Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC v. State
| Decision Date | 11 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D14–3213.,1D14–3213. |
| Citation | 164 So.3d 806 |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
| Parties | VERIZON BUSINESS PURCHASING, LLC, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, A State Agency, Appellee. |
Katherine E. Giddings and Kristen E. Fiore of Akerman LLP, Tallahassee; Michael J. Bowen and Peter O. Larsen of Akerman LLP, Jacksonville, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and J. Clifton Cox, Special Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Appellant, Verizon Business Purchasing, LLC, appeals the trial court's Final Judgment entered in favor of Appellee, the Florida Department of Revenue (“Department”), and argues that the Notice of Proposed Assessment issued to it by the Department was not the final assessment contemplated in the pertinent statute of limitations. For the following reasons, we agree with Appellant and reverse the Final Judgment.
As set forth by the trial court, the Department notified Appellant in January 2007 that it was going to audit the monthly sales tax returns that Appellant had filed for the preceding three-year period, January 2004 through December 2006. The audit was commenced and, for various reasons, the parties entered into a series of agreements extending the statute of limitations time period within which the Department could issue an assessment.1 The final extension agreement was entered into in August 2010 and provided that the new statute of limitations date for issuance of the tax assessment would be March 31, 2011. On February 8, 2011, the Department issued to Appellant a Notice of Proposed Assessment (“NOPA”), which “identifie[d] the [tax] deficiency” for the three-year period at issue. The balance due from Appellant was $3,169,168.74, plus interest. Appellant was informed that if it did not agree with the “proposed assessment,” it could request a review through an informal protest, an administrative hearing, or a judicial proceeding. Appellant had until April 11, 2011, to file an informal written protest. If Appellant did not file a protest, “the proposed assessment [would] become a FINAL ASSESSMENT on 04/11/2011.” The NOPA further set forth, “If you request an administrative hearing or judicial proceeding, you must file your request no later than 06/08/2011 or 60 days from the date the assessment becomes a Final Assessment.” If Appellant agreed with the “proposed assessment,” it could pay the balance due within sixty days from the “Notice date” by returning its payment in the enclosed envelope along with the “NOPA remittance coupon.”
In September 2011, Appellant filed an amended complaint against the Department. In Count One, Appellant challenged the NOPA on statute of limitations grounds. It contended that the “sales and use tax liability asserted in the NOPA did not become an assessment until April 11, 2011,” that the Department was required to issue any assessment with respect to the audit period at issue prior to March 31, 2011, and that, as a result, the “Assessment is invalid in its entirety and must be abated.” As an affirmative defense, the Department argued that Count One failed to state a cause of action because the NOPA was a legal assessment as a matter of law for purposes of the statute of limitations. Both parties subsequently moved for summary judgment.
In the Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court determined that the NOPA constituted an assessment for purposes of section 95.091(3)(a). In support of its determination, the trial court cited our decision in Florida Export Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 510 So.2d 936 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), which, according to the trial court, held that an assessment for purposes of chapter 212, Florida Statutes, occurs whenever the Department communicates the amount of taxes claimed to be due and makes a demand for the taxpayer to make payment. The trial court also noted that Florida Administrative Code Rule 12–6.003 refers to a NOPA as an assessment, and it reasoned that at the time the Department issues a NOPA, it has completed its work on the audit and has fixed the amount of additional tax due. The trial court rejected Appellant's argument that section 213.21(1)(b), Florida Statutes, which provides for a tolling of the statute of limitations period for the issuance of final tax assessments when informal protest procedures are sought, establishes that the assessment contemplated in section 95.091(3)(a) is a final assessment. The trial court alternatively determined that even if the NOPA was not an assessment, only the first month of the audit period would be untimely because each month of “the taxing periods in the audit period” was extended. In other words, the “new statute of limitations date for issuance of an assessment for the first month of the audit period, January 2004, was extended by the final Extension Agreement to March 31, 2011” and the “[t]he second month of the audit period, February 2004, was extended to April 30, 2011, and through all 36 months of the audit period.” Thereafter, the trial court entered a Partial Final Judgment in the Department's favor as to Count One of the amended complaint, Appellant voluntarily dismissed the other two counts of its amended complaint, and the Final Judgment was entered. This appeal followed.
Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and if the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So.2d 126, 130 (Fla.2000). Summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Id. Statutory construction is also a question of law subject to de novo review. W. Fla. Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. See, 79 So.3d 1, 8 (Fla.2012). The polestar of statutory construction is legislative intent. Id. at 8–9. To discern legislative intent, a court must look first to the plain and obvious meaning of the statute's text, which may be discerned from a dictionary. Id. at 9. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, a court must apply the unequivocal meaning and not resort to the rules of statutory construction. Id. If, however, an ambiguity exists, a court should look to the rules of statutory construction to help interpret legislative intent, which includes the examination of a statute's legislative history and the purpose behind its enactment. Id. Statutes imposing taxes and penalties must be strictly construed against the taxing authority and any ambiguity in the provision of a tax statute must be resolved in the taxpayer's favor. Philip C. Owen, Chartered v. Dep't of Revenue, 597 So.2d 380, 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
As we explained, section 95.091(3)(a) 1.b., Florida Statutes (2010), provides that the Department may “determine and assess the amount of any tax, penalty, or interest due under any tax enumerated in s. 72.011 ” “within 3 years after the date the tax is due, any return with respect to the tax is due, or such return is filed, whichever occurs later.” (Emphasis added). This case presents the issue of whether the Department timely assessed Appellant for purposes of the statute of limitations when it issued the NOPA within the agreed-upon extended statute of limitations period. Appellant contends that the Department's proposed tax assessment did not constitute the assessment contemplated in section 95.091(3)(a) and that it is the date upon which a proposed assessment becomes final that must be used to ascertain whether an assessment is timely. The Department argues that the proposed assessment was the pertinent assessment for purposes of the statute of limitations. As the parties acknowledge, section 95.091 does not define the word “assess.”
In support of its argument, the Department relies upon section 72.011, Florida Statutes (2010), which addresses in part the jurisdiction of circuit courts in specific tax matters. Section 72.011(1)(a) provides that a “taxpayer may contest the legality of any assessment or denial of refund of tax ... by filing an action in circuit court; or, alternatively, the taxpayer may file a petition under the applicable provisions of chapter 120.” Section 72.011(2)(a) provides in part that “[a]n action may not be brought to contest an assessment of any tax, interest, or penalty assessed under a section or chapter specified in subsection (1) more than 60 days after the date the assessment becomes final.” The date upon which “an assessment ... becomes final and procedures by which a taxpayer must be notified of the assessment ... must be established: [b]y rule adopted by the Department....” § 72.011(2)(b) 1., Fla. Stat. (2010). In accordance with the statute, Florida Administrative Code Rule 12–6.003 (2010), which is entitled “Protest of Notices of Proposed Assessment Issued by the Department Which Result From an Audit,” provides in part how a taxpayer “may secure review of a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Assessment).” Subsection (1)(c) of the rule provides that the “Assessment becomes final for purposes of Chapter 72, F.S., upon the expiration of 60 consecutive calendar days ... after the date of issuance on the Assessment....”
As the Department contends, section 72.011(2)(a) supports its position that the Legislature contemplated both non-final and final tax assessments. Although the word “non-final” was not used in the statute, the implication is clear by virtue of the Legislature's use of the language “assessment becomes final.” Nevertheless, we find that neither the language of section 72.011 nor rule 12–6.003 settles the specific matter at hand of whether the assessment contemplated in section 95.091(3)(a) is a final assessment.
As did the trial court, the Department also relies upon our decision in Florida Export Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 510 So.2d 936 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). There, the appellants were plaintiffs in a class action against the appellees, the Department and the Comptroller,...
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