Vicksburg Bank v. Worrell

• Citation: 67 Miss. 47,7 So. 219
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
• Decision Date: 20 January 1890
• Parties: VICKSBURG BANK v. W. O. WORRELL, TAX COLLECTOR

7 So. 219

67 Miss. 47

VICKSBURG BANK v. W. O. WORRELL, TAX COLLECTOR

Supreme Court of Mississippi

January 20, 1890

FROM the chancery court of Warren County, HON. W. R. TRIGG Chancellor.

The Vicksburg Bank filed this bill, seeking to enjoin the appellee, the sheriff and tax collector of Warren county from selling for taxes a lot with the buildings thereon situated in the city of Vicksburg. The bill alleges that complainant, in December, 1887, invested a part of its capital stock and assets in the purchase of the said lot and buildings, occupied by it since in carrying on its banking business; that in 1887 the lot was assessed to its then owner, from whom complainant purchased; that pursuant to the revenue act of 1888 [Laws 1888, pp. 8-20] complainant paid into the state treasury the amount of privilege tax required by said act and received the privilege tax license by law specified for the year 1888, which by the provisions of the act was in lieu of all other taxes, state, county and municipal, upon the shares and assets of said bank; that the board of supervisors were notified of the purchase by the bank, of the payment of the privilege tax, and the exemption claimed by the bank; that the board of supervisors refused to strike the land from the assessment roll.

The bill further alleges that said property was likewise assessed by the city of Vicksburg for city taxes for the year 1888 although not given in for assessment by any one, and that the board of aldermen likewise refused to strike the lot from the city assessment roll; that the property was advertised by appellee, as tax collector, for the taxes claimed to be due the state, county and city. The bill prayed for an injunction against the said tax collector, upon the ground that, said property was exempt from taxes other than the privilege tax under the above-mentioned act of 1888.

The clause of said act relied on is as follows: "And the privilege tax imposed upon and paid by such banks of deposit or discount shall be in lieu of all other taxes, state county and municipal, upon the shares and assets of said banks."

Injunction was issued as prayed for, and the defendant appeared and moved to dissolve the injunction and dismiss the bill: [1] because there is no equity upon the face of the bill; [2] the bill shows no sufficient cause why the lot should not be sold for taxes; [3] the taxes levied by the board of supervisors are legal and are unpaid; [4] the payment of the privilege tax cannot operate to exempt the said real estate; [5] the bill failed to state the amount of capital stock and assets of said corporation and the price paid for the said privilege, so that the court could determine whether the lot was included in the assets protected by the said tax.

By his answer, which, accompanied the motion to dissolve, the defendant alleged that the total tax levied for 1888 by the state, county and city amounted to thirty-six mills on the dollar, and at the assessed valuation of the lot and buildings the tax due thereon was $ 648; whereas the complainant paid a privilege tax of only $ 750, which, it is contended by complainant, exempts it from all other taxes on not only the said lot, but its capital stock of $ 75,000.

The answer further submitted to the court that the said act of the legislature, in so far as it undertakes to relieve the bank from payment of the same taxes assessed to individuals in said city and county, was in contravention of art. xii, § 13, of the constitution of the state of Mississippi, to wit: "The property of all corporations for pecuniary profit shall be subject to taxation the same as that of individuals ;" and also in violation of section 20 of the same article of the constitution, to wit: "Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the state. All property shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be assessed by law."

The answer further set up that among the taxes levied by the board of supervisors of said county for the year 1888 was a special tax of one-half mill per thousand dollars for the repairing of the court-house of the county, and that a large portion of the money raised by the board of supervisors by taxation was annually expended by it for bridges and other necessary conveniences for the people of the county; and that the said act of 1888, in so far as it attempted to relieve the bank from any county tax, violates section 16, art. xii, of the constitution of the state, which is as follows: "No county shall be denied the right to raise by special tax money sufficient to pay for the building and repairing of court-houses, jails, bridges and other necessary conveniences for the people of the county; and money thus collected stroll never be appropriated for any other purpose; provided the tax thus levied shall be a certain per cent. on all tax levied by the state."

The point is also raised in the answer that only a small part of the buildings on the lot in question is used by complainant as a banking house, while the rest is rented for other purposes, and that the word "assets" in the statute must be taken to mean only such personal property as is necessary to carrying on the banking business; but if mistaken in this view, respondent contends that by the charter of said bank it was allowed to acquire and hold only so much land as may be necessary from time to time to the transacting of the business or as may be acquired in payment of debts due to the bank, and the buildings in question were not thus acquired; and that complainant cannot, even if the said act of 1888 is valid and effectual, enjoin without tendering the taxes due on that part of the buildings not used for banking purposes.

By agreement, the case was submitted to the court upon the bill, answer and motion to dissolve, waiving all objection as to the manner in which the several questions were presented.

The court by its final decree dissolved the injunction and ordered the lot sold to pay the taxes assessed against it, and from this decree the complainant appeals.

Decree reversed and cause remanded.

Birchett & Gilland, for the appellant.

1. That the act of 1888 is constitutional as to the state, we have only to refer to Mississippi Mills v. Cook, 56 Miss. 41, in which the right and power of the legislature to exempt the property of corporations from taxation was decided after full argument and full consideration. The exemption of railroads in process of construction, given by the proviso to section 608 of code of 1880, is also affirmed in Y. & M. V. R. R. Co. v. Thomas et al., 65 Miss. 553.

The same kind of statute has been applied to railroads since 1880 [Code of 1880, §§ 597, 608], and has never been questioned, but rather impliedly recognized and affirmed in that case.

2. The act of 1888, being constitutional as to the state, is constitutional as to the county and city. They have no inherent right or power of taxation, but can exert such only as is conferred by the legislature. R. R. Co. v. Jackson, 38 Miss. 334; Dailey v. Swope, 47 Ib. 367; Beck v. Allen, 58 Ib. 143.

But, even if the county has the inherent right of taxation under section 16 of art. xii, of the constitution, as held by Judge Campbell in his dissenting opinion in Beck v. Allen, supra, still the act of 1888 is constitutional as to the county, for the county tax thereby authorized must "be a certain per cent. on all tax levied by the state," so that only that property which is taxed by the state can be taxed by the county under that power. No one will contend that the property of railroad companies which have paid the privilege tax imposed by §§ 607, 608 of the code of 1880, is liable to taxation by a county under section 16 of art. xii, of the constitution.

3. The legislature did not intend to include the real estate of banks in words "shares and assets of said banks."

We must be guided by the plain meaning of the words. So. R. R. Co. v. Jackson, 38 Miss. 334; Cooley on Taxation [first edition], 198.

"Assets are property, whether real or personal, available for the payment of debts of a person, estate, or corporation." Abb. Law Dict.; 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, 824, 825.

What is there in the act of 1888 to impress on the word "assets" a different meaning from that given to the word by the legislature in section 2025 of the code of 1880? The law-making power has itself defined the word so as to include real estate, and has not left it to the courts to construe. Cooley on Taxation, 198.

"Shares" is equivalent to "capital" or "capital stock," as appears from the language of the act itself. Baltimore v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 6 Gill, 288; Bank of Georgia v. Savannah, Dudley, 132; Bank of Cape Fear v. Edwards, 5 Ired. [Law], 516; People v. Commissioners, 23 N.Y. 222; Cooley on Taxation, 164.

Where the capital stock of a bank was exempted from taxation by its charter, all its property, real or personal, was held to be exempt. New Haven v. City Bank, 31 Conn. 106; Richmond v. Richmond & Danville R. R. Co., 21 Gratt. 604; Baltimore v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 6 Gill, 288; New, Jersey v. Yard, 95 U.S. 104; Osborn v. N.Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., 40 Conn. 491.

Where a certain tax is levied upon the stock of banks in lieu of all other taxes, the real estate of the bank is not liable to additional state, county, or municipal taxation. Covington v. City National Bank of Covington, 21 F. 484.

4. The meaning of the legislature can sometimes be obtained by reference to kindred statutes. Cooley on Taxation, 198.

Sections 607 and 608 of the code of 1880 levy a privilege tax on railroads; "provided, that the lands owned by railroad companies are not used in operating the railroads, shall be taxable as other property and for all purposes."

Section 585 of the code [repealed in 1886] levied a...