Vest v. Giant Food Stores, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 September 1992
• Docket Number: No. 68,68
• Citation: 329 Md. 461,620 A.2d 340
• Parties: Woodrow W. VEST v. GIANT FOOD STORES, INC. et al. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 461

329 Md. 461

620 A.2d 340

Woodrow W. VEST v. GIANT FOOD STORES, INC. et al.

No. 68, Sept. Term, 1992.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 9, 1993.

Luiz R.S. Simmons, on brief, Silver Spring, for petitioner.

Christopher R. Costabile, on brief, Fairfax, VA, for respondents.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, CHASANOW, KARWACKI and ROBERT M. BELL, JJ.

CHASANOW, Judge.

The issue before us is the interpretation of Maryland Code (1957, 1985 Repl.Vol.), Article 101, § 40(c), ¹ which restricts the Workers' Compensation Commission's ability to reopen prior awards of compensation to five years following the last payment of compensation.

I.

On November 3, 1980, Woodrow Wilson Vest injured his lower back while working at the Landover, Maryland, warehouse of Giant Food Stores, Inc. (Giant). On December 30, 1980, Vest filed an "Employee's Claim" with the Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission), alleging that he was injured in the course of his employment with Giant. Neither Giant, Giant's insurer, nor Vest requested a hearing, and on January 30, 1981, the Commission issued an "Award of Compensation" (the Award) without a hearing based on the information set forth in the claim form, the employer's injury report, and a surgeon's report contained in its files.

The Award of Compensation provided that "[a]fter due consideration of the above entitled case, it is determined that the claimant sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment" and that the Commission had "concluded to pass an Order based on the evidence in the record...." The Commission required Giant and its insurer to pay Vest "$241.00 per week, payable weekly, during the continuance of [Vest's] temporary total disability...." The Award also stated that it was "subject to further determination by the Commission as to whether the claimant has sustained any permanent disability."

Vest received temporary total disability benefits from November 5, 1980 to December 21, 1980; from December 28, 1980 to January 3, 1981; and from February 1, 1982 to February 2, 1982. He received temporary partial disability benefits intermittently from December 20, 1980 to June 12 1981 and from January 28, 1982 to March 6, 1982. Vest received his last payment on April 5, 1982.

In the summer of 1987, Vest underwent two operations on his lower back which he alleged were related to the November 1980 injury. Giant's insurer paid the medical expenses for both operations. ² In 1988, Vest's doctor determined that Vest had a forty-five percent permanent partial disability of his lower back following the operations. Vest presented a claim to Giant's insurance carrier seeking compensation for his permanent partial disability. Giant's insurer denied the claim on the basis that the statutory five-year limitations period had expired.

On April 5, 1989, exactly seven years from the date of his last payment of compensation, Vest petitioned the Commission to reopen his claim to redetermine the nature and extent of his disability. The Commission conducted a hearing and denied Vest's request on the grounds that the limitations period had expired. Vest appealed the Commission's decision to the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. The circuit court granted Giant's motion for summary judgment, also on the basis of limitations. Vest then appealed to the Court of Special Appeals which affirmed the circuit court. Vest v. Giant Food, Inc., 91 Md.App. 570, 605 A.2d 627 (1992). We granted certiorari to determine when the § 40(c) limitations period commenced in this case.

II.

The outcome of this case hinges upon the interpretation of the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act). Specifically, we must interpret and apply the Act's reopening provision found in Maryland Code (1957, 1985 Repl.Vol.), Article 101, § 40(c). Section 40(c) provides:

"Modifications or changes.--The powers and jurisdiction of the Commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may, from time to time, make such modifications or changes with respect to former findings or orders with respect thereto as in its opinion may be justified; provided, however, that no modification or change of any award of compensation shall be made by the Commission unless application therefor shall be made to the Commission within five years next following the last payment of compensation."

Vest raises four arguments as to why the limitations provision of § 40(c) should not foreclose the Commission's ability to reopen his case. First, Vest argues that the January 30, 1981 Award of Compensation was neither an "award of compensation" nor a "finding" within the meaning of § 40(c), thus never triggering the limitations period. Second, even assuming that the January 1981 Award was an "award of compensation," Vest contends that § 40(c) only applies to final awards of compensation, and the January 1981 Award was not designated as final. Third, he urges that the Commission's January 1981 Award expressly retained jurisdiction over the case for a future determination of permanent partial disability, thus tolling any applicable limitations period. Finally, Vest asserts that, because his prior Award was for a temporary disability only, § 40(c) did not preclude the reopening of the Award with respect to permanent disability.

When interpreting a statute's provisions, our goal is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 73, 591 A.2d 481, 484-85 (1991). The primary source from which to determine this intent is the language of the statute itself. Revis v. Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund, 322 Md. 683, 686, 589 A.2d 483, 484 (1991). In determining the meaning of the statutory provisions, the statute must be examined as a whole and the interrelationship or connection among all its provisions are considered. Howard County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Walls, 288 Md. 526, 530, 418 A.2d 1210, 1213 (1980). Furthermore, when interpreting the Workers' Compensation Act, if there is any ambiguity in the statute's language we generally construe the Act "as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes." Id. With these principles of statutory interpretation in mind, we address each of Vest's arguments and affirm the decision of the Court of Special Appeals.

III.

Vest's initial arguments center on the method by which the Commission issued the January 1981 Award. In general, Vest contends that the limitations period does not apply where the Commission orders compensation, without the benefit of a hearing, based solely on the evidence in the record before it. In advancing his theory, Vest argues that such awards fail to qualify as either "awards of compensation" or "findings" in the context of § 40(c).

A.

Under § 40(c), modifications of an "award of compensation" may occur only within five years of the last payment of compensation under such an award. Vest reasons that if the January 1981 Award was not an "award of compensation," then the limitations period would not apply. We must, therefore, determine whether the Commission's January 1981 Award was an "award of compensation" under § 40(c).

The Act defines "compensation" as "the money allowance payable to an employee or to his dependents as provided for in this article...." § 67(5) (emphasis added). This definition of compensation is broad and encompasses most forms of payment to employees provided under the statute, although it excludes the payment of medical expenses. Holy Cross Hosp. v. Nichols, 290 Md. 149, 161-63, 428 A.2d 447, 453-54 (1981). Since §§ 36(2) and 36(6) of the Act provide for the payment of a percentage of an employee's weekly salary due to temporary total disability and temporary partial disability, the payments Vest received for these injuries (excluding reimbursement of medical expenses) were "compensation" under the Act.

Although the Act defines the term "compensation," it does not expressly define the term "award." Section 40(a) does, however, define the process the Commission follows in determining whether to grant or deny "awards" under the Act. Section 40(a) provides:

"Hearing and award.--The Commission shall make or cause to be made such investigation of any claim as it deems necessary, and upon application of either party, shall order a hearing. Within thirty days after a claim for compensation is submitted under this section, or such hearing concluded the Commission shall make or deny an award, determining such claim for compensation, and file same in the office of the Commission." (Emphasis added).

Section 40(a) thus establishes two methods by which the Commission makes or denies awards: by hearing after application of either party or, in the absence of a hearing, upon the evidence contained in the record before it. Cf. Oxford Cabinet Co. v. Parks, 179 Md. 680, 684-85, 22 A.2d 481, 483 (1941) (describing the relationship between the two methods).

Vest attempts to distinguish between the two methods. He contends that the payment of compensation without a hearing cannot be regarded as an "award of compensation" under § 40(c). He asserts that such orders do "no more than determine the compensability of the claim" and do not constitute "a decision regarding the validity of the claim." Vest cites no Maryland authority for this interpretation, and we find it to be without merit. Neither § 40(a) nor § 40(c) distinguish between the two methods of granting awards for purposes of applying the limitations period, and we decline Vest's invitation to create a distinction. Thus, we find that the January 1981 Award was an "award of compensation" under § 40(c).

B.

Vest attempts to create another issue from the fact that the Commission made the January 1981 Award without a hearing. He notes that the limitations period in § 40(c) applies only to "modifications or changes with respect to former findings or orders...