Vertentes v. Barletta Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 September 1983
• Citation: 16 Mass.App.Ct. 463,452 N.E.2d 271
• Parties: Joao VERTENTES v. The BARLETTA COMPANY, INC.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 271

452 N.E.2d 271

16 Mass.App.Ct. 463

Joao VERTENTES v. The BARLETTA COMPANY, INC.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued Dec. 13, 1982.

Decided Aug. 3, 1983.

Further Appellate Review Granted Sept. 30, 1983.

William F. Patton, Fall River (Steven A. Kaufman, Marlborough, with him), for defendant.

Scott E. Charnas, Boston, for plaintiff.

Before HALE, C.J., and CUTTER and SMITH, JJ.

SMITH, Justice.

The plaintiff suffered serious injuries when struck by a motor vehicle in the course of his employment as a construction worker on a highway rebuilding project. After receiving worker's compensation benefits from his employer, a subcontractor, he brought this action in tort against The Barletta Company, Inc. (Barletta), the general contractor on the project. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and assessed damages in the amount of $900,000. ¹ After judgment entered on the verdict, the defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, see Mass.R.Civ.P. 50(b), 365 Mass. 814 (1974), ² on the following grounds: (1) there was no evidence upon which the defendant could be held to be either directly or vicariously liable to the plaintiff, (2) the judge erred when she instructed the jury that as matter of law the work that the plaintiff's employer was engaged in, i.e., highway construction on a high speed highway, was inherently dangerous, and (3) the plaintiff's receipt of worker's compensation benefits barred recovery from the defendant. The motion was denied and the defendant appealed.

There was evidence from which the jury could find the following facts. On July 11, 1974, Barletta entered into a contract with the Massachusetts Department of Public Works (Department) to reconstruct a ten mile length of Route 24 between Brockton and Bridgewater. The contract stated that Route 24 was a major high speed, high volume thoroughfare. Barletta subcontracted portions of the work to several independent contractors, including Richard F. Lyons, Inc. (Lyons). The plaintiff was employed by Lyons as a laborer on the project. One of the plaintiff's responsibilities was the placement and removal of orange marker barrels of the type used to redirect traffic past highway construction sites. Each subcontractor on the job had employees whose responsibilities included the placement and removal of traffic barrels.

On the afternoon of September 26, 1974, the plaintiff was riding in a truck as a passenger, with his foreman as driver, travelling southbound on the median strip that divided the northbound and southbound portions of the highway. The foreman observed several isolated traffic barrels on or near the white lines separating the passing lanes from the travel lanes on the southbound portion of the highway. Those barrels had not been placed in accordance with Department regulations. When the foreman saw the barrels, he realized that they had to be moved. He stopped the truck at the northernmost barrel, and the plaintiff began to remove the barrels from the highway onto the median strip. This process was repeated several times until the plaintiff was struck by a truck, driven by a person not connected with the project, which had come around a curve and was proceeding up a gradual incline in the highway. Three subcontractors of Barletta were working in the vicinity of the accident on the day in question but there was no direct evidence concerning which one had incorrectly placed the barrels in the roadway. The contract between Barletta and the Department incorporated the Department's regulations which required Barletta to inspect the placement of the traffic control barrels set out by its subcontractors. After the accident, in addition to worker's compensation benefits, the plaintiff received a settlement, prior to trial, from the driver of the truck that struck him.

1. Vicarious liability by virtue of inherently dangerous activity. Based on the foregoing evidence, the plaintiff contends that Barletta was vicariously liable for the negligence of one of its subcontractors in misplacing the marker barrels, on the ground that the subcontractors were engaged in inherently dangerous activity. For its part, Barletta argues that it was error to deny its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the plaintiff was an employee of a subcontractor and not a member of the general public and that therefore Barletta could not, as matter of law, be held to be vicariously liable for any harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the negligence of any of Barletta's subcontractors.

In general, it has been held that "the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409 (1966). Herrick v. Springfield, 288 Mass. 212, 216, 192 N.E. 626 (1934). Whalen v. Shivek, 326 Mass. 142, 150, 93 N.E.2d 393 (1950). There are numerous exceptions to this general rule. ³ The exception material to this case imposes liability where the nature and circumstances of the work to be performed are such that injury to others will probably result unless precautions are taken. In such a circumstance the employer of the independent contractor may be found answerable for the failure of the contractor to take such precautions. Ibid. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 416. It has been stated with respect to this exception that "the work of the independent contractor for which the employer is held liable on this principle must be inherently or intrinsically dangerous." Whalen v. Shivek, supra. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 427. ⁴ Several cases in Massachusetts have discussed the exception but they are not helpful here because the decisions involved injuries to members of the general public and not to employees of independent contractors. See, e.g., Woodman v. Metropolitan R.R., 149 Mass. 335, 339-340, 21 N.E. 482 (1889); McGinley v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 248 Mass. 583, 143 N.E. 537 (1924); McConnon v. Charles H. Hodgate Co., 282 Mass. 584, 585, 587-588, 185 N.E. 483 (1933); Herrick v. Springfield, 288 Mass. at 216, 192 N.E. 626; Ducey v. Springfield Co-operative Bank, 341 Mass. 449, 449-450, 170 N.E.2d 356 (1960). ⁵

The question presented by this case--whether the duty of care owed by the employer of the independent contractor who is performing inherently dangerous work, such as on a public highway, extends to employees of the independent contractor--has not been decided in Massachusetts. There is a marked split of authority on this point throughout the country. Several states have held that the vicarious liability doctrine as applicable to inherently dangerous activity does extend to employees of independent contractors. Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, 68 Cal.2d 245, 254-255, 66 Cal.Rptr. 20, 437 P.2d 508 (1968). Giarratano v. Weitz Co., 259 Iowa 1292, 1306-1308, 147 N.W.2d 824 (1967). Mallory v. Louisiana Pure Ice & Supply Co., 320 Mo. 95, 112-117, 6 S.W.2d 617 (1928). International Harvester Co. v. Sartain, 32 Tenn.App. 425, 456-457, 222 S.W.2d 854 (1948). Other courts have limited the reach of the doctrine to members of the general public. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Price, 170 So.2d 293, 298 (Fla.1964). Hader v. Coplay Cement Mfg. Co., 410 Pa. 139, 151, 189 A.2d 271 (1963). Humphreys v. Texas Power & Light Co., 427 S.W.2d 324, 330-331 (Tex.Civ.App.1968). Epperly v. Seattle, 65 Wash.2d 777, 781-784, 399 P.2d 591 (1965). ⁶

We have chosen to follow the latter view and hold that, in the circumstances of this case, an employer of an independent contractor cannot be held to answer for an injury to the employees of the independent contractor, occasioned by the negligence of that contractor or other independent contractors, solely on the basis that the work so delegated poses an inherent danger. Our result rests upon the rationale behind the development of the concept of vicarious liability for inherently dangerous work. That doctrine grew out of the basic premise that a landowner who requests the performance of work which is of such a nature that members of the general public will probably be injured unless special precautions are taken should not be allowed to evade liability through the device of a contract with an independent contractor. Davis v. John L. Whiting & Son, 201 Mass. 91, 93, 87 N.E. 199 (1909). See also Woodman v. Metropolitan R.R., 149 Mass. at 340, 21 N.E. 482; Quinn v. Crimmings, 171 Mass. 255, 256, 50 N.E. 624 (1898). By contrast, Barletta was acting as a general contractor on a highway project and the plaintiff was not a member of the general public, but one who, the record shows, was well acquainted with the risks of his workplace. ⁷ Therefore, to impose liability on the general contractor in this situation would represent a substantial departure from the concerns recognized by the Supreme Judicial Court as justifying the doctrine of vicarious liability for inherently dangerous work.

In reaching our decision, we have considered the availability of worker's compensation benefits. Persons like the plaintiff who are injured on the job are not left without compensation. If, however, we permit recovery against Barletta on the basis of vicarious liability, not only would the plaintiff be able to collect more than an injured employee of Barletta, but also we would provoke a variety of consequences that could create an imbalance in the allocation of risks intended by the Legislature in enacting the comprehensive worker's compensation statutes. See Squillante's Case, 389 Mass. 396, 398, 450 N.E.2d 599 (1983). The courts must be especially chary of so tinkering with the worker's compensation system. Ibid. Were liability to be imposed in a case such as this, those employing independent contractors to perform inherently dangerous work might consider it prudent to demand indemnity from those contractors for the cost of any recovery obtained by the...