Verner v. Muller

• Decision Date: 14 June 1911
• Citation: 71 S.E. 654,89 S.C. 117
• Parties: VERNER et al. v. MULLER et al., County Com'rs.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

71 S.E. 654

89 S.C. 117

VERNER et al. v. MULLER et al., County Com'rs.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

June 14, 1911

Petition by James S. Verner and another to enjoin W. F. Muller and others, as members of the Board of County Commissioners of Richland County, from issuing certain township bonds for bridge purposes. Injunction denied, and petition dismissed.

Weston & Aycock, for petitioners . Clarkson & Clarkson for respondents.

JONES C.J.

The petitioners, as taxpayers, seek to enjoin the board of county commissioners of Richland county from issuing certain coupon bonds of Columbia township in Richland county about to be issued under alleged authority of the act of February 20 1908 (25 St. at Large, p. 1431).

It is contended, first, that the act is in violation of section 17 article 3, of the Constitution, providing: "Every act or resolution having the force of law shall relate to but one subject and that shall be expressed in the title." The title of the act is: "An act to provide for free bridges across the Congaree and Broad rivers in this state, between Columbia township in Richland county and the county of Lexington, the acquisition thereof by said Columbia township, and the issue of bonds, if approved by the electors of Columbia township, for the purpose of such acquisition." Section 7 of the act provides: "That authority is hereby given to build or purchase, and to maintain said bridges," etc. The point made is that the title authorizes only the purchase or acquisition of bridges now standing, while the body of the act permits the construction of new bridges as well as the purchase of those now standing. The mandate of the Constitution is complied with if the title states the general subject of legislation and the provisions in the body of the act are germane thereto as means to accomplish the object expressed in the title. Connor v. Railroad, 23 S.C. 427; State v. O'Day, 74 S.C. 448, 54 S.E. 607. The provision in the body of the statute is not only germane to the subject expressed in the title, but is clearly within the meaning of the words of the title. "Acquisition" is the act of getting or obtaining something, which may be already in existence, or may be brought into existence through the means employed to acquire it. A bridge may be acquired by construction as well as by purchase. Moreover, the object was to provide free bridges. This contention cannot be sustained.

It is next alleged that the election was invalid because some of the managers were appointed by the chairman of the board of county commissioners, whereas the statute required the appointment to be made by the board. It appears that the board of county commisssioners approved all the managers, and authorized the chairman to fill any vacancies that might occur, and that the chairman made some appointment to fill vacancies. There is nothing to show that the board did not approve the appointments made by the chairman under their authority. If we should concede that original appointment by the board was necessary, there is nothing to show that there were not sufficient appointees at each precinct to hold a legal election. No fraud or unfairness in the conduct of the election is suggested. An election fairly conducted by de facto officers may be valid. Wilson v. Cox, 73 S.C. 398, 53 S.E. 613; Stackhouse v. County Board, 86 S.C. 425, 68 S.E. 561.

It is also alleged that Waverly precinct, where votes were taken, was stationed at a point about one-quarter of a mile from the fork of Rice Creek spring and Camden road, whereas section 203, Civil Code 1902, provides that said voting place shall be "at or near" the said fork. We cannot say as matter of law that a country precinct a quarter of a mile from the crossing of a stream and a road may not be characterized as located "near" such point.

But it appears that the votes cast at Waverly precinct were 32 "for bonds," and 13 for "no bonds," and that the votes in the whole township were 453 "for bonds," and 82 for "no bonds." Hence the vote at Waverly could be thrown out without affecting the result. A mere irregularity not sufficient to affect the result will not vitiate an election. Welsh v. Board, 79 S.C 246, 60...