Vernon v. Medical Management Associates of Margate

• Decision Date: 16 January 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-6613-CIV.,95-6613-CIV.
• Citation: 912 F. Supp. 1549
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
• Parties: June VERNON and Delroy, Vernon, Plaintiffs, v. MEDICAL MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES OF MARGATE, INC. d/b/a Margate Medical Center, Michael Scheer, M.D. and Laura Ebersold, Defendants.

912 F. Supp. 1549

June VERNON and Delroy, Vernon, Plaintiffs, v. MEDICAL MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES OF MARGATE, INC. d/b/a Margate Medical Center, Michael Scheer, M.D. and Laura Ebersold, Defendants.

No. 95-6613-CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

January 16, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

C.J. Keith, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiffs.

Leonard K. Samuels, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

MARCUS, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendant Margate Medical Center's Motion to Dismiss Counts II-VII of the Plaintiff's Complaint, filed August 18, 1995; Defendant Laura Ebersold's Motion to Dismiss Counts I-VII of the Plaintiff's Complaint, filed August 18, 1995; and Defendant Michael Scheer's Motion to Dismiss Counts I, III-IV and VII of the Plaintiff's complaint, filed August 21, 1995. After a thorough review of the record and pleadings, and for the reasons stated below, Defendant Scheer's motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Count I and DENIED as to Counts III, IV and VII. Defendant Ebersold's motion to dismiss is GRANTED in its entirety, and the complaint is dismissed as to Ebersold. Defendant Margate's motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Count VI and DENIED as to Counts II, III, IV, V and VII. The Plaintiff shall file within ten (10) days of the date of this Order an amended complaint in order to allege for purposes of Count VII that she was married to Delroy Vernon at the time of the Defendants' alleged acts of misconduct.

I.

The Plaintiff, June Vernon, served as a receptionist at the Broward County office of Defendant Medical Management Associates of Margate, Inc., d/b/a Margate Medical Center ("Margate"), which is engaged in the business of providing medical services to its clients. Defendant Michael Scheer, a medical doctor employed by Margate, supervised Vernon during her employment with Margate. Defendant Laura Ebersold also exercised supervisory responsibilities over the Plaintiff.

According to the complaint, Scheer engaged in repeated acts of sexual harassment targeted at the Plaintiff. Complaint, at ¶ 12. The alleged acts of misconduct included touching, squeezing, hugging, tickling and the making of lewd remarks. Id. Ebersold allegedly participated in this pattern of harassment by failing to take action to halt the offending conduct, despite being on notice of Scheer's wrongful acts. Id. at ¶ 13. When Vernon informed Ebersold of the offensive environment, Ebersold allegedly responded that Vernon would have to "deal with it herself." It is also alleged that Ebersold told Vernon not to complain about Scheer's alleged conduct because "if they had to choose between the two employees, they would choose the Doctor and discharge the Plaintiff." Id. Despite this warning, Vernon proceeded to file a charge with the Broward County Human Rights Division. According to the complaint, Margate responded by changing her work schedule and transferring her to other medical centers that it owned and operated. As a result of these events, Vernon was forced to quit her employment with Margate.

The Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on July 3, 1995, seeking reinstatement, back pay, punitive damages, injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment. Count I of the complaint alleges that the Defendants constructively discharged the Plaintiff by creating or permitting a sexually hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Count II alleges that the Defendants are liable for acts of battery committed by Michael Scheer. Count III alleges that the Defendants are liable for invasions of privacy committed by Scheer. Count IV alleges that the Defendants are liable for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in light of Scheer's conduct. Count V alleges that the Defendants are liable for acts of false imprisonment committed by Scheer. Count VI alleges that Defendants Margate and Ebersold are liable for negligence, by failing to use reasonable care in responding to the complaints about Dr. Scheer that the Plaintiff had lodged. Count VII is brought by Delroy Vernon (June's husband), and asserts that the Defendants are responsible for a loss of consortium with his wife. Counts II through VII of the complaint arise under Florida law.

Each of the Defendants has filed a motion to dismiss some or all of the complaint. The Defendants raise various substantive grounds for dismissal, and, in the alternative, argue that this Court should exercise its discretion under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), to dismiss the Plaintiff's state law claims. The Plaintiff filed a combined response to these motions on September 28, 1995.¹ Scheer replied on October 5, 1995, while Margate and Ebersold filed a consolidated reply on October 18, 1995. Ebersold also filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority on November 30, 1995.

II.

The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the facial sufficiency of the statement of claim for relief. It is read alongside Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." This motion is not designed to strike inartistic pleadings or to provide a more definite statement to answer an apparent ambiguity. Thus the analysis of a 12(b)(6) motion is limited primarily to the face of the complaint and attachments thereto. See 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 at 590-92 (1969) (Wright & Miller). Moreover, for the purposes of the motion to dismiss, the complaint must be construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and the factual allegations taken as true. See SEC v. ESM Group, Inc., 835 F.2d 270, 272 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 840 F.2d 25, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055, 108 S.Ct. 2822, 100 L.Ed.2d 923 (1988).

According to the Eleventh Circuit: The Supreme Court has stated that the "accepted rule" for appraising the sufficiency of a complaint is "that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Tiftarea Shopper, Inc. v. Georgia Shopper, Inc., 786 F.2d 1115, 1117-18 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting Conley).

Id. A complaint may not be dismissed because the plaintiff's claims fail to support the legal theory he relies upon since the court must determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory. Robertson v. Johnston, 376 F.2d 43 (5th Cir.1967).² We hasten to add that this motion is viewed with disfavor and rarely granted. See e.g., Madison v. Purdy, 410 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir.1969); International Erectors, Inc. v. Wilhoit Steel Erectors & Rental Service, 400 F.2d 465, 471 (5th Cir.1968) (noting that "dismissal of a claim on the basis of barebone pleadings is a precarious disposition with a high mortality rate"). The pleadings must show, in short, that the Plaintiff has no claim before the 12(b)(6) motion may be granted. It is against this standard that we consider the Defendants' motion to dismiss.

A.

Ebersold and Scheer have moved to be dismissed from Count I of the complaint. Count I alleges that both of these Defendants are liable in their individual capacities for alleged violations of Title VII. Ebersold and Scheer assert that, under controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent, there is no individual liability under the statute. We agree.

The language of Title VII creates liability for acts of employment discrimination attributable to an "employer." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person." (emphasis added). The statute's reference to "any agent" seems to encompass a Title VII action against an individual agent. At least prior to 1991, the Eleventh Circuit may have suggested this view of the statute. See Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 n. 1 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 874 F.2d 821 (1989); Williams v. City of Montgomery, 742 F.2d 586, 588-89 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1053, 105 S.Ct. 1756, 84 L.Ed.2d 819 (1985).

In Steele, for example, a female employee (Steele) brought an action against a corporate employer and one of the corporation's officers (Bucknole). The Plaintiff alleged that the corporation could be liable under Title VII for various acts of sexual harassment perpetrated by the officer. The corporate defendant filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that it could not be held responsible for the misconduct of its officer. The district court granted the motion, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on appeal, holding that an employer is not liable for the acts of its employees unless it had notice of the employee's misconduct. In a footnote, however, the Court of Appeals added the following language:

Steele misconstrues the concept of direct liability. Bucknole, an agent of the corporate employer, is directly liable for his actions that violate Title VII. Likewise, the corporate employer would be directly liable for his actions that violate Title VII. Likewise, the corporate employer would be directly liable for Bucknole's actions taken within the scope of their agency. However, when Bucknole acts outside the scope of the agency, the corporate employer can only be liable indirectly if it knew or should have known of Bucknole's actions and failed to take prompt remedial action.

867 F.2d at 1311 n. 1 (emphasis added).

Notwithstanding this dictum, in Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1991), the Eleventh Circuit stated...