Vick Consol. School Dist. No. 21 v. New
| Decision Date | 04 June 1945 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-7667.,4-7667. |
| Parties | VICK CONSOL. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 21 et al. v. NEW. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Bradley County; John M. Golden, Judge.
Action by Arthur G. New against Vick Consolidated School District No. 21 and another to recover alleged balance due for teaching, in which defendant named filed a cross-complaint. Judgment was entered dismissing both the complaint and cross-complaint, and each party appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
J. R. Wilson, of El Dorado, for appellants.
Aubert Martin, of Warren, for appellee.
This is a controversy between a school district and one of the teachers. The directors were also defendants along with the district, but we treat the case as being between the district and the teacher.
On January 1, 1944, Arthur G. New filed his complaint against the Vick Consolidated School District, seeking to recover $320.00 as an alleged balance due for teaching in 1942-43, and also seeking to recover his proportionate part of the balance remaining in the 1942-43 budget fund earmarked for teacher salaries under Act 319 of 1941. To this complaint the defendant filed a demurrer.
In the same case, the school district filed a cross-complaint against Arthur G. New, claiming that he had obtained a teacher's contract from the district by falsely representing that he then had a license to teach school, and that he had thus received money from the school district in violation of the law, and the district should recover from him all money he received from the district. To this cross-complaint the plaintiff filed a demurrer.
On September 4, 1944, the Circuit Court sustained the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint, and also sustained the plaintiff's demurrer to the defendant's cross-complaint. The plaintiff elected to stand on his complaint, and the defendant elected to stand on its cross-complaint; so final judgment was entered dismissing both the complaint and cross-complaint and each side has appealed. Although in this court the district is the appellant and New is the cross-appellant, nevertheless, for clarity, we will refer to the parties as they were styled in the lower court, i.e., plaintiff and defendant. We first consider the complaint, and then the cross-complaint.
I. Plaintiff's Complaint. In his complaint, with the two amendments thereto, New alleged, inter alia:
(1) That he "was at all times hereinafter mentioned the holder of a certificate showing that he was duly qualified to teach in said school"; and "that he was the holder of a junior high school certificate dated June 30, 1941 and which was valid until the 30th of June, 1943, and that he is the holder of a three-year elementary certificate issued by the Arkansas Department of Education dated December 12, 1942, and that application for such certificate was made prior to commencing plaintiff's work at Vick."
(2) "That on the 5th day of September, 1942 the said directors of said district * * * elected the plaintiff as superintendent of the school at Vick and to teach said school for a period of eight months beginning September 14, 1942."
(3) "That on the 21st of November, 1942 one of the teachers who was employed when the budget for the year 1942-43 was made, having resigned, on that date an additional supplemental contract was made" with the plaintiff New, which provided, among other things, that New would receive $320 additional salary for teaching three of the subjects of the resigned teacher; and that the "contract was reduced to writing and filed with the County Supervisor of Bradley County and with the Treasurer of Bradley County."
(4) "That plaintiff fully complied with said contract and performed the services required of him, but that the defendants failed and refused to pay him" this $320.00;
(5) That for the school year 1942-43, after paying all teachers' salaries, there is left a balance of $1040.06 in the fund earmarked for teachers' salaries under the provisions of Act 319 of 1941, and that the plaintiff comes within the provisions of Act 319 of 1941 and is entitled to his pro rata part of such unexpended balance, and that the school district has refused to pay the sum to him. The plaintiff prayed for judgment for $320.00 and for his pro rata part of the $1040.06 as above mentioned.
We have reached the conclusion that the complaint stated a cause of action, and the defendant's demurrer should have been overruled.
As regards the claim for $320: This complaint alleged a cause of action, in that it alleged the defendant's corporate existence, the plaintiff's license to teach, the making of a contract in writing, the terms thereof, the filing of the contract with the proper authorities, the fulfillment by the plaintiff, and the refusal of the defendant to pay the $320.
As regards the claim under Act 319 of 1941: The complaint alleged a cause of action, in that, in addition to the allegations previously mentioned, the complaint alleged that a budget had been adopted by the district under the said act, that all the money earmarked for teachers' salaries had not been expended, that a certain balance remained, that the plaintiff was entitled to a part of the balance, and that the district refused to pay the plaintiff. Cases involving the rights of teachers under Act 319 of 1941 are: Fowlkes v. Wilson, 205 Ark. 895, 171 S.W.2d 958 and Fennell v. School District No. 13, Ark., 187 S.W.2d 187. The defendant's demurrer to the complaint was a general demurrer, merely stating that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. We hold that the Circuit Court was in error in sustaining the general demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint.
II. Defendant's Cross-Complaint. Without waiving the demurrer to the complaint, the defendant filed an answer and cross-complaint. Since the complaint was decided on the demurrer, the answer must be treated as withdrawn; and we do not consider anywhere in this opinion any of the matters contained in the answer. We consider the cross-complaint only to determine whether the trial court was correct in sustaining the demurrer to it. In the cross-complaint the defendant alleged, inter alia:
(1) That New secured a teacher's contract from the school district by falsely representing that he had a valid and subsisting teacher's certificate; that "he well knew at the time he procured the execution of this contract that he did not have a valid certificate, * * * and that his representations to the Vick School District were not true, and that he was not entitled to a contract without a living certificate; * * * that in the contract executed on September 1, 1942 the district should pay Arthur G. New the sum of $150.00 per month for a term of eight months beginning September 14, 1942;"
(2) That "the defendants would further show that when the said Arthur G. New did obtain a certificate authorizing him to teach school, it was a three-year elementary certificate, and was issued on the twelfth day of December, 1942 * * *."
The defendant prayed for the return of the money paid New from the funds of the district on the allegedly void contract.
To this cross-complaint, the plaintiff New offered a general demurrer, which the court sustained. This part of the case has given us considerable concern. In the previous portion of this opinion, we have stated that the circuit court should have overruled the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint, because the plaintiff alleged that he had a license. Now, on the cross-complaint the defendant alleges that the plaintiff did not have a license. This is not by way of answer, but by way of cross-complaint; and the demurrer admits these allegations.
As we understand the contention of the defendant, the district is saying that Arthur G. New had no license of any kind from September 14, 1942, to December 12, 1942, a period of about three months; and that during that period of time he taught school for the Vick District, and received about $450 of money from the district, and that this money should be returned because New had no license for that period of time. What we are saying here relates only to that situation. Consideration of any of the other questions is reserved as pointed out in the concluding section of this opinion. The question here is whether the district can recover money paid a person for teaching, if that person, during such period of time, had no license to teach school.
A. The rule in Tallman v. Lewis. The concluding sentence in Section 11603 of Pope's Digest reads:
"Any person who shall teach in a public school in this State without a legal certificate of qualification to teach shall not be entitled to receive for such services any compensation from the school fund."
That sentence constitutes an absolute inhibition against any teacher attempting to draw money from the public treasury, unless the teacher had a license at the time of teaching. This is no new law. In substance, this has been the law since 1875. Act 46 of 1875, approved Dec. 7, 1875, was the act to maintain the free common schools of Arkansas, and Section 80 of that act reads:
"* * * that any person who shall teach in a common school in this state, without a certificate of his qualification to teach, shall not be entitled to receive for such services any compensation from revenues raised by tax or in any wise appropriated for the support of common schools."
The evident theory of the law is that one who is to instruct the youth should be competent to do so; that attempted instruction by an incompetent person may be worse than no instruction at all; and that to allow an incompetent person to instruct is to misappropriate and misuse the taxpayers' money. With this statutory inhibition, we view the case here as one in which the rule of Tallman v. Lewis is applicable, as we will hereinafter explain.
Cases involving alleged irregular dealings between an individual and a...
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