Vetter v. Fun Footwear Co.

Decision Date30 November 1995
Citation668 A.2d 529,447 Pa.Super. 84
PartiesAnthony J. VETTER, administrator of the estate of Roxanne Vetter, deceased, and Anthony J. Vetter and Sally Vetter, his wife, individually, Appellants, v. FUN FOOTWEAR COMPANY, also d/b/a Fun Shu, Ltd., McAdoo Fuels, Inc., t/a Stefanisko's Catering Service, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Black Creek Township, and Sugarloaf Township.
CourtPennsylvania Superior Court

Catherine A. McGovern, Freeland, for appellants.

Ralph E. Kates, III, Wilkes-Barre, for Fun Footwear, appellee.

Before ROWLEY, President Judge, and CAVANAUGH, BECK, TAMILIA, KELLY, JOHNSON, HUDOCK, FORD ELLIOTT and SAYLOR, JJ.

ROWLEY, President Judge.

In this appeal, we consider whether an employee, who is injured in an automobile accident after leaving an employer-sponsored Christmas party, can maintain a personal injury action against her employer, or whether her exclusive remedy is under the Workers' Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 1 et seq. After reviewing the record, the parties' briefs, and the applicable case law, we vacate the judgment on the pleadings granted in favor of appellee Fun Footwear Company, also d/b/a Fun Shu, Ltd., and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Roxanne Vetter, the deceased daughter of appellants Anthony J. and Sally Vetter, was employed by appellee on December 18, 1982, when she attended an employer-sponsored Christmas party. Vetter left the party with three co-workers in a car driven by one of those co-workers, David Zook. Although he was under the age of twenty-one, Zook had been served alcoholic beverages at the party and was visibly intoxicated. After a brief stop at his mother's house, Zook proceeded on a state road in Luzerne County. He subsequently lost control of his car and struck a tree. Vetter was fatally injured in the accident.

Vetter's parents, individually, and Anthony J. Vetter, as administrator of his daughter's estate, filed an action for wrongful death and survival against, inter alia, appellee, alleging that appellee had been negligent in allowing Zook to consume alcoholic beverages at the Christmas party. Appellee filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that appellants' exclusive remedy was under the Workers' Compensation Act. On March 29, 1994, the trial court granted appellee's motion and dismissed it from the action. Appellants filed this timely appeal. 1

In reviewing an order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings, we apply the following principles:

Entry of judgment on the pleadings is permitted under Pa.R.C.P. 1034 which provides for such judgment after the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to delay trial. A motion for judgment on the pleadings is similar to a demurrer. It may be entered where there are no disputed issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In determining if there is a dispute as to facts, the court must confine its consideration to the pleadings and relevant documents. The scope of review on an appeal from the grant of judgment on the pleadings is plenary. We must determine if the action of the court below was based on a clear error of law or whether there were facts disclosed by the pleadings which should properly go to the jury.

Kosor v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company, 407 Pa.Super. 68, 71-72, 595 A.2d 128, 129-30 (1991) (citations omitted). With those principles in mind, we will address the issue raised in this appeal.

The Workers' Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for an employee who seeks to recover for an injury sustained in the course of his or her employment:

(a) The liability of an employer under this act shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other liability to such employes, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin or anyone otherwise entitled to damages in any action at law or otherwise on account of any injury or death as defined in section 301(c)(1) and (2) [77 P.S. § 411(1) and (2) ] or occupational disease as defined in section 108 [77 P.S. § 27.1]

77 P.S. § 481(a) (footnotes omitted). Section 411 of the Act provides as follows:

(1) The terms "injury" and "personal injury," as used in this act, shall be construed to mean an injury to an employe, regardless of his previous physical condition, arising in the course of his employment and related thereto.... The term "injury arising in the course of his employment," as used in this article, ... shall include all [ ] injuries sustained while the employe is actually engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer, whether upon the employer's premises or elsewhere....

77 P.S. § 411(1). Where, as here, the injury at issue occurs off the employer's premises, it is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act only if, at the time of the injury, the employee was actually engaged in the furtherance of her employer's business. City of Monessen School District v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Hays), 155 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 56, 624 A.2d 734 (1993); Brown v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Liken Employment Nursing Services), 138 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 560, 588 A.2d 1014 (1991), appeal denied, 529 Pa. 625, 600 A.2d 540 (1991). Whether an injury occurred while the employee was engaged in furtherance of her employer's business is a question of law to be determined on the basis of the applicable facts. Speight v. Burens, 371 Pa.Super. 478, 483, 538 A.2d 542, 544 (1988).

Both this Court and the Commonwealth Court have held that an employee's attendance at an employer-sponsored social event is in furtherance of the employer's business for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act. For example, in Miller v. Keystone Appliances, 133 Pa.Super. 354, 2 A.2d 508 (1938), this Court determined that an employee acted in the course of his employment when he attended an employer-sponsored picnic because the picnic was held so that the employees could become better acquainted and have a good time, and so that there would be better cooperation in the company's business. The evidence which supported that determination was, according to the Court, ample. Specifically, the employer arranged for the facilities where the picnic was held, the employer purchased and distributed tickets for amusements and refreshments without cost to the employees who attended, and the employer closed its offices on the day of the picnic without deducting wages for the salaried employees. A program of entertainment and sports was arranged, with two sales managers being in charge of the entertainment. The president of the company spoke to the attendees, addressing work-related business. The employer mailed notices about the picnic, and salesmen received bulletins from the sales promotion manager notifying them of the picnic and outlining the day's activities. Finally, the employee was directed to attend the picnic by his supervisor, who personally ascertained the number of salesmen attending. Under those circumstances, the Court held that the employee was injured while in the course of his employment.

Similarly, in Feaster v. S.K. Kelso & Sons, 22 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 20, 347 A.2d 521 (1975), the Commonwealth Court concluded that the purpose of an employer-sponsored picnic was to promote the employer's interest in good relationships with his employees, relying on the following circumstances:

The stipulation here filed establishes that the picnic at which Mr. Feaster met his death was sponsored by the employer for its employees and their families, that food was supplied by the employer, that the picnic was announced by a poster at the place of employment and that such affairs had become an annual custom with this employer.

Id. at 25, 347 A.2d at 524. Therefore, the employee's attendance at the picnic furthered his employer's business.

In Tredyffrin-Easttown School District v. Breyer, 48 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 81, 408 A.2d 1194 (1979), the employee, a high school math teacher and a volunteer assistant coach for the school's track team, attended a picnic held at the home of the head track coach. In holding that the employee was engaged in the furtherance of his employer's business when he was injured at the picnic, the Court stated,

It cannot be gainsaid that the picnic in the instant case promoted the School District's interest in good relationships between its teachers and their students and the vitality of its athletic programs.

The School District, through its employees, encouraged the claimant to participate in extracurricular activities with his students. The picnic for senior members of the track team was an eleven year tradition and a normal part of the activities involved in the track and field program at Conestoga. Claimant went to the picnic in furtherance of activities on behalf of which the School District approved the claimant's voluntary services.

Id. at 84, 408 A.2d at 1195.

In Investors Diversified Services v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Howar), 103 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 562, 520 A.2d 958 (1987), the employee attended a Christmas party for sales representatives given by the employer's divisional sales manager. The manager encouraged the employee to attend the party so as to promote camaraderie among the employees and to permit them to associate with successful people. Several employees received awards in recognition of high sales performance. The Court concluded that the "party fostered good relationships between the employer's salesmen, commended laudable employees, and thereby promoted the vitality of the employer's sales program." Id. at 567, 520 A.2d [447 Pa.Super. 91] at 960. Therefore, the Court held that the employee had attended the party in furtherance of his employer's business interest.

More recently, in City of Monessen, supra, the employee, an assistant band director and instructional music teacher, was injured as she was...

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