Vergon v. Vergon, 62436
Decision Date | 10 May 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 62436,62436 |
Citation | 622 N.E.2d 1111,87 Ohio App.3d 639 |
Parties | VERGON, Appellee, v. VERGON, Appellant. |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Madelon Sprague, Cleveland, for appellee.
Gary A. Kazdin, Cleveland, for appellant.
Defendant-appellant Frederick P. Vergon, Jr. ("appellant") appeals from a judgment of divorce, asserting the following assignments of error:
Appellant's third assignment of error has merit. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
Florence S. Vergon filed a complaint for divorce upon the grounds of gross neglect of duty on August 25, 1989. Judge Patrick F. Gallagher ruled that the Vergons were not "intelligently ready to terminate their marriage" and directed them to seek counseling. The trial court vacated this journal entry on August 2, 1990, and ordered trial to resume November 15, 1990. Trial was completed on December 31, 1990. Judge Gallagher retired December 31, 1990. A memorandum opinion dated January 3, 1991, was signed by Judge Gallagher and journalized January 8, 1991.
Judge James P. Celebrezze succeeded Judge Gallagher. As the successor, he signed a journal entry August 1, 1991, granting the divorce on the grounds of gross neglect of duty. The journal entry was the same as plaintiff's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Defendant's motion for a new trial was overruled. Thereafter, a timely notice of appeal was filed.
Appellant's third assignment of error presents a threshold determination of whether the trial court had jurisdiction to issue the memorandum opinion subsequent to the trial judge's retirement and whether his successor judge had jurisdiction to render judgment and make findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The memorandum opinion is dated January 3, 1991, and was journalized on January 8, 1991. Judge Gallagher retired December 31, 1990.
The term of a common pleas judge is set for a fixed amount of time and, once that time expires, the judge is without authority to act in an official capacity. There is no such thing as holding over. For every purpose, the judge goes out at the expiration of the fixed term. "No power remains in his hands beyond the one term by reason of the authority given." State ex rel. Belford v. Hueston (1886), 44 Ohio St. 1, 9, 4 N.E. 471, 476. The memorandum opinion signed by the trial judge is void.
We also find that Judge Gallagher was not a de facto judge at the time he signed the memorandum opinion. "A de facto officer is one who enters upon and performs the duties of his office with the acquiescence of the people and the public authorities and has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be and is dealt with as such." State v. Staten (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 107, 54 O.O.2d 235, 267 N.E.2d 122. The instant case is distinguishable from that in Huffman v. Shaffer (1984), 13 Ohio App.3d 291, 13 OBR 356, 469 N.E.2d 566. In Huffman, a retired judge was appointed to the municipal bench and rendered a decision after his certification date. This court held the title to appointment as substitute showed some color of title and that he was a de facto judge. In this case the judge was not appointed by the Chief Justice as a substitute but duly elected for a fixed term of office and held no color of title past that term.
Appellant also argues that the successor judge had no jurisdiction to enter the decree of divorce as a substitute judge after trial and before judgment and findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court did not hear the evidence or observe the witnesses. There is no indication that he familiarized himself with the record before judgment was entered. The judgment entry is actually the plaintiff's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The words "plaintiff's" and "proposed" were whited out...
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