Vickers v. Motte, 40506
| Decision Date | 24 April 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,No. 40506,40506,1 |
| Citation | 137 S.E.2d 77,109 Ga.App. 615 |
| Parties | R. B. VICKERS et al. v. C.E. MOTTE |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
The trial court did not err in overruling the general demurrer to the petition which alleged that a public officer was doing authorized public work, but in a manner which injured plaintiff's property, and was doing so maliciously and with intent to injure the property of plaintiff.
Motte, defendant in error, in 1954 purchased a lot in Alma, Georgia, on which was located a tin building with concrete floor wherein he has operated a blacksmith and welding shop since that time. Sixteenth Street bounded Motte's lot on the north; Market Street bounded said lot on the east. In 1955, Market Street was elevated eight inches and paved. In 1962 Sixteenth Street was elevated eight inches and paved. The improvement of these streets caused surface water from them to flow onto Motte's lot.
Bacon County owned the lot to the south of Motte's property, which was a higher elevation than Motte's property and from which water naturally flowed north. The county also owned the lot west of Motte which was of lower elevation than Motte's property and water naturally flowed from Motte's property onto said west lot.
The petition as amended alleges that Motte dug ditches around his property after the paving of city streets and caused water to flow westward as it normally would prior to elevation of the streets; that in April, 1963, defendant Richard B. Vickers, Commissioner of Roads and Revenues of Bacon County, acting under color of his office as Chairman of the Commissioners, caused county employees to commence filling in the lot to the west of lands owned by petitioner; that defendant knew that filling in the lot on the west would cause water to flood petitioner's lot but heedlessly, negligently and in utter disregard of the property rights of petitioner, continued to fill in such lot; that notice was given to Vickers and that he was asked to desist; that the defendant commissioner was experienced in surface water control and, regardless of such experience and heedless of the advices of the county surveyor, and regardless of the pleas of this petitioner not to flood his properties, the defendant commissioner did heedlessly, negligently, and in total and utter disregard of the property rights of this petitioner and in bad faith continue to fill in such properties to the west of this petitioner's lands; that the defendant commissioner was fully aware of the damage being done this petitioner but heedless thereof, and of plaintiff's entreaties, continued filling the lands to the west of lands of the petitioner and refused to ditch or otherwise divert such surface waters so they would not flow upon the lands owned by petitioner, all in bad heedlessly, recklessly and negligently. Recovery was sought for the damages to personalty and realty.
The defendants in the lower court, the commissioner and his surety on his official bond, filed a general demurrer to the petition as amended. Said demurrer was overruled by the court and this case is before this court on assignment of error to that ruling.
Leon A. Wilson, II, Waycross, Braswell Deen, Jr., Alma, for plaintiffs in error.
Barrie L. Jones, Alma, for defendant in error.
As to public officers, every presumption in favor of the validity and legality of his official acts, both ministerial and governmental, will be indulged, nothing to the contrary appearing. Perry v. Bank of Ellijay, 182 Ga. 768, 187 S.E. 18; Bailey v. Miller County, 24 Ga.App. 746, 102 S.E. 178.
In the present case, there being no allegations to the contrary, we must presume that the county commissioners had the authority and right to fill in the lot owned by the county and that same was for the public good and for a lawful function. Therefore, defendant had the official and lawful authority to raise the elevation of said lot.
Further, in view of the law relating to the Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues in and for Bacon County (Ga.L.1927, p. 488; Ga.L.1950, p. 2672; Ga.L.1951, p. 3183), which provides that they should have exclusive jurisdiction over and control all county matters, and that the chairman shall have charge of all labor necessary for effectual operation of all county machinery and which gives him authority to hire and discharge employees in county work, he necessarily has discretionary powers as to what work should be done, when, how and where necessary.
Public officers are vested with discretionary powers which, as to some officers such as judges, are termed judicial; as to others, quasi-judicial. In the exercise of these rights they are granted immunity from civil liability for mistakes in judgment honestly made. This immunity 'extends to errors in the determination both of law and of fact.' 22 R.C.L. 486.
It is the general rule that public officers, when acting in good faith and within the scope of their duty, are not liable to private action. This immunity is not extended to them when they do things not authorized by law, or act in a wanton or malicious way and with intent to injure the property of another. In the latter case, they are responsible for a violation of their duty. McClellan v. Carter, 30 Ga.App. 150, 151, 117 S.E. 118.
Hudspeth v. Hall, 113 Ga. 4, 7, 38 S.E. 358, 359.
'Where commissioners are appointed by an Act of the Legislature, for the purpose of selecting and laying off a county site, and a discretion is confided to them, in their judgment, to select a point nearest to the centre of the county, having due regard to eligibility, &c.: Held, that if they proceed, in good faith, to select such site, no Court has a right to control the exercise of their judgment, unless they invade private rights.' State ex rel. Fain v. Woody, 17 Ga. 612(1).
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Lathrop v. Deal
...in the exercise of discretionary duties if his acts are wilful, malicious, or corrupt." (Citation omitted)); Vickers v. Motte , 109 Ga.App. 615, 617, 137 S.E.2d 77 (1964) ("It is the general rule that public officers, when acting in good faith and within the scope of their duty, are not lia......
-
Thompson v. Spikes
...could not be held liable for negligence when drunken prisoners, while driving truck, caused injury to plaintiff). 25 Vickers v. Motte, 109 Ga.App. 615, 137 S.E.2d 77 (1964) (where allegations were sufficient to show that officials' decision to fill certain land was maliciously intended to c......
-
Tsg Water Resources v. D'Alba & Donovan Certified
...will." Rapid Group, Inc. v. Yellow Cab of Columbus, Inc., 253 Ga.App. 43, 49, 557 S.E.2d 420, 426 (2001)(quoting Vickers v. Motte, 109 Ga.App. 615, 619-20, 137 S.E.2d 77(1964)). "[B]ad faith cannot be prompted by an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties but must result from some inter......
-
Rapid Group, Inc. v. Yellow Cab of Columbus, A01A1363.
...conscious doing of wrong, and means breach of known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. [Cit.]" Vickers v. Motte, 109 Ga.App. 615, 619-620, 137 S.E.2d 77 (1964). Yellow Cab presented evidence at trial that Moore was negligent in the following ways: (1) failing to advise his cl......
-
Waiver of Sovereign Immunity: an Analysis of Gilbert v. Richardson - Susan Hurt
...15. Id. at 331, 264 S.E.2d at 879. 16. Id. 17. Id. at 329, 452 S.E.2d at 878. 18. Id. at 331, 452 S.E.2d at 880. See Vickers v. Motte, 109 Ga. App. 615, 618, 137 S.E.2d 77, 79 (1964) (Board of education was not liable for selecting a dangerous school bus route because the decision was a gov......