Vetzel v. Brown
| Citation | 86 So.2d 138 |
| Parties | Oscar L. VETZEL and Florence Vetzel, his wife, Appellants, v. Howell L. BROWN, Marjorie D. Brown, his wife, Melvin R. Wilson, Ermal L.Wilson, his wife, Robert W. Christy, Connie W. Christy, his wife, Harold A.Robinson and Bernice A. Robinson, his wife, Appellees. |
| Decision Date | 02 March 1956 |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Hall, Farnsworth & Rousseau, Tampa, for appellants.
Bucklew & Ramsey, Tampa, for appellees.
Mr. and Mrs. Vetzel, plaintiffs below and appellants here, are the owners of a parcel of unimproved land consisting of three and a fraction lots in Unit No. 4 of Belmar Subdivision in the City of Tampa, County of Hillsborough, Florida. The defendants own and occupy homes in the same unit of the same subdivision. All parties deraign their title, but not immediately, from a common grantor, one Rosemary Stearns. The purpose of plaintiffs' suit was to cancel, as againat defendants and all other persons similarly situated, certain restrictions on the use of their property contained in an agreement executed in 1947 by Miss Stearns and a Mr. and Mrs. Crabb.
Miss Stearns owned lots in Units No. 4 to 7 inclusive, and the Crabbs owned lots in Units No. 8 and 9 of Belmar Subdivision. By their 1947 agreement, they mutually covenanted on behalf of themselves, their heirs, legal representatives, successors and assigns, to restrict the use of such lots to the purposes therein mentioned, and expressly provided that the covenants therein contained should run with the land and 'be binding upon all persons hereto, and all persons, firms or corporations claiming through or under them.' The agreement designated certain lots in Unit No. 4 as business lots and restricted all the others to residential usage, either single-family or duplex. It contained other restrictions as to set-back lines, building heights, and the like. It was recorded in the public records of Hillsborough County. One of its effects-and the one with which we are here concerned-was to establish a business or commercial zone on each side of Manhattan Avenue, including the west half of the block in which the Vetzels' lots are located. The lots in the east half of this blcok were restricted to residential usage, and the Vetzels' lots lie on the south end of the east half of this block, adjoining on the west the western, or commercial, side of the block.
The Vetzels bought their lots in 1955 under a deed that expressly provided that the title was 'subject to easements and restrictions of record.' There was a grocery store with parking area and loading platform directly across the street, and a church on the corner diagonally across the street, from their lots. They were advised by their grantor that the property was zoned for business usage, and a check with the City of Tampa zoning officials confirmed their statement. They did not check the record title to the property and had no actual notice of the restrictions contained in the 1947 Stearns-Crabb agreement until after they had bought the property and were attempting to obtain a loan to construct a store building on it. They contended in the lower court, and argue here, that the restrictive covenants of the 1947 agreement cannot be enforced against them because (1) there was no privity of estate between Miss Stearns and the Crabbs to support a covenant running with the land and binding upon subsequent purchasers, and (2) the change in the character of the neighborhood since the 1947 agreement was executed would make it inequitable to enforce its restrictive covenants against them. The lower court heard the testimony and found against them on both issues. They have appealed from the final decree dismissing their complaint.
As to their first contention, that is, that the 'privity of estate' which is one of the essentials of a covenant running with the land means a mutuality or succession of interest between the original covenantor and covenantee, it must be conceded that there are cases so holding. See Clark, Covenants and Interests Running with Land, 2d Ed., p. 111 et seq. Mr. Clark, however, criticizes this view as being supported neither by ancient law nor modern policy. He says in his work, supra, at page 117, that And he concludes that 'privity in the sense of succession to the estate of either party to the covenant is the only historically justifiable requirement * * *' Clark, ibid., page 131. See also 165 Broadway Building v. City Investing Co., 2 Cir., ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bennett v. Behring Corp.
...3d DCA 1974); Tri-County Produce Distributors, Inc. v. Northeast Production Credit Assn., 160 So.2d 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964); Vetzel v. Brown, 86 So.2d 138 (Fla.1956); Zaucha v. Town of Medley, 66 So.2d 238 (Fla.1953); and Rinehart v. Phelps, 150 Fla. 382, 7 So.2d 783 Furthermore, the record ......
-
Tri-Continental Fin. Corp. v. Tropical M. Enterprises
...support they cite the many cases collected in the annotation to Oliver v. Hewitt, 191 Va. 163, 60 S.E.2d 1, 23 A.L.R.2d 516; Vetzel v. Brown, Fla., 86 So.2d 138; and 32 C.J. "Injunctions", Sec. 315, p. 203, where it is "Where restrictive covenant with respect to the use of property, real or......
-
Hagan v. Sabal Palms, Inc.
...headnote): "Purchasers of land are bound by constructive notices of restrictive covenants in their chain of title (citing Vetzel v. Brown, Fla., 86 So.2d 138; Tolar v. Meyer, Fla.App., And in Maule Industries, supra, (fifth headnote): "The record is notice to a subsequent purchaser of matte......
-
Silver Blue Lake Apartments, Inc. v. Silver Blue Lake Home Owners Ass'n
...but those who take from him and those in the neighborhood who may be considered as beneficiaties of the contract.' And in Vetzel v. Brown, Fla.1956, 86 So.2d 138, we said 'Such use restrictions have long been enforced by courts of equity against a grantee taking title with notice of the res......