co. v. United States (D. C.) 3 F. Supp. 112, upon which libelant relies. But in the Adders Case the question was whether the amendment of 1932 covered a situation in which an action, which had been brought against the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, was dismissed, and a later libel was filed against the United States. In holding that the amendment applied to such a case, the court merely decided that it would be unreasonable to insist upon the formal identity of the obligor when both respondents are in substance the same. In the Phoenix Ins. Co. Case the court merely held, finding no intent on the part of Congress to limit relief under the act to then owners of existing causes of action, it should not be so limited, but should include a subrogee of such owners. See The City of Brunswick (D. C.) 6 F. Supp. 597, and Galveston Dry Dock & Construction Co. v. United States (D. C.) 7 F. Supp. 460.

Where there is any ambiguity with respect to the meaning of an act of Congress, it is competent for a court to use, as an aid to interpretation, reports of congressional committees. See Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. C., B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 42 S. Ct. 232, 66 L. Ed. 371, 22 A. L. R. 1086; Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed. 349, 16 A. L. R. 196. Such reports of both the Senate and the House of Representatives, while perhaps not expressly supporting the construction here placed upon the amendment, at least permit and strongly suggest it. In the report to the Senate from the Committee on the Judiciary when ...