Verhein v. Piper
| Decision Date | 16 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | A17-1938 |
| Citation | 917 N.W.2d 96 |
| Parties | Kim VERHEIN, petitioner, Appellant, v. Emily Johnson PIPER, Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services, Respondent, Washington County Community Services, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Stephen Dekovich, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc., St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Ali P. Afsharjavan, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent commissioner)
Peter J. Orput, Washington County Attorney, Richard D. Hodsdon, Assistant County Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent county)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Klaphake, Judge.
Appellant challenges the denial of her application for Minnesota supplemental aid (MSA). After a hearing, respondent-commissioner concluded that Minn. Stat. § 256D.024, subd. 1 (2016), unambiguously conditions appellant’s receipt of MSA benefits on submission to random drug testing. The district court concluded on appeal that the drug-testing requirement within section 256D.024, subdivision 1(a), does not violate the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. On appeal to this court, appellant argues that the commissioner erred in concluding that the statute unambiguously applies to her, and the district court erred in concluding that the statute is constitutional. Because the statute is ambiguous, and because the canons of construction resolve the ambiguity in favor of appellant, we reverse.
In January 2000, appellant Kim Verhein was convicted of fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to 17 months’ imprisonment. At some point after her release from a correctional facility in 2001, she applied for and began receiving MSA benefits.
In November 2013, the Minnesota Department of Human Services informed respondent Washington County Community Services (the county) that appellant had a post-July 1, 1997, drug conviction. The county notified appellant that, under section 256D.024, subdivision 1(a), she is required to undergo random drug testing as a condition of receiving MSA benefits. In September 2015, the county notified appellant that her random drug testing would occur on September 16, 2015. Appellant appeared for testing, but refused to provide a sample. The county terminated appellant’s MSA benefits effective November 1, 2015.
In June 2016, appellant reapplied for MSA benefits. The county denied appellant’s application and informed her that her prior refusal to submit to testing rendered her ineligible to receive benefits for five years. Appellant appealed the denial of her application to respondent Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services (the commissioner), arguing that the drug-testing requirement did not apply to her, her refusal to submit to testing did not render her ineligible for a five-year period, a permanent drug-testing requirement violates the Fourth Amendment, and she is entitled to a curative payment for unpaid benefits dating back to November 1, 2015. After a hearing, the commissioner concluded that section 256D.024, subdivision 1(a), unambiguously requires random drug testing of persons convicted of certain felony drug offenses after July 1, 1997, as a condition of receiving MSA benefits. Appellant requested reconsideration of the decision. The commissioner denied the request.
In January 2017, appellant appealed the commissioner’s decision to the district court. Appellant argued that the testing requirement within section 256D.024, subdivision 1(a), is unconstitutional because it conditions her receipt of benefits on a relinquishment of her Fourth Amendment rights. The district court affirmed the commissioner’s decision in part, concluding that the plain and unambiguous language of the statute conditions receipt of benefits for persons convicted of a drug offense after July 1, 1997, on submission to random drug testing. The district court concluded that appellant’s Fourth Amendment challenge failed, citing precedent of this court indicating that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions does not apply to the Fourth Amendment. The district court remanded the issue of whether a five-year ineligibility period applied to test refusals.1
This appeal follows.
I. Is the appeal moot?
II. Does Minn. Stat. § 256D.024, subd. 1, unambiguously condition eligibility for MSA benefits on random drug testing of applicants and recipients who have completed a court-ordered sentence for a qualifying drug conviction more than five years prior?
III. Is appellant entitled to a curative payment?
As a preliminary matter, the commissioner argues that this appeal is moot because appellant only appealed the 2016 denial of her application, and the commissioner reversed that denial on remand. Appellant argues that the case presents a live controversy because she has challenged whether Minn. Stat. § 256D.024, subd. 1, requires her to submit to drug testing as a condition of receiving benefits, an issue that was not resolved when the case was remanded.
The issue of whether an appeal is moot is a legal question subject to de novo review. In re McCaskill , 603 N.W.2d 326, 327 (Minn. 1999). Wayzata Nissan, LLC v. Nissan N. Am., Inc. , 875 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Minn. 2016) (citations omitted). "Mootness has been described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness)." Dean v. City of Winona , 868 N.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Minn. 2015) (quotations omitted). This court may not issue advisory opinions. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schwan , 687 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. App. 2004).
Appellant appealed the denial of her application and demanded payments dating back to the termination of her benefits in 2015. On remand from the district court’s order, the commissioner reversed the denial of appellant’s application, permitting it to be processed. But appellant’s receipt of benefits continues to be conditioned on compliance with testing requirements. It is this condition that appellant challenged below and continues to challenge on appeal. We therefore conclude that the appeal presents a live controversy between the two parties, and this court may afford effective relief.
Even if the commissioner’s action on remand rendered this appeal technically moot, we conclude that the appeal is reviewable because it is "functionally justiciable." "[Appellate courts] have the discretion to consider a case that is technically moot when the case is functionally justiciable and presents an important question of statewide significance that should be decided immediately." Dean , 868 N.W.2d at 6 (quotations omitted). The exception is to be narrowly applied, but may be satisfied if "the record contains the raw material (including effective presentation of both sides of the issues raised) traditionally associated with effective judicial decision-making." Id. (quotation omitted).
The parties have effectively presented both sides of the controversy, and the applicability and constitutionality of Minn. Stat. § 256D.024, subd. 1, affects all persons who apply for or receive general assistance or MSA benefits and who also have a post-July 1, 1997, felony drug conviction. The commissioner provides guidance to all counties on how to apply Minn. Stat. § 256D.024, subd. 1, when processing applicants’ requests for benefits. This presents an issue of statewide significance that should be decided immediately. See In re Guardianship of Tschumy , 853 N.W.2d 728, 740-41 (Minn. 2014) (); Kahn v. Griffin , 701 N.W.2d 815, 823 (Minn. 2005) (). We therefore proceed to the merits of this appeal.
MSA benefits are available to aged, blind, or disabled persons who receive supplemental security income from the federal government under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 - 1383f (2012 & Supp. 2016). Minn. Stat. § 256D.425, subd. 1 (2016). County social services agencies, under the supervision of the commissioner, are required to administer and distribute benefits to recipients of general assistance and supplemental security income. Minn. Stat. §§ 256.01, subd. 2(Supp. 2017), 393.07, subd. 2 (2016). An applicant for MSA benefits must meet the eligibility requirements under the general-assistance chapter, Minn. Stat. §§ 256D.01 -.54 (2016 & Supp. 2017). Minn. Stat. § 256D.405, subd. 1(a) ().
Section 256D.024, subdivision 1(a), limits the eligibility for benefits under the general-assistance chapter if an individual has been convicted of certain drug crimes after July 1, 1997. The statute provides:
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