Verduzco v. Conagra Foods Packaged Foods, LLC
| Decision Date | 07 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:18-cv-01681-DAD-SKO,1:18-cv-01681-DAD-SKO |
| Parties | ARTURO VERDUZCO, Plaintiff, v. CONAGRA FOODS PACKAGED FOODS, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Arturo Verduzco filed this lawsuit against defendant Conagra Foods Packaged Foods, LLC after plaintiff was allegedly subject to workplace discrimination by defendant's employees. (Doc. No. 1.) The court previously granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim with leave to amend and in the dismissal order instructed plaintiff "to pay close attention to the legal standards . . . before filing any amended complaint" in this action. (Doc. No. 27 at 15.) Thereafter, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint ("FAC"). (Doc. No. 29.) Currently pending before the court is defendant's motion to dismiss the FAC for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 33.) For the reasons explained below, defendant's motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
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Plaintiff originally filed this action asserting various employment-discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the Equal Pay Act ("EPA"), and California common law for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"). (Doc. No. 1.) The court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety but granted plaintiff leave to amend. (Doc. No. 27.) The FAC reasserts some of the same claims the court previously dismissed, but includes new claims and additional factual allegations.
The FAC asserts seven claims against defendant: (1) gender discrimination under Title VII and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA")1; (2) disability discrimination under the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and under FEHA; (3) failure to accommodate under the ADA and FEHA; (4) failure to engage in the interactive process under the ADA and FEHA; (5) retaliation under Title VII for filing charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH"); (6) pay discrimination under the EPA; and (7) IIED. (FAC at ¶¶ 50-137.)
The FAC's sixth and seventh claims are nearly identical to certain claims appearing in plaintiff's original complaint, with little to no different allegations in support thereof. For these two claims, the court incorporates by reference the supporting allegations as set forth in its previous dismissal order and will not summarize them again here. (See Doc. No. 27 at 2-3.)
The FAC's first claim for gender discrimination differs from the original claim in one material way but otherwise rests on the theory that plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of his gender when he was denied training as a quality assurance supervisor. (Compare Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 52, with FAC at ¶ 59.) However, the alleged time frame in which plaintiff plausibly worked in that position has now been changed. The court found that the original complaint did not plausibly allege that plaintiff served as a quality assurance supervisor past October 2015.(See Doc. No. 27 at 7-8.) Given that date, the court found that plaintiff's claim in this regard was time-barred. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff now alleges with documentary support that he served in that position, at least in some capacity, through November 2018. (FAC at ¶ 58.) As discussed below, this new factual allegation is material in assessing whether plaintiff's claim for gender discrimination is time-barred.
The FAC's fifth claim, alleging retaliation after filing charges with the EEOC and DFEH, also differs from plaintiff's original theory of retaliation. (Compare Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 82-90, with FAC at ¶¶ 110-127.) In his original complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant retaliated against him for filing two EEOC/DFEH charges: EEOC Charge # 556-2014-00770 and EEOC Charge # 556-2014-00854 (the "2014 Charges"). (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 83.) The 2014 Charges purportedly focused on race/national original discrimination, although no details were provided regarding the alleged discrimination. (See Doc. No. 8-3.) The theory of plaintiff's original retaliation claim was that his request for time off from work was denied because he filed the 2014 Charges. (Id.) Plaintiff then filed a charge with the EEOC/DFEH for retaliation based on the filing of the 2014 Charges: EEOC Charge # 556-2016-00365 (the "April 2016 Charge"). (Id.) On January 9, 2018, the EEOC issued a notice of right to sue on the April 2016 Charge. (Doc. No. 8-4 at 1.) Thus, the original complaint was filed based on the April 2016 Charge.
The FAC abandons the theory alleged in the April 2016 Charge, namely that defendant was retaliated against because he filed the 2014 Charges. Instead, the FAC's retaliation claim is based on two new theories. First, in or around January and February 2018, plaintiff claims that defendant failed to train him as a mechanic in retaliation for his complaints in 2015 when plaintiff was denied training as a quality assurance supervisor. (FAC at ¶ 113-14.) Second, in or around July and August 2019, plaintiff alleges that he was on a "medical restriction" and requested a reassignment in positions, from juice topping helper, which required plaintiff "to stand for several hours" and "caused him significant pain," to a position as a cook. (Id. at ¶ 115-16.) Defendant purportedly denied that request. (Id. at ¶ 116-19.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant's denial was in retaliation for plaintiff's complaining about gender and racial harassment in the past, including potentially the 2014 Charges. (Id. at ¶¶ 120-21 (citing the 2014 Charges).) On March 19, 2020,plaintiff filed a charge with the DFEH claiming he had been retaliated against in 2018 and 2019 as discussed above (the "2020 Charge"). (See id. at 46-48.) The same day, the DFEH issued plaintiff a right to sue. (Id. at 45.) Thus, plaintiff's retaliation claim is now based on the 2020 Charge (not the April 2016 Charge, as it was in the original complaint).
The FAC's second, third, and fourth claims brought under the ADA are entirely new. On July 22, 2019, plaintiff informed defendant "that he was placed on limited duties by his doctor due to several herniated discs in his spine." (Id. at ¶ 72.) As a result of that condition, plaintiff was purportedly unable to lift more than 50 pounds and asked to be reassigned job positions because he could not perform his duties as a mechanic helper. (Id. at ¶ 73.) Plaintiff asked to be reassigned to a position as a cook but was told that other employees had priority. (Id. at ¶ 74.) Defendant denied that request for reassignment, even though plaintiff alleges he was more senior than other cooks and defendant employed fewer cooks than was necessary. (Id. at ¶¶ 74-75.) Due to the accommodation denial, plaintiff was diagnosed with two hernias on August 3, 2019. (Id. at ¶ 76.) Plaintiff was sent home on August 6, 2019 and has not returned to work since. (Id.) Although plaintiff continued to submit updates from his doctor every two months after being sent home, defendant refused to even meet with plaintiff and has not allowed him to return to work. (Id. at ¶ 77.) Plaintiff asserts three claims related to his disability. With respect to his disability discrimination claim, plaintiff alleges that he was denied workplace accommodation "due to his continual complaints regarding the gender and racial harassments claims he filed both within the company and with the EEOC and DFEH." (Id. at ¶ 78.) The FAC also asserts claims for failure to accommodate, (id. at ¶¶ 82-94), and failure to engage in the interactive process, (id. at ¶¶ 95-109.)
The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int'l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). A dismissal may be warranted where there is "the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff must allege "enough factsto state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). However, the court will not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice" to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. A complaint must do more than allege mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is permitted to consider material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint, documents that are not physically attached to the complaint if their authenticity is not contested and the plaintiff's complaint necessarily relies on them, and matters of public record. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001). The FAC attaches supporting documents, including portions of an administrative charge, right-to-sue notices issued by...
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