Vesta Mills v. City Council of Charleston

• Decision Date: 27 March 1901
• Citation: 38 S.E. 226,60 S.C. 1
• Parties: VESTA MILLS v. CITY COUNCIL OF CHARLESTON et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

38 S.E. 226

60 S.C. 1

VESTA MILLS v. CITY COUNCIL OF CHARLESTON et al.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

March 27, 1901

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Charleston county; Ernest Gary, Judge.

Suit by the Vesta Mills against the city council of Charleston and another to restrain the collection of alleged invalid city taxes. From a decree in favor of plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Legare & Holman, for appellants.

Smythe Lee & Frost, for respondent.

GARY A. J.

The facts of the case are thus stated by his honor the circuit judge:

"This is a suit for an injunction to restrain the city of Charleston from collecting a tax claimed by the city authorities of Charleston to be due the city by the plaintiff, the Vesta Mills. The facts are agreed and submitted in the form of a stipulation. It appears that during the year 1888 the Charleston Mills was incorporated under a general act of the general assembly of the state of South Carolina, and was organized with a paid-up capital of $250,000, and the object was for the purpose of manufacturing cotton cloth. This mill erected the buildings, a part of which is now owned by the plaintiff company. The Charleston Cotton Mills continued to manufacture cotton cloth until March. 1896, when it became embarrassed, ceased operations, and all of the property consisting of plant, buildings, and machinery, was sold under a decree of the court, on the 1st day of February, 1897; the facts attending such sale being more fully set out in an affidavit of Mr. Lee. The bondholders of the Charleston Cotton Mills, through a committee, purchased the machinery, land, and the present buildings (now owned by the plaintiff), for the benefit of all parties interested. On the 6th day of April, 1897, the Charleston Mills was incorporated under the laws of this state, and the committee who purchased the property of the Charleston Cotton Mills, as above mentioned, conveyed said property, consisting of the buildings, machinery, and plant, to the Charleston Mills on the 10th day of April, 1897. The Charleston Mills likewise became embarrassed, and in 1898 failed in business; and subsequently all of its property, consisting of the plant, machinery, and buildings, was sold under a decree of the United States Court, and the same was purchased by J. H. Montgomery for $100,000, who assigned his bid to the plaintiff company, for whom he bid, and caused the same to be conveyed by the special master of the United States court to the plaintiff company. Pending the hearing of this cause of action, and upon proper notice, the plaintiff obtained a temporary injunction or restraining order from Judge W. G. Benet, enjoining the defendants from proceeding in any way to collect the said taxes, or any part thereof, or to further levy upon, sell, or in any way interfere with any of the property, real or personal, of the plaintiff, until the hearing and decision of this case upon the merits. In the month of February of the present year, and subsequent to the restraining order of Judge Benet, the city council of Charleston passed an ordinance to the effect that the collection and enforcement of taxes for municipal purposes on real and personal property within the city of Charleston shall not be stayed or prevented by any injunction, writ, or order issued by any court or judge thereof. At the hearing of this cause the defendant was permitted to amend the answer of the city of Charleston, and to set up the ordinance just alluded to as a defense and bar to the plaintiff's contention for a perpetual injunction."

The circuit judge proceeds to dispose of the issues as follows:

"Before discussing the merits of the case, it is necessary to dispose of this question we encounter at the threshold of the case. My conclusion is that the defense cannot be sustained, for two reasons: The first, because the ordinance is prospective, and not retrospective. The ordinance is silent as to the fact, and under such circumstances the general rule of construction is that it must be construed to be prospective, unless it appears from the words of the act that it was intended to be retrospective. Second, it will be noted that the ordinance was passed not only subsequent to the commencement of the plaintiff's action, but subsequent, also, to the restraining order of Judge Benet. The object and effect of that order was to protect or preserve the status of these litigants, both plaintiffs and defendant, until a final hearing on the merits; and to sustain the defendant's contention would, in effect, hold that while the restraining order was in force the defendant could go ahead and pass an ordinance the effect of which would be to oust the court of its jurisdiction in an action already pending in court. In other words, it would enable the city council to legislate for itself a complete defense to an action already pending. I cannot, therefore, put such an unnatural and strained construction upon this ordinance. This plea or defense is therefore overruled.

"We now come to the main question, and that is whether the plaintiff, the Vesta Mills, is liable for the city taxes, the collection of which has been stayed by an order of Judge Benet. And the answer depends upon a proper construction of an ordinance of the city of Charleston passed by its officers on the 24th day of March, 1896; and it is as follows:

"'(44) An ordinance to exempt certain manufactories from taxation except for school purposes, for five successive years from the time of the establishment of such manufactories.

"'Be it ordained by the mayor and aldermen of the city of Charleston, in city council assembled, that from and after the ratification of this ordinance by a majority of such qualified electors of the city of Charleston as shall vote at an election to be held for that purpose, on the fourth Tuesday in April, 1896, all manufactories established after that time within the corporate limits of the said city, and doing business therein, employing ten or more hands, or having a paid-up capital of

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