Vesey v. Vesey

• Decision Date: 18 July 1952
• Docket Number: No. 35707,35707
• Parties: , 32 A.L.R.2d 1090 VESEY et al. v. VESEY et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 385

54 N.W.2d 385

237 Minn. 295, 32 A.L.R.2d 1090

VESEY et al. v. VESEY et al.

No. 35707.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 18, 1952.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Allegations of complaint examined and Held sufficient to allege a felonious killing of decedent by defendant in violation of the criminal statutes of this state.

2. Since the surviving joint owner of a joint and several bank account takes an interest in the account not from the estate of the deceased joint owner but by virtue of the contract of deposit, the provisions of M.S.A. § 525.87 are not applicable to bar a surviving joint owner who feloniously takes the life of the other joint owner from acquiring the balance of the account.

3. Where one joint owner of a joint and several bank account feloniously causes the death of the other joint owner, this court, in absence of a controlling statute, will impose a constructive trust upon the balance of the account for the benefit of the estate of the decedent, thereby preventing the surviving joint owner from taking the balance thereof by right of survivorship.

4. Where a contract creating a joint and several bank account gives each joint owner a right to withdraw all funds from the account, which right will be defeated if he fails to survive the other joint owner or if the other withdraws the funds first, one joint owner cannot gain an indefeasible interest by feloniously causing the death of the other. The uncertainty as to whose right would have been defeated in the ordinary course of events is to be resolved against the survivor, and a constructive trust imposed upon the entire balance of the account.

Reversed.

O. O. Myhre, L. M. Severson, R. C. Andrews, Minneapolis, for appellants.

Nelson, Palmer & Moses, Stinchfield, Mackall, Crounse & Moore, Minneapolis, for respondents.

CHRISTIANSON, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order sustaining demurrers to plaintiffs' complaint.

Plaintiffs, who are children by a prior marriage of the decedent, William Vesey, bring this action against Mary Ellen Vesey, widow of decedent, the Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis as administrator of decedent's estate, and the Chicago-Lake State Bank and the Twin City Federal Savings and Loan Association, depositories of funds in the names of William and Mary Ellen Vesey. Plaintiffs seek judgment adjudging that Mary Ellen Vesey is not entitled to the funds and directing the depositories to pay them to decedent's administrator for the benefit of plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs allege that William and Mary Ellen Vesey, subsequent to their marriage in 1947, opened a checking account in the Chicago-Lake State Bank and a savings account in the Twin City Federal Savings and Loan Association, both in the form of a joint and several account with right of survivorship; that all deposits in the two accounts were made by William Vesey; that there were balances of about $3,200 and $4,000, respectively, in the accounts at the time of his death; and that subsequent to his death defendant Mary Ellen Vesey withdrew the funds in the checking and savings accounts and redeposited them in her own name in the bank and the savings and loan association.

Plaintiffs allege further that at the time of his marriage to defendant Mary Ellen Vesey decedent was a robust man in good health, but that, with premeditation and design to impair decedent's health and to hasten his death, said defendant began a course of nagging, threats of violence, and actual physical violence which weakened decedent mentally and physically; that at the time of his death on March 1, 1951, decedent was suffering from a serious heart ailment, aggravated by chronic asthma, and was weak, disabled, and subordinated to the will of defendant Mary Ellen Vesey; that, although she knew of decedent's condition and that any exertion might be fatal to him, defendant coerced decedent, who was unaware of his heart condition, to walk with her through deep snow on a cold and windy day, which exertion and exposure caused his death after he had walked two blocks.

Plaintiffs allege that defendant Mary Ellen Vesey wilfully and feloniously caused the death of decedent and that by reason of such conduct she is not entitled to the funds in the depositories.

Defendants' demurrers to the complaint were sustained.

1. The first question presented by this case is whether the complaint alleges a felonious killing of decedent by defendant Mary Ellen Vesey. ¹

The parties and the district court have treated the complaint as presenting a question of negligent homicide within the terms of the statutes defining manslaughter in the second degree. ² The complaint, however, includes allegations of premeditation and design to hasten decedent's death and that defendant Mary Ellen Vesey wilfully caused his death, which import a higher degree of felonious homicide. ³ It is not necessary for us to decide the degree of murder or manslaughter alleged; it is sufficient that the complaint alleges a killing which the criminal statutes of this state declare to be a felony.

No cases having fact situations like the instant case have been cited, and none have been found. The case with facts most similar is United States v. Freeman, 25 Fed.Cas.No.15,162, p. 1208; 4 Mason 505, in which the captain of a ship, knowing that a sailor was weak and disabled, ordered him to climb the rigging of the ship, from which he fell and was drowned. The captain was held guilty of manslaughter. The court noted that it would be murder if malice were present and that it did not matter whether moral or physical force caused the sailor to comply with the order. Coercing or persuading another to do an act which is likely to prove fatal is murder or manslaughter. ⁴ The above reasoning applies to the instant case, in which defendant Vesey allegedly caused decedent to do an act which she knew would be dangerous to his life and which did in fact cause his death. It is sufficient that the act complained of accelerated decedent's death, and the fact that he was in ill health and weak does not lessen the criminal responsibility. ⁵ We think the complaint alleges a felonious homicide.

2. The second question presented by this case is whether M.S.A. § 525.87 bars one joint owner of a joint and several bank account who feloniously takes the life of the other joint owner from acquiring the balance of the account. That section provides in part:

'No person who feloniously takes or causes or procures another so to take the life of another shall Inherit from such person or Receive any interest in the estate of the decedent, or take by Devise or Bequest from him any portion of his estate.' (Italics supplied.)

The quoted portion of the statute applies only if the interest which the survivor takes upon the death of the decedent is part of the estate of the decedent.

The statute relating to bank accounts ⁶ of the type involved in this case is § 48.30, which provides in part:

'* * * When any deposit shall be made by or in the names of two or more persons upon joint and several account, the same, or any part thereof, and the dividends or interest thereon, may be paid to either of these persons or to a survivor of them, or to a personal representative of the survivor.'

This court, in Dyste v. Farmers & Mechanics Sav. Bank, 179 Minn, 430, 229 N.W. 865, held that in addition to protecting the bank the statute also recognizes that making a deposit in that manner gives to each of the persons named the right to make withdrawals therefrom and gives to the survivor the right to withdraw the residue. It also held that the right to make withdrawals vested a present interest which was sufficient to sustain a valid gift against a charge that it was an invalid testamentary disposition. The interest vested by the right to make withdrawals is also sufficient to take the bank accounts in the instant case out of the terms of § 525.87, since the surviving joint owner of the accounts takes not from the estate of the deceased joint owner but by virtue of the contract of leposit.

3. The next question is whether, in the absence of a statute, a person who feloniously takes the life of another should be permitted to take the balance of funds held by the two in joint and several account.

Other jurisdictions have reached conflicting results in cases involving interests similar to those involved here. Some have held that the survivor takes absolutely because he has a complete vested interest by virtue of the original conveyance or contract and gained nothing by the death which he did not already have. ⁷ In one case involving real and personal property and a joint bank account, all held in joint tenancy, the court held that the statutes of that jurisdiction relating to joint tenancy, which made no exception to the right of survivorship where the survivor murdered the other joint tenant, were binding on the court. ⁸ New York appears to be the only jurisdiction in which the courts have divested the survivor of all legal title. They have done so on the grounds that to allow him to take would be abhorrent to the rules of equity and justice. ⁹ Many courts, agreeing with the sentiments of the New York court, have held that, although the survivor's interest vested by virtue of the original conveyance or contract, he must hold varying portions of the property on constructive trust for the benefit of those who would take the decedent's estate. ¹⁰

In our opinion, the latter view is preferable. It does not interfere with any vested legal rights, yet it gives effect to the appealing doctrine that a person should not be permitted to profit by his own wrong. That doctrine has been given effect many times by this court, which has imposed constructive trusts whenever the legal title to property was obtained through means or under circumstances which rendered it unconscionable for the holder of legal title to retain and enjoy the beneficial interest. 6 Dunnell, Dig. & Supp. § 9916. The...